Gail Jones v. Michael Astrue , 585 F. App'x 275 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1365
    GAIL S. JONES,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.   Robert E. Payne, Senior
    District Judge. (3:12-cv-00909-REP)
    Submitted:   October 30, 2014              Decided:   November 25, 2014
    Before SHEDD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Gail S. Jones, Appellant Pro Se.      Jonathan Holland Hambrick,
    Robin Perrin Meier, Assistant United States Attorneys, Richmond,
    Virginia;    Beverly    Hope     Zuckerman,    SOCIAL     SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gail    S.    Jones    appeals     the   district     court’s    order
    adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and upholding the
    Commissioner’s      denial    of     Jones’    application      for      disability
    insurance benefits.          We have reviewed the record and find no
    reversible error.         Accordingly, although we grant Jones leave to
    proceed    in    forma    pauperis,    we     affirm    the    district     court’s
    judgment.       Jones v. Astrue, No. 3:12-cv-00909-REP (E.D. Va. Mar.
    4, 2014).
    Jones challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that her hearing
    loss, knee pain, and foot issues did not render her disabled.
    Our review of this conclusion is limited to evaluating whether
    the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and
    whether the correct law was applied.                 See Johnson v. Barnhart,
    
    434 F.3d 650
    , 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).                        “Substantial
    evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”                   Craig v. Chater,
    
    76 F.3d 585
    , 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Richardson v. Perales,
    
    402 U.S. 389
    , 401 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    If conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ on an
    issue, we defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.               
    Id. First, Jones
    argues the ALJ should have given more
    weight to the opinions of Audiologist Bridgette Fowler and Dr.
    Julie     Redmond   and     should    have    credited       Jones’s     statements
    2
    regarding her alleged impairment.                     The ALJ permissibly afforded
    less weight to the opinions of Fowler and Redmond because their
    opinions       were      inconsistent         with    other       substantial         evidence
    (e.g.,    Jones’s        ability       to    drive,       shop,    attend      church,     and
    communicate effectively at the hearings).                          See Mastro v. Apfel,
    
    270 F.3d 171
    ,      178    (4th    Cir.       2001).         Also,     although     Jones
    testified       regarding       the     extent       of     her    impairment,         Jones’s
    description         of   her    daily       activities       and      Dr.    Wayne     Shaia’s
    opinion and the ALJ’s impression that Jones could communicate
    effectively despite her impairment support the ALJ’s decision
    not to fully credit Jones’s testimony regarding her impairment.
    Second, Jones argues the ALJ should have considered
    the opinions of doctors from Colonial Heights Orthopedics before
    concluding      Jones      is   not    disabled       due    to    her      knee    condition.
    This argument was not raised at the district court and cannot be
    considered on appeal.              See United States v. Edwards, 
    666 F.3d 877
    , 887 (4th Cir. 2011).                   To the extent Jones challenges the
    ALJ’s conclusion that her knee pain was not sufficiently severe,
    the    ALJ’s    conclusion       was        supported      by     substantial        evidence.
    Although Jones reported pain and was diagnosed with crepitus,
    there were no other abnormalities in her knee.                                     Rather, the
    evidence during the relevant period shows that Jones pulled her
    knee    on     an    exercise      bike,      not     that      she    presented       with   a
    potentially disabling condition.
    3
    Finally, although Jones mentions her foot pain in her
    informal brief, she does not provide an argument addressing the
    ALJ’s rejection of her allegations of disability due to bursitis
    and plantar fasciitis.        She has, therefore, forfeited appellate
    review of this issue.     See 4th Cir. R. 34(b).
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions    are   adequately   presented     in    the    material
    before   this   court   and   argument   would   not   aid    the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    4