Patricia Cummings v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2023 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 22-1759      Doc: 26            Filed: 12/28/2023   Pg: 1 of 6
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 22-1759
    PATRICIA DENISE CUMMINGS,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant – Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    Beth P. Gesner, Magistrate Judge. (1:20-cv-03530-BPG)
    Submitted: November 9, 2023                                  Decided: December 28, 2023
    Before THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: Andrew N. Sindler, LAW OFFICES OF ANDREW N SINDLER, LLC,
    Severna Park, Maryland, for Appellant. Brian C. O’Donnell, Associate General Counsel,
    Stephen Giacchino, Supervisory Attorney, William Feldman, David N. Mervis, Special
    Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY
    ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland; Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney,
    OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-1759        Doc: 26        Filed: 12/28/2023     Pg: 2 of 6
    PER CURIAM:
    Patricia Cummings applied for social security benefits in 2014, claiming she was
    unable to work due to several physical and mental impairments. An administrative law
    judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing and denied her claim in 2017, but the district court vacated
    the decision and remanded for further consideration of Cummings’s hand impairments.
    Another ALJ held a new hearing on remand and also found that Cummings was not
    disabled. This time, the district court upheld the decision. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    I.
    The Social Security Administration (“the Agency”) uses a five-step process to
    evaluate whether someone is disabled under the Social Security Act.               
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4). The first three steps ask “(1) whether the claimant is working; (2) if not,
    whether she has a ‘severe impairment’; and (3) if she does, whether the impairment ‘meets
    or equals a listed impairment.’” Patterson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    846 F.3d 656
    ,
    659 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    ). “If the claimant fails at step three, the
    ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the most
    the claimant can still do despite physical and mental limitations that affect her ability to
    work.” Shinaberry v. Saul, 
    952 F.3d 113
    , 119 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Then, at step
    four, the ALJ applies the RFC to determine if “the claimant has proven that she is unable
    to perform past work.” 
    Id. at 119
    . “If so, the ALJ proceeds to step five, where the burden
    shifts to the [Agency] to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claimant can
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    perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, considering
    the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up).
    On remand, the ALJ found at steps one and two that Cummings had not worked
    since 2014 and had several severe impairments, including bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome
    and mild arthritis of the elbows and knees, though not fibromyalgia. At step three, the ALJ
    determined that none of Cummings’s severe impairments met or medically equaled one of
    the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ accordingly
    conducted an RFC assessment and concluded that Cummings could “perform light work
    as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b),” with additional limitations on posture, manipulative
    movements, and environmental-hazard exposure. Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at
    step four that Cummings could not perform her past work as a car detailer. But, at step
    five, the ALJ determined that tens of thousands of jobs were nonetheless available to
    Cummings in the national economy, and denied her claim. The district court affirmed the
    Agency’s decision, and Cummings appealed.
    II.
    We review the district court’s decision de novo and will affirm the Agency if “the
    ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by
    substantial evidence.” Shinaberry, 952 F.3d at 120 (cleaned up); see 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g).
    “Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
    a conclusion.” Pearson v. Colvin, 
    810 F.3d 204
    , 207 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). We will
    not “reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our
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    judgment for that of the ALJ.” Shinaberry, 952 F.3d at 123 (cleaned up). We will also
    defer to the ALJ “where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to
    whether a claimant is disabled.” Id. (cleaned up).
    Cummings raises several challenges on appeal to the Agency’s analysis, all of which
    fail. She first challenges the ALJ’s determination that her fibromyalgia did not constitute
    a severe impairment. But, as the Agency points out, Cummings forfeited this argument by
    failing to raise it before the district court. See Hicks v. Ferreyra, 
    965 F.3d 302
    , 310
    (4th Cir. 2020). Cummings has also not identified any “exceptional circumstances” that
    would justify departing from our rule against “consider[ing] issues raised for the first time
    on appeal.” See 
    id.
     (cleaned up). We therefore find that Cummings has forfeited her
    arguments regarding fibromyalgia, and do not address them further.
    Nor did the Agency err in its RFC assessment when it found that Cummings’s
    statements about her symptoms’ intensity and persistence were inconsistent with other
    evidence in the record. A claimant’s statements regarding her symptoms “need not be
    accepted to the extent they are inconsistent with the available evidence, including objective
    evidence of the underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can
    reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she suffered.” Craig v.
    Chater, 
    76 F.3d 585
    , 595 (4th Cir. 1996). Several medical examinations reported that
    Cummings, contrary to her reported symptoms, could walk normally without the assistance
    of a cane or walker. The ALJ also determined that Cummings’s impairments were “mild,”
    a finding based directly on the statements of medical experts in the record. The ALJ further
    noted the conservative management of Cummings’s symptoms — who reported taking
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    only ibuprofen for her pain and inconsistently using her prescribed wrist braces — as well
    as her daily activities, such as personal grooming and hygiene, supervising her children
    during homeschooling, and being the primary caregiver for her young grandchild. These
    are all relevant factors when evaluating a claimant’s symptoms and their potential limiting
    effects. 
    40 C.F.R. § 416.929
    (c)(3)(i)-(vii). *
    Finally, the Agency adequately explained why it gave little weight to a medical
    source statement of Dr. Perkis, a treating physician of Cummings. Dr. Perkis based that
    statement solely on Cummings’s reported symptoms rather than objective evidence; the
    statement conflicted with other medical evaluations before the Agency on Cummings’s
    condition; and the statement did not explain the connection between the symptoms reported
    and almost all of the work limitations identified. The ALJ did not need to give controlling
    weight to a medical statement unsupported by objective evidence and inconsistent with
    substantial evidence in the record. See Arakas v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
    983 F.3d 83
    ,
    106 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.927
    (c)(2)).
    In short, Cummings asks us to reweigh conflicting evidence in the record. This we
    will not do. Shinaberry, 952 F.3d at 123. We affirm the Agency’s thorough and reasoned
    decision as supported by substantial evidence. We dispense with oral argument because
    *
    Cummings additionally argues that the ALJ disregarded evidence of frequent
    unplanned doctor visits that would lead to absenteeism incompatible with employment, but
    she cites no part of the record in support of this assertion.
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    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
    and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-1759

Filed Date: 12/28/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/29/2023