United States v. Camron Witkowski , 687 F. App'x 251 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4705
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CAMRON B. WITKOWSKI, a/k/a Cameron B. Witkowski,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief District Judge. (2:13-cr-00094-RBS-DEM-4)
Submitted: April 25, 2017 Decided: April 27, 2017
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Appellant Attorney,
Andrew Grindrod, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellant. Randy Carl Stoker, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Camron Witkowski appeals from the district court’s order revoking his supervised
release and imposing a 15-month sentence. Counsel has filed an Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), brief stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether Witkowski’s sentence was plainly unreasonable. Witkowski was
notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so. The
Government has declined to file a response brief. We affirm.
We discern no error in the district court’s decision to impose a 15-month sentence
followed by a 45-month term of supervised release. This court will affirm a sentence
imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40
(4th Cir. 2006). While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B (2015), and the statutory
requirements and factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
(2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), the district court ultimately has broad discretion
to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the Chapter 7 advisory policy
statements and the § 3553(a) factors it is permitted to consider in a supervised release
revocation case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory
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maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted).
We have carefully reviewed the record and Anders brief and conclude that
Witkowski’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable. In accordance with Anders, we have
reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment order. This court requires that counsel
inform Witkowski, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Witkowski requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Witkowski. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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