United States v. Alfred Adams , 686 F. App'x 233 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4429
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALFRED ADAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. Richard M. Gergel, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00727-RMG-2)
Submitted: April 17, 2017 Decided: April 27, 2017
Before DIAZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William W. Watkins, Sr., WILLIAM W. WATKINS, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Robert Nicholas Bianchi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alfred Adams appeals his conviction and 121-month sentence entered pursuant to
his guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin and
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 851 (2012). On
appeal, counsel for Adams filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether
the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Adams’ plea and whether
the district court erred by applying a four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1 (2015), and by using a prior drug conviction from 1995 to
increase the mandatory minimum sentence Adams faced for his offense. Adams has not
filed a supplemental pro se brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do so. We affirm
the district court’s judgment.
Before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court, through colloquy with the defendant,
must inform the defendant of, and determine that he understands, the nature of the charge
to which the plea is offered, the penalties he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing
by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114,
116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the defendant entered his plea
voluntarily, absent threats, force, or promises outside the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Because
Adams did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court or otherwise preserve
any allegation of Rule 11 error, we review the plea colloquy for plain error. United States v.
Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815-16 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Our review of the record reflects that the district court did not explicitly inquire
whether Adams’ guilty plea was the result of threats or promises not contained in the plea
agreement, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). The plea agreement provided,
however, that it represented the entire agreement between Adams and the Government.
The court also did not discuss the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, see Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O), but Adams is a United States citizen. Accordingly, we conclude
that the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 and that the court’s minor
omissions did not affect Adams’ substantial rights. See id. Moreover, Adams entered his
guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily, and a factual basis supported the plea. See DeFusco,
949 F.2d at 116, 119-20.
Turning to Adams’ sentence, “[w]e review a sentence for reasonableness ‘under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
320 (2016). This review entails appellate consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the district court’s
sentencing decision is procedurally reasonable, then we must consider whether the
sentence is substantively reasonable, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. We presume that a sentence imposed within a properly calculated
Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.
2014).
Upon review, we discern no procedural or substantive sentencing error by the
district court, including the application of the sentence enhancement found in USSG
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§ 3B1.1. The district court correctly calculated Adams’ total offense level, criminal
history, and advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The court afforded the parties an
adequate opportunity to present arguments concerning the appropriate sentence and
provided Adams an opportunity to allocute. Finally, the court provided an adequate,
individualized explanation for the sentence that Adams received, and Adams has not
rebutted the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence. See
Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. His sentence is therefore reasonable.
Finally, for the first time on appeal Adams questions whether the district court erred
by relying on his 1995 conviction for a drug offense in South Carolina to enhance his
sentence under §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 851. The plain language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
does not include any time limit on the use of prior convictions in imposing an enhanced
sentence for a felony drug offense. Thus, we discern no error, let alone plain error, in the
district court’s reliance on the prior conviction.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Adams, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Adams requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Adams.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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