United States v. Shamika Clinkscale ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4328
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SHAMIKA CHANTAY CLINKSCALE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00373-WO-3)
Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: November 26, 2014
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shamika Chantay Clinkscale appeals her conviction and
thirty-month sentence imposed following her guilty plea to
possession of stolen firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(j) and 2 (2012). On appeal, Clinkscale’s counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal but questioning whether Clinkscale’s guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary and whether her sentence is reasonable.
Clinkscale was notified of her right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government has
declined to file a response brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must
conduct a colloquy with the defendant in which it informs the
defendant of, and determines that the defendant understands, the
nature of the charges to which she is pleading guilty, any
mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum penalties she faces, and
the rights she is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116
(4th Cir. 1991). The court must ensure that the defendant’s
plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent
factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3).
Because Clinkscale did not move to withdraw her guilty
plea or otherwise identify in the district court any error in
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the plea proceedings, we review the adequacy of the plea
colloquy for plain error. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d
337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009). We discern no error, plain or
otherwise, in the plea colloquy. Rather, the court fully
complied with the requirements of Rule 11, ensuring that
Clinkscale’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an
independent factual basis. We therefore conclude her guilty
plea is valid and enforceable.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We “must first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error,”
including improper calculation of the Guidelines range,
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, and inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
575 (4th Cir. 2010). If we find no procedural error, we examine
the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under “the totality
of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence
imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to
satisfy the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We
presume that Clinkscale’s within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278,
289 (4th Cir. 2012). Clinkscale bears the burden to “rebut the
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presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We conclude Clinkscale’s sentence is reasonable. The
district court correctly calculated Clinkscale’s Guidelines
range and considered that range and the parties’ arguments in
determining the sentence. The court provided a detailed
explanation of the sentence it imposed, grounded in the
§ 3553(a) factors. Moreover, Clinkscale has not rebutted the
presumption of reasonableness accorded her within-Guidelines
sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Clinkscale’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Clinkscale, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Clinkscale requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Clinkscale.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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