United States v. Gary Smith ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6391
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY LAMONTT SMITH, a/k/a Marion Alexander Smith, Jr., a/k/a Jermaine
Arcel Turner, a/k/a G, a/k/a Black,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior District Judge. (2:11-cr-00472-PMD-1)
Submitted: November 28, 2018 Decided: December 7, 2018
Before WILKINSON, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary Lamontt Smith, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Lamontt Smith appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012). Smith, who pleaded guilty to a
drug offense pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, sought relief
under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we
vacate the court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo the district court’s “ruling as to the scope of its legal authority
under § 3582(c)(2).” United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2013).
“[Section] 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the
defendant ‘has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.’” Hughes v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). “A sentence
imposed pursuant to a [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement is no exception to the general rule
that a defendant’s Guidelines range is both the starting point and a basis for his ultimate
sentence.” Id. at 1776. Thus, ordinarily, a sentence resulting from a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
agreement is eligible for reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id. A defendant is not entitled to
such relief, however, “[i]f the Guidelines range was not a relevant part of the analytic
framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement” or if
the record “clear[ly] demonstrat[es] . . . that the court would have imposed the same
sentence regardless of the Guidelines.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court determined that § 3582(c)(2) relief was unavailable because the
sentencing court sentenced Smith pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, not
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the Guidelines range. In reaching this conclusion, the district court applied the rule
established in United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1775. The district court did not have the benefit of Hughes, which
issued after the district court’s order, and significantly expanded the circumstances in
which a defendant sentenced pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement may be
granted a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).
Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the sentencing court
eschewed the Guidelines range in favor of other sentencing factors, as in Koons v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (2018) (“Petitioners’ sentences were not ‘based on’
Guidelines ranges that the sentencing judge discarded in favor of mandatory minimums
and substantial-assistance factors.”). The court discussed the Guidelines range with
Smith at the sentencing hearing and concluded that the 19-year Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence
was fair in light of the circumstances of the case and because it was within the Guidelines
range. Although other factors may have been relevant, the record does not clearly
demonstrate that the Guidelines were irrelevant to the sentencing court’s acceptance of
the plea agreement or that the court would have imposed the same sentence absent the
Guidelines. See Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1776.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
*
By this disposition, we determine only that Smith is eligible for relief under
§ 3582(c)(2), not that he is entitled to such relief. We express no opinion on the latter
issue, leaving that for the district court to decide in the first instance. See Hughes, 138
(Continued)
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are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
S. Ct. at 1777 (“[t]he district court can consider the benefits the defendant gained by
entering a [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement when it decides whether a reduction is
appropriate (or when it determines the extent of any reduction), for the statute permits,
but does not require the court to reduce a sentence” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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