United States v. Michael Jones , 533 F. App'x 231 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4597
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANTHONY JONES, a/k/a Spunk,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00099-FL-1)
Submitted: June 24, 2013 Decided: July 17, 2013
Before KING, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Jones pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to
life imprisonment. On appeal, Jones argues that the Government
breached the plea agreement by failing to move for an additional
one-level reduction in Jones’ offense level pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3E1.1(b) (2010), and
that the district court erred in imposing his sentence. We
affirm.
Because Jones did not claim in the district court that
the Government breached the plea agreement, we review for plain
error. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133-34 (2009).
Accordingly, Jones has the burden to show that the Government
plainly breached his plea agreement, that he was prejudiced by
the error, and that the breach “seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2009).
Plea agreements are grounded in contract law, and both
parties should receive the benefit of their bargain. United
States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2009). “‘[W]hen a
plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement
of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the
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inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’”
Id. (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
The Government breaches a plea agreement when the promise it
made to induce the plea goes unfulfilled. Santobello, 404 U.S.
at 262. Because of “constitutional and supervisory concerns,”
the Government is held to a greater degree of responsibility
than the defendant for imprecision or ambiguities in plea
agreements. United States v. Garcia, 956 F.2d 41, 44 (4th Cir.
1992).
The Government concedes that it breached the plea
agreement. Thus, there is no question that an error occurred
that is plain. However, even with the one-point reduction Jones
seeks, his offense level would remain the same. See USSG Pt. A,
cmt. n.2. Thus, the breach did not affect Jones’ substantial
rights because there is no “nonspeculative basis in the record
to conclude that the district court would have imposed a lower
sentence but for the [breach].” United States v. Knight, 606
F.3d 171, 180 (4th Cir. 2010).
Turning to Jones’ sentence, we review for abuse of
discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
This review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.; United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). After
determining whether the district court correctly calculated the
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advisory Guidelines range, we must decide whether the court
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed the
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76; United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575.
If the sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we
apply a presumption on appeal that the sentence is reasonable.
United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir.
2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the defendant
demonstrates “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The district court correctly calculated and considered
the advisory Guidelines range, and heard argument from counsel
and allocution from Jones. The court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and explained that the within-Guidelines sentence was
warranted in light of Jones’ drug trafficking crime, Jones’
history of drug dealing, the need to deter others like Jones,
and the need to protect the public. Further, Jones fails to
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offer any grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal that the
within-Guidelines sentence of life imprisonment is substantively
reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jones.
We affirm the district court’s judgment, and deny
Jones’ motion to file a pro se supplemental brief. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the material before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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