United States v. Thomas Hinson , 533 F. App'x 276 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
THOMAS RUGGERIO HINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00320-WO-1)
Submitted: June 24, 2013 Decided: July 18, 2013
Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Carlyle Sherrill, III, SHERRILL & CAMERON, PLLC, Salisbury,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Ruggerio Hinson was charged with possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006)
(Counts One and Three) and possession of an unregistered
firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2006) (Count Two). In accordance
with a written plea agreement, Hinson pled guilty to Counts One
and Three. He was sentenced to 120 months on Count One and
seventy-two months, consecutive, on Count Three. Hinson
appeals, claiming that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). We first examine the sentence for “significant
procedural error.” Id. We then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality
of the circumstances. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597
F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is within the
properly calculated Guidelines range, we may presume that the
sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218
(4th Cir. 2008).
Hinson first asserts that his sentence is unreasonable
because, even though the offenses of conviction were the same,
he received a significantly higher sentence on Count One. This
claim is without merit. In the case of multiple counts of
conviction, the Guidelines require that if the “total
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punishment” exceeds the highest statutory maximum, the district
court “shall” impose consecutive terms of imprisonment to the
extent necessary to achieve the total punishment. U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5G1.2(d) (2011). “Total
punishment . . . [is] the precise sentence determined by the
sentencing judge from within the appropriate [G]uidelines
range.” United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817, 820 (8th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Guidelines range was 168-210 months, and the
district court determined that a 192-month sentence would be the
total punishment. Because Hinson was statutorily subject to a
maximum of ten years on each count, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)
(2006), the district court followed the mandated procedure and
sentenced him to 120 months on Count One, to be followed by
seventy-two months on Count Three, thereby achieving the
within-Guidelines total punishment of 192 months.
We also reject Hinson’s claim that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable in light of his mental problems. The
district court provided a comprehensive explanation of the
chosen sentence, appropriately weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) sentencing factors. The court stated that it had
considered a psychological evaluation, which disclosed that
Hinson had certain mental health and cognitive issues. However,
the court determined that other factors, including the serious
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nature of the instant offenses and Hinson’s criminal history,
warranted the selected sentence. We conclude that the district
court provided an adequate explanation of the sentence, taking
into consideration the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
Our review of the record establishes that Hinson’s
arguments on appeal are without merit and that his presumptively
reasonable, within-Guidelines sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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