United States v. Gregory Parr ( 2024 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 24-4002      Doc: 26         Filed: 08/30/2024     Pg: 1 of 4
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 24-4002
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    GREGORY K. PARR,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
    Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00027-GMG-RWT-1)
    Submitted: August 27, 2024                                        Decided: August 30, 2024
    Before KING and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: Scott C. Brown, SCOTT C. BROWN LAW OFFICE, Wheeling, West
    Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Kimberley D. Crockett,
    Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 24-4002       Doc: 26          Filed: 08/30/2024      Pg: 2 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Gregory K. Parr appeals the 24-month sentence imposed following the revocation
    of his supervised release. On appeal, Parr argues that the upward-variant revocation
    sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
    “A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
    supervised release. This [c]ourt will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
    maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 
    957 F.3d 426
    , 436
    (4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable,
    [we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
    unreasonable,” 
    id.,
     applying “the same procedural and substantive considerations that
    guide our review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate posture
    than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett, 
    788 F.3d 370
    ,
    373 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “[I]f a sentence is either procedurally or substantively
    unreasonable,” we then address “whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable—that is,
    whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
    explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
    Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors.” United
    States v. Coston, 
    964 F.3d 289
    , 297 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e) (listing applicable factors). “[A]lthough the court need not be as
    detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
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    USCA4 Appeal: 24-4002      Doc: 26         Filed: 08/30/2024      Pg: 3 of 4
    post-conviction sentence, it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
    imposed.” United States v. Slappy, 
    872 F.3d 202
    , 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). The
    district court must, at a minimum, explain the sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful
    appellate review, “with the assurance that the court considered any potentially meritorious
    arguments raised by [the defendant] with regard to his sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs,
    
    897 F.3d 199
    , 205 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). And where, as here, a court imposes a
    sentence above the policy statement range, the court must explain why that sentence “better
    serves the relevant sentencing [factors].” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209 (internal quotation marks
    omitted). “A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if, in light of the totality of
    the circumstances, the court states an appropriate basis for concluding that the defendant
    should receive the sentence imposed.” Coston, 964 F.3d at 297 (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    In this case, the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing the
    upward-variant, statutory maximum 24-month revocation sentence. The district court
    plainly indicated that it believed Parr had repeatedly lied to probation, including regarding
    his need for medical treatment, to avoid mandatory drug screening. The district court
    highlighted that Parr was dishonest, unaccountable, and uncooperative, and in doing so
    implicitly rejected Parr’s argument that his time in jail had shown him the importance of
    communicating with probation. And the district court’s emphasis on its heightened
    concern regarding Parr having stalked a food service worker showed it found Parr’s
    mitigating arguments were outweighed by a substantial need to promote deterrence and
    protect the public. This explanation adequately shows the district court considered Parr’s
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    USCA4 Appeal: 24-4002      Doc: 26         Filed: 08/30/2024      Pg: 4 of 4
    arguments in mitigation and establishes an adequate basis for the chosen sentence.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the 24-month sentence is reasonable.
    We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 24-4002

Filed Date: 8/30/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2024