United States v. Christafer Friend ( 2023 )


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  • USCA4 Appeal: 22-4681      Doc: 41         Filed: 12/07/2023    Pg: 1 of 4
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 22-4681
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTAFER DOUGLAS FRIEND,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
    Norfolk. John A. Gibney, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:22-cr-00042-JAG-RJK-1)
    Submitted: November 30, 2023                                 Decided: December 7, 2023
    Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt, Assistant
    Federal Public Defender, Keith Loren Kimball, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
    OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
    Jacqueline Romy Bechara, Alexandria, Virginia, Emily Rebecca Gantt, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4681        Doc: 41        Filed: 12/07/2023      Pg: 2 of 4
    PER CURIAM:
    Christafer Douglas Friend seeks to appeal the life sentence imposed following his
    guilty plea, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to attempted sex trafficking of a minor,
    in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 1591(a)(1), (b)(1). The district court additionally imposed
    a lifetime term of supervised release. Friend raises two challenges on appeal. First, he
    contends that his life sentence is substantively and procedurally unreasonable. Second, he
    argues that the district court reversibly erred by including a discretionary condition of
    supervised release (the “special computer condition”) * in the written judgment that it did
    not orally pronounce at sentencing. Friend contends that this error requires us to vacate his
    sentence and remand for resentencing.
    Invoking the waiver of appeal rights contained in the plea agreement, the
    Government has moved to dismiss the appeal to the extent Friend challenges the
    reasonableness of his sentence. The Government also moves to vacate, in part. It
    acknowledges the district court’s error in failing to pronounce the special computer
    condition and concedes that this argument is not barred by the appeal waiver. However,
    the Government argues that, for various reasons, a full resentencing is inappropriate.
    *
    This condition mandates that Friend
    shall not own or have a computer in his residence or place of employment.
    Also, the defendant shall not use a computer to access any online computer
    services in any location, including employment, without the prior approval
    of the probation officer. This includes any internet service provider bulletin
    board systems, or any other public or private computer network.
    (J.A. 154). “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
    2
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4681      Doc: 41          Filed: 12/07/2023     Pg: 3 of 4
    A district court is required to orally pronounce at sentencing all discretionary
    conditions of supervised release. United States v. Rogers, 
    961 F.3d 291
    , 296 (4th Cir.
    2020); see also United States v. Singletary (Singletary I), 
    984 F.3d 341
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2021).
    This requirement “is a critical part of the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing,”
    Rogers, 961 F.3d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted), and ensures the defendant has
    an opportunity to challenge unwarranted conditions before they are imposed, id. at 298.
    The usual remedy for a Rogers/Singletary error is to vacate the sentence and remand for a
    full resentencing. See Singletary I, 984 F.3d at 346 & n.4.
    The Government argues that, in light of Friend’s life sentence, a full resentencing is
    unwarranted because Friend “likely will never be subject to the challenged condition.” The
    Government therefore suggests that the appropriate remedy is either simply to vacate the
    special computer condition, or to vacate the condition and remand for resentencing on that
    condition only. However, “defendants with valid Singletary claims are entitled to a full
    vacatur of their sentences and remand for resentencing.” United States v. Singletary
    (Singletary II), 
    75 F.4th 416
    , 427 n.7 (4th Cir. 2023) (noting, however, that defendants
    raising such claims can “elect to request a narrower remedy, in the form of a limited remand
    on only the challenged conditions”). Friend does not request a narrower remedy.
    Although the Government attempts to distinguish these cases, we find the
    Government’s arguments for departing from our established precedent unpersuasive. We
    have recognized that “custodial and supervised release terms [are] components of one
    unified sentence.” United States v. Ketter, 
    908 F.3d 61
    , 65 (4th Cir. 2018); see Singletary
    I, 984 F.3d at 346 & n.4 (rejecting suggestion to “simply . . . strike” challenged conditions
    3
    USCA4 Appeal: 22-4681      Doc: 41         Filed: 12/07/2023     Pg: 4 of 4
    from written judgment and reiterating that “Rogers drew no distinction between the
    defendant’s supervised release sentence and his custodial sentence”). Accordingly, we find
    that the usual remedy for a Rogers error is appropriate in this case. Because this “leaves
    us with no occasion to reach [Friend’s] other arguments,” Singletary I, 984 F.3d at 346, we
    deny the Government’s motion.
    We therefore vacate Friend’s sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-4681

Filed Date: 12/7/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/8/2023