United States v. Jonathan Moore , 586 F. App'x 129 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4146
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN BENJAMIN MOORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00103-CCE-2)
Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: December 3, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin D. Porter, MORROW PORTER VERMITSKY FOWLER & TAYLOR,
PLLC, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Lisa Blue
Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Benjamin Moore was convicted after a jury
trial of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) and 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(B) (2012), carrying and using by brandishing a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012), possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
922(g)(1), and 924(a)(2) (2012), attempted interference with
commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), and was
sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
raising as an issue for review whether the district court erred
in failing to rule on Moore’s pro se motion to suppress on its
merits. The Government declined to file a brief. Moore was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but
he has not done so. We affirm.
Prior to trial and while represented by counsel,
Moore - proceeding pro se - filed a self-styled motion to
suppress evidence in which he requested that the district court
order a fingerprint examination of firearms and exclude the
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admission of statements under Fed. R. Evid. 403 and 408. The
district court denied the motion without prejudice to any
evidentiary objections counsel might make at trial.
We conclude that the district court did not reversibly
err in failing to rule on Moore’s claims in the motion on their
merits. It is well-settled that a criminal defendant does not
have a constitutional right to hybrid representation.
See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); United
States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1100-03 (4th Cir. 1997).
Additionally, Moore did not suggest any reason why the district
court should have exercised its discretion to allow some manner
or form of hybrid representation in his case, and, on appeal,
counsel does not suggest any reason why the court should have
allowed such representation. See Singleton, 107 F.3d at 1100(noting that a district court may, in its discretion, allow
hybrid representation); United States v. Sacco, 571 F.2d 791,
793 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that defendant need not be granted
permission to serve as co-counsel absent showing of special
need). Accordingly, the district court was under no obligation
to entertain Moore’s pro se motion and thus did not reversibly
err in denying the motion without ruling on the merits of the
claims presented therein.
Additionally, in accordance with Anders, we have
reviewed the remainder of the record in this case and have found
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no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Moore, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Moore
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Moore.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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