In Re: Mason v. ( 2004 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 04-1056
    In Re:    E. LOWELL MASON,
    Petitioner.
    On Petition for Writ of Prohibition
    (BK-02-334-58; CA-03-271-3; CA-03-234-3; AP-03-3026)
    No. 04-1074
    In Re:    E. LOWELL MASON,
    Petitioner.
    On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
    (CA-03-788; CA-03-1012)
    Submitted:    June 18, 2004                 Decided:   December 8, 2004
    Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
    Petitions denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    E. Lowell Mason, Petitioner Pro Se.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
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    PER CURIAM:
    E. Lowell Mason filed a petition for writ of prohibition,
    No. 04-1056, in which he asserts that the bankruptcy court for the
    Western District of North Carolina improperly transferred to that
    court a bankruptcy proceeding that was filed in the bankruptcy
    court for the Middle District of North Carolina.                He requests that
    this court enjoin the bankruptcy court for the Western District of
    North Carolina from acting in the proceeding transferred from the
    Middle District.
    A writ of prohibition will not issue unless it “clearly
    appears    that     the   inferior     court     is    about    to    exceed     its
    jurisdiction.”        Smith   v.    Whitney,     
    116 U.S. 167
    ,   176   (1886).
    Additionally, a writ of prohibition is a drastic remedy which
    should    be    granted   only     where   the   petitioner’s     right     to   the
    requested relief is clear and indisputable. In re Vargas, 
    723 F.2d 1461
    , 1468 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Missouri, 
    664 F.2d 178
    , 180 (8th
    Cir. 1981).      Further, a writ of prohibition should be granted only
    where the petitioner has no other adequate means of relief.                    In re
    Banker’s Trust Co., 
    775 F.2d 545
    , 547 (3d Cir. 1985).
    Here, we find that Mason has not established that he has
    a clear right to the relief he seeks.              Moreover, Mason has other
    means by which to challenge the bankruptcy court’s order.                   Because
    a writ of prohibition may not be used as a substitute for an
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    appeal, Missouri, 
    664 F.2d at 180
    , we deny Mason’s petition for
    writ of prohibition.
    In No. 04-1074, Mason seeks a writ of mandamus.         In this
    petition,   Mason   complains   of   the   transfer   of   the   bankruptcy
    proceeding from the Middle District to the Western District of
    North Carolina;     he also asserts that he did not consent to trial
    by a magistrate judge in the action he filed in the district court,
    and that the district court did not act on his motion for entry of
    default against Susan Sowell--a defendant in that action.
    Mason has failed to show that he has a “clear right to
    the relief sought,” as required for the granting of mandamus
    relief.   See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 
    449 U.S. 33
    , 35
    (1980).   To the extent that Mason asserts that the district court
    delayed in acting on his motion for entry of default, we find no
    unreasonable delay.    Additionally, any challenge Mason has to the
    transfer of the bankruptcy proceeding and to the order granting an
    extension of time for Sowell to file an answer to his complaint may
    be asserted in an appeal, and therefore mandamus relief is not
    appropriate.    See In re United Steelworkers of Am., 
    595 F.2d 958
    ,
    960 (4th Cir. 1979).
    Mason has moved in this court for entry of default
    against Susan Sowell in his district court case, and to strike a
    document filed by Sowell in an appeal Mason previously filed in
    this court.    We deny these motions.      Additionally, we deny Mason’s
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    directed motions in which he seeks from Sowell and from Anna Mills
    Wagoner a response to his inquiries.
    In conclusion, while we grant Mason’s motions for leave
    to proceed in forma pauperis in both of these cases,* we deny
    Mason’s petition for writ of prohibition and his petition for writ
    of mandamus.    We further deny his motions to strike a document
    filed by Sowell in appeal No. 03-1909, motion for entry of default,
    and his directed motions.     We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before   the   court   and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    PETITIONS DENIED
    *
    Mason’s motions for an extension of time to either pay the
    filing fee or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis are
    denied as moot.
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