United States v. Reginald Bullock , 586 F. App'x 137 ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4480
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    REGINALD EARL BULLOCK,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
    District Judge. (1:13-cr-00408-TDS-1)
    Submitted:   November 24, 2014            Decided:   December 4, 2014
    Before KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greg Davis, Assistant
    Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.    Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Stephen T.
    Inman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
    Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Reginald           Earl    Bullock       appeals       his    sentence      after
    pleading    guilty        to    possession          of    a    firearm   by   a   felon   in
    violation      of    18   U.S.C.        §§ 922(g)(1),           924(a)(2)     (2012).     On
    appeal,    Bullock        contends       that       his       sentence   is   unreasonable
    because it is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).               We affirm.
    We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
    an abuse of discretion standard.                     United States v. McManus, 
    734 F.3d 315
    , 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)).                  Because Bullock does not point out any
    procedural improprieties in his sentence, we limit our review to
    its substantive reasonableness.                     See United States v. Wallace,
    
    515 F.3d 327
    , 333-34 (4th Cir. 2008).                            We presume a sentence
    within    or    below      a    properly        calculated         Guidelines     range   is
    substantively reasonable.                United States v. Susi, 
    674 F.3d 278
    ,
    289 (4th Cir. 2012).              The presumption can only be rebutted by
    showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against
    the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.                    United States v. Louthian, 
    756 F.3d 295
    , 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    135 S. Ct. 421
    (2014).
    We have reviewed the record and Bullock’s arguments,
    and we conclude that his sentence is substantively reasonable.
    “[D]istrict         courts       have     extremely            broad     discretion     when
    determining the weight to be given [to] each of the § 3553(a)
    2
    factors.”     United States v. Jeffery, 
    631 F.3d 669
    , 679 (4th Cir.
    2011).     The district court correctly calculated that Bullock’s
    Guidelines range was 57 to 71 months and reasonably determined
    that   a   63-month     sentence     in    the    middle      of    the    range     was
    appropriate     in    this   case   in    light   of    his    arguments       and   the
    § 3553(a) factors.       Based on a totality of the circumstances, we
    conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
    and we accord deference to its sentencing decisions.                       See United
    States v. Rivera-Santana, 
    668 F.3d 95
    , 106 (4th Cir. 2012).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense   with    oral    argument      because    the       facts   and   legal
    contentions     are    adequately    presented     in    the       materials     before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-4480

Citation Numbers: 586 F. App'x 137

Judges: Keenan, Wynn, Hamilton

Filed Date: 12/4/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024