United States v. Demirion Barnett ( 2024 )

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4702 Doc: 32 Filed: 11/18/2024 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4702
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMIRION KEZIAH BARNETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Wilmington. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (7:23-cr-00026-M-BM-1)
Submitted: November 14, 2024 Decided: November 18, 2024
Before THACKER and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON, STYERS & MAY, PLLC,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney,
David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Demirion Keziah Barnett appeals the 100-month sentence imposed by the district
court following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm and ammunition after having been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). On appeal, Barnett contends that the district
court erred in calculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by applying a two-level
enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2023), for obstruction of
justice based on the court’s finding that, after Barnett was arrested, he called another person
from jail and instructed that person to create a false affidavit claiming ownership of certain
firearms that law enforcement had attributed to Barnett. Barnett also asserts that his
100-month sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court created an
unwarranted sentencing disparity between him and other defendants sentenced in the
Eastern District of North Carolina when it considered his juvenile criminal history and
scored two of Barnett’s juvenile adjudications in determining his criminal history category.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Rather than review the merits of Barnett’s challenge to the calculation of his
Guidelines range, “we may proceed directly to an assumed error harmlessness inquiry.”
United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “To apply this assumed error harmlessness inquiry we require
(1) knowledge that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had
decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way and (2) a determination that the sentence
would be [substantively] reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in the
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defendant’s favor.” United States v. McDonald, 850 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Shivers, 56 F.4th 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2022).
An error will be deemed harmless only when we are “certain” that these inquiries are met.
United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).
Here, the district court stated during the sentencing hearing that it would have
imposed the same 100-month sentence even if it had miscalculated the Guidelines range.
We thus conclude that the first requirement of the assumed error harmlessness inquiry is
satisfied. See Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 383.
Next, we must assess whether Barnett’s sentence would be substantively reasonable
even if the district court had sustained his objection to the two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice. Had the district court done so, Barnett’s Guidelines range would
have been 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment rather than 100 to 125 months’ imprisonment.
We are satisfied that the 100-month sentence imposed by the district court is
substantively reasonable even under an assumed Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months. 1
Indeed, the district court adequately explained why a 100-month sentence was necessary
using the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d
212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that substantive reasonableness review requires an
examination of “the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth
1
Barnett’s 100-month sentence is within the Guidelines range that he asserts is
proper. See United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that
within-Guidelines-range sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable).
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in § 3553(a)”). In particular, the district court emphasized that Barnett had a significant
criminal history despite his young age and acknowledged that Barnett was serving a term
of state probation for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill when he committed
the instant offense. Relatedly, the district court explained that consideration of Barnett’s
juvenile criminal history was proper because that history reflected Barnett’s pattern of
illegally possessing and using firearms, rendering his possession of a firearm here even
more serious and dangerous. Finally, the district court determined that a sentence of 100
months would promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, protect
the public from any future crimes Barnett might commit, and afford adequate deterrence.
Because Barnett’s 100-month sentence is supported by the district court’s consideration of
the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that the sentence is substantively reasonable. 2
2
In making his substantive reasonableness argument, Barnett asserts that the district
court did not adequately consider his arguments for a lower sentence. That assertion
sounds in procedural reasonableness, not substantive reasonableness. See United States v.
Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2024) (“A sentence is procedurally
unreasonable if the district court . . . fail[s] to address the defendant’s nonfrivolous
arguments.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, Barnett identifies no
argument for a lower sentence that the district court did not address. See Grayson O Co. v.
Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument by
failing to present it in its opening brief or by failing to develop its argument—even if its
brief takes a passing shot at the issue.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, at the end of the sentencing hearing, the district court asked defense counsel
whether it had failed to address any of counsel’s significant arguments for a lower sentence,
and counsel responded in the negative. See United States v. Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864, 871
(7th Cir. 2024) (“We have held . . . that if a district court asks a defendant whether it has
addressed his main arguments in mitigation, a defendant’s affirmative response can waive
an appellate argument to the contrary.”).
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For those reasons, we are satisfied that any Guidelines calculation error in these
proceedings was harmless, and we reject Barnett’s challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. See McDonald, 850 F.3d at 645. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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