Siddhanth Sharma v. Alan Hirsch ( 2024 )

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-2164
SIDDHANTH SHARMA,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ALAN HIRSCH, Chairman of NCBOE, in his official capacity; KAREN BRINSON
BELL, in his official capacity; JEFF CARMON, in his official capacity; SIOBHAN
MILLEN, in his official capacity; STACY EGGERS, IV, in his official capacity;
KEVIN LEWIS, in his official capacity; STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina at
Raleigh. Richard E. Myers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:23−cv−00506−M−BM)
Argued: September 25, 2024 Decided: November 14, 2024
Amended: November 20, 2024
Before WILKINSON, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson
wrote the opinion in which Judge Richardson and Judge Rushing joined.
ARGUED: Madelyn Strohm, Peyton Mitchell, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Nicholas Scott Brod,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: John J. Korzen, Maxwell J. Anthony, C. Isaac Hopkin, Luul Y.
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Lampkins, Appellate Advocacy Clinic, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General,
Terence Steed, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mary Carla Babb, Special Deputy
Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees.
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WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
The plaintiff here lodges a challenge to the felony-disclosure requirement for a
candidate running for federal office in North Carolina. This state law requires that
candidates check a box indicating if they have any felony convictions and then submit a
short supplemental form with basic information regarding such convictions and the
restoration of citizenship rights. The district court upheld the statute. Because the felony-
disclosure requirement falls within the Constitution’s broad grant of authority to the states
to regulate elections, we now affirm. We remand appellant’s challenge to a separate
address-disclosure requirement to the district court with directions to dismiss that claim as
moot.
I.
Siddhanth Sharma (“Sharma”) is a twenty-seven-year-old convicted felon who
currently resides in Wake County, North Carolina. In September 2023, Sharma announced
his candidacy for North Carolina’s Thirteenth Congressional District seat in the State’s
2024 Republican primary election. Sharma’s full citizenship rights had been restored on
September 3, 2023, and he registered to vote on September 5. J.A. 233.
Prospective candidates seeking the nomination of a political party in a primary
election must submit a notice of candidacy. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(a); J.A. 91-92.
Among other inquiries, the notice form asks, “Have you ever been convicted of a felony?”
Id. § 163-106(e). Candidates who check “yes” must submit a supplemental form which
requires them to list “the name of the offense, the date of conviction, the date of the
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restoration of citizenship rights, and the county and state of conviction.” Id. Failure to fully
complete the forms results in the “individual’s name [] not appear[ing] on the ballot,” and
the voiding of all votes cast for that individual. Id.
On September 14, 2023, without having submitted his notice of candidacy, Sharma
filed suit against members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (“the State” or
“the Board”). He challenged the felony-disclosure requirement as violative of the
Qualifications Clause of the U.S. Constitution and challenged both the felony-disclosure
requirement and an additional address-disclosure requirement as violative of the First
Amendment. He also sought an injunction requiring the State to adopt a notice-of-
candidacy form without a felony-disclosure requirement, and another injunction requiring
the State to remove all voters’ addresses from the voter-search database. J.A. 16-17, 52.
The State moved to dismiss his claims for lack of standing and failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. J.A. 119.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. While acknowledging that Sharma
had not yet filed his notice-of-candidacy form, the court nonetheless found standing to
challenge the felony-disclosure requirement because Sharma alleged a sufficient pre-
enforcement injury connected to a constitutional interest. Sharma v. Hirsch, No. 23-CV-
00506-M, 2023 WL 7406791, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2023). However, the district court
concluded that felony disclosure did not constitute an additional qualification because it
did not render any candidate “ineligible for ballot position.” Id. at *10 (quoting U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995)).
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Likewise, the district court held that the felony-disclosure requirement did not
violate the First Amendment. Firstly, applying “exacting scrutiny,” the district court held
that felony disclosure served a substantial interest in promoting an informed electorate.
Secondly, the court found that the requirement posed only a modest burden, and thus the
State had significant leeway in light of its legitimate regulatory interests. Id. at *11 (citing
John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)).
With regard to the address-disclosure requirement, the district court found that
Sharma lacked standing because his injury was insufficiently particularized. Rather, the
chilling effect he claimed to experience was “common to all members of the public.” Id. at
*13 n.5 (quoting Griffin v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 912 F.3d 649, 655 (4th Cir.
2019)).
Sharma appealed the district court’s dismissal of his challenges on November 2,
2023. J.A. 259. He subsequently submitted his notice of candidacy, correctly noting his
felony history, on December 7, 2023, shortly before the December 15 filing deadline. J.A.
22, 260-264. He appeared on the ballot on March 5, 2024, and ultimately lost the primary
election.
II.
We must, as an initial matter, set forth the federalist structure by which the
Constitution empowers regulation of elections. Article I’s Elections Clause provides that
[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
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U.S. CONST. art I, § 4, cl. 1. Under this scheme, the states “have a major role to play in
structuring and monitoring the election process, including primaries.” Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000); see also Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 10 (2023)
(“The Clause imposes on state legislatures the duty to prescribe rules governing federal
elections.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has defined
permissible state election laws broadly as “the numerous requirements as to procedure and
safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right
involved.” Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). “It cannot be doubted that these
comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional
elections, [encompassing] . . . notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of
voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors
and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.” Id.While state discretion has the potential to lead to nonuniform practices in the
methods of selecting federal officers, such flexibility is an intended feature of the Elections
Clause, not a flaw. Indeed, in the years preceding ratification of the Constitution, states
traditionally held near absolute authority over the selection of delegates to nationally
relevant political bodies. For example, the colonies and states customarily selected
delegations to the First and Second Continental Congresses, the Congress under the
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE,
THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 30-31 (1979); ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V,
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para. 3 (“Each state shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the states, and while
they act as members of the committee of the states.”); New York Assembly Resolution on
the Appointment of Delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Feb. 26, 1787), in 4 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 101-02 (Harold C. Syrett ed. 1962).
The Constitution thus reflected this American ethos of state influence over the
selection of national representatives. While the states would cede much of their sovereignty
to the federal government, they gained certain rights, including the “broad power” to
prescribe the “Times, Places, and Manner” of holding federal elections. Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005) (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479
U.S. 208, 217 (1986)). This was a federalist compromise: the Constitution provided basic
qualifications which the states could not discard or alter, but otherwise afforded states
significant latitude to implement voter qualifications, ensure that elections ran smoothly,
that candidates met their constitutional requirements, and that voters were properly
informed. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (discussing states’
“comprehensive” election codes and that “there must be a substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes”).
This compromise did not serve to appease all concerns over the loss of state
sovereignty, but it was an acknowledgement that state governments were well equipped to
respond to the needs of their electorates. No uniform system of elections would suit both
Rhode Island and Virginia equally. For the Founders or Congress to attempt to delve into
every minutia of federal elections would be folly. State governments operated closer to the
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ground and could devise electoral regulations responsive to the different geographic and
demographic character of their populaces. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE LAW OF
THE LAND 165-280 (2015) (highlighting how these differences impacted constitutional
interpretation and lawmaking).
While states are afforded great berth in devising proper electoral processes, they are
not without limit in this field. States must yield to other constitutional provisions that
protect the rights of voters and candidates. Beyond their inability to create new
qualifications for officeholding, states cannot discriminate against candidates or voters on
the basis of race, nor can they attempt to dissuade or compel political affiliation with
specific groups. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S.
442 (2008); Clingman, 544 U.S. at 586-87. Regulation of elections within the states
proceeds, for example, subject to the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. State
authority, while broad, is not absolute.
When states do not otherwise violate constitutional rights and requirements, only
Congress may supersede their discretionary authority. Perhaps the chief congressionally
imposed limit on the states is the Voting Rights Act, but this statute is not at issue today.
Congress in this case has been silent. “The [Elections] Clause is a default provision; it
invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections” insofar
as “Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67,
69 (1997); see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
And even then, Congress’s authority cannot be considered apart from its historical
purpose. The Elections Clause’s “grant of congressional power was the Framers’ insurance
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against the possibility that a State would refuse to provide for the election of representatives
to the Federal Congress.” Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. at 8; see also Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n (“AIRC”), 576 U.S. 787, 815 (2015). As
Alexander Hamilton put it, Congress should possess the basic power to “regulate, in the
last resort, the election of its own members.” FEDERALIST NO. 59 (1788) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961) (emphasis added); see also 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 437 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976) (“Sir, let it be remembered
that this power can only operate in a case of necessity, after the factious or listless
disposition of a particular state has rendered an interference essential to the salvation of the
general government.” (quoting Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Nov. 30,
1788) (statement of Jasper Yeates))).
The nuanced balance of congressional and state authority over electoral procedures
provides no green light for federal courts to devise preferences of their own. Indeed, a
“dominant purpose of the Elections Clause” was to create a possible pathway for
congressional preemption and not to otherwise “restrict the ways States enact legislation.”
AIRC, 576 U.S. at 814-15. We cannot strain the intent and meaning of state election laws
to find constitutional violations where there are none. As the constitutional text highlights,
the proper venue for debates over discretionary state election policies remains with
Congress, more so than with the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also
Alexander v. S.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 144 S. Ct. 1221, 1258 (2024) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part) (“The Framers’ considered choice of a nonjudicial remedy is highly
relevant context to the interpretation of the Elections Clause.”).
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III.
A.
The above analysis of state electoral authority provides the context for addressing
the central question in this appeal: does a requirement for the public disclosure of
candidates’ felony histories, which will not appear on the ballot, constitute an
impermissible qualification for office.1 For the following reasons, we must answer that
question in the negative.
The federal Constitution provides an exclusive list of the qualifications for
congressional office. “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
1
The issue here is one that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” S. Pac.
Term. Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
“Election-related disputes qualify as ‘capable of repetition’ when ‘there is a
reasonable expectation that the challenged provisions will be applied against the plaintiffs
again during future election cycles.’” Lux v. Judd, 651 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir. 2011)
(quoting N.C. Right to Life Comm. Fund for Indep. Political Expenditures v. Leake, 524
F.3d 427, 435 (4th Cir. 2008)). And the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that the
exception is especially appropriate when mootness would have otherwise been the result
of a completed election cycle. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974); Fed.
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007); Davis v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 735 (2008).
It is unusual that a plaintiff comes before our court having already established
repetition, but Sharma has done so. He brought nearly identical claims in a case about the
2022 Republican primary election for the same seat in the U.S. House of Representatives.
See Sharma v. Circosta, No. 22-CV-59, 2023 WL 3437808, at *1 (E.D.N.C. May 11,
2023), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part, No. 23-1535, 2024 WL 771697 (4th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2024) (per curiam). Where repeated conduct is before the court in the present, the
prospect of future repetition becomes all the more likely. And now, Sharma has publicly
declared his intent to run again in the next congressional election. Siddhanth Sharma, X
(formerly TWITTER) (Mar. 6, 2024), https://perma.cc/UT37-CBW3 (“I bet you will not see
14 candidates on the ballot next time, but you WILL see me.”). At that time, he will face
the same felony-disclosure requirement and the same dilemma of fully litigating this
challenge before the December notice-of-candidacy filing period ends.
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the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. And, since Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court has
continually affirmed the “Framers’ understanding that the qualifications for members of
Congress had been fixed in the Constitution.” 395 U.S. 486, 541 (1969); see also U.S. Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 796-97 (1995); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 623-628 (1833) (“It would seem but fair
reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the [C]onstitution
established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all others, as
prerequisites.”).
States have no authority under the Elections Clause to pass qualifications
masquerading as time, place, and manner regulations. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832-33;
STORY, supra, § 624. However, the Framers were concerned primarily with the categorical
exclusion of certain citizens from officeholding, including religious qualifications and
district residency qualifications. STORY, supra, §§ 623, 628. The Qualifications Clause was
not designed to restrict states from passing reasonable procedural measures that individuals
must complete to formalize their candidacy.
Today, courts read the Qualifications Clause with a slightly broader lens to cover
two types of government regulations: (1) laws that exclude or effectively exclude a
candidate from the ballot, see, e.g., Thornton, 514 U.S. at 831, and (2) laws that publicly
disadvantage certain political viewpoints on the face of the ballot, see, e.g., Cook v.
Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 524-25 (2001).
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Even under this more capacious framework, the felony-disclosure requirement is
not a disqualification at all. If prospective candidates possess a felony history, they may
still appear on the federal ballot, regardless of whether their full citizenship rights have
been restored. See J.A. 127 & n.4. In this respect, the felony-disclosure requirement could
not be more different than the term-limit requirement held unconstitutional in United States
v. Thornton. There, Arkansas had amended its constitution to preclude any individual who
had previously served two or more terms in the U.S. Senate from appearing on the ballot
for that same position. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784. While the Supreme Court acknowledged
the possibility that a former senator or two-term incumbent could still be reelected with
write-in ballots, it held that precedents supporting “manner” regulations did not enable
states to completely eliminate all avenues to “ballot access.” Id. at 835. To comply with
the Arkansas Constitution necessarily meant, in Thornton’s view, exclusion from the
ballot. However, Sharma’s compliance with the felony-disclosure requirement—a simple
checkbox and half-page form—enabled him to appear on the ballot.
Likewise, the felony-disclosure requirement did not derogatorily brand Sharma for
his political viewpoints. The Court in Cook v. Gralike held that Missouri exceeded its
power under the Elections Clause when it required that ballots include candidates’
positions and congressional voting histories on proposed term limits. 531 U.S. at 514-15.
“Adverse [ballot] labels handicap candidates ‘at the most crucial stage in the election
process—the instant before the vote is cast,’” and thus seek to impermissibly “dictate
electoral outcomes.” Id. at 525-26 (first quoting Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402
(1964); then quoting Thornton, 514 US. at 833-34).
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North Carolina’s felony-disclosure requirement in no way disadvantages political
viewpoints. The disclosure is the mere repetition of a simple fact contained in the public
record. See State v. Sharma, No. COA19-591, 2020 WL 7350699, at *1, 5 (N.C. Ct. App.
Dec. 15, 2020). Unlike the disclosure in Cook, the felony disclosure does not reveal
anything about Sharma’s personal philosophy or opinions on public policy. And
significantly, the felony disclosure does not appear on the ballot. To view it, voters must
solicit the completed notice-of-candidacy form, which does not appear to be downloadable
from the State’s website. Thus Sharma cannot claim that North Carolina seeks to influence
voters at the “instant before the vote is cast.” Cook, 531 U.S. at 525 (quoting Martin, 375
U.S. at 402).
Being no form of unconstitutional qualification, the felony-disclosure requirement
is a proper exercise of North Carolina’s “time, place, and manner” regulatory power.
Thornton and Cook explicitly permit “manner” regulations that “encompass[] matters like
‘notices, registration, . . . protection of voters, [and] prevention of fraud and corrupt
practices.” Cook, 531 U.S. at 523-24 (quoting Smiley, 285 U.S. at 366); see Thornton, 514
U.S. at 834-35. Disclosing past histories of lawbreaking in a prospective lawmaker falls
within the ambit of permissible safeguards necessary to “ensur[e] that elections are ‘fair
and honest,’ and ‘that some sort of order, rather than chaos is to accompany the democratic
process.’” Cook, 531 U.S. at 524 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
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B.
Sharma also claims that North Carolina’s felony-disclosure requirement is a form
of compelled speech violative of the First Amendment. Under Anderson/Burdick,
determining the appropriate standard of review requires that we examine the “character and
magnitude” of the burden on Sharma’s First Amendment rights:
[W]hen those rights are subjected to “severe” restrictions, the regulation must
be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.”
But when a state election law provision imposes only “reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally
sufficient to justify” the restrictions.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992) (first quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); then quoting Anderson,
460 U.S. at 788); accord Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 256-58 (4th Cir. 2019).
The felony-disclosure requirement imposes only the lightest burden on Sharma’s
rights. Why? Because the speech this disclosure compels is relatively innocuous. The
disclosure does not cover candidates’ personal beliefs, policy preferences, or political
affiliations. Sharma remains free to speak as he pleases and on any topic he selects. If the
felony-disclosure requirement compromised political expression, Sharma would be right
in insisting that we apply “exacting scrutiny,” see Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,
594 U.S. 595, 607-08 (2021); however, no such issue is at play here. As discussed above,
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-106(e) only requires disclosure of a simple historical fact illustrative
of nonpolitical activity. A fact already available to the public to boot.
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Thus we ask only whether the felony disclosure requirement is sufficiently justified
by “the State’s important regulatory interests.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. Our precedent is
clear that “[t]here can be no question about the legitimacy of the State’s interest in fostering
informed and educated expressions of the popular will.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796;
Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 220; Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 458 (“The State’s asserted
interest in providing voters with relevant information about the candidates on the ballot is
easily sufficient to sustain I–872.”). Here, the state is making already available public
information more accessible to voters upon inquiry—an element beneficial to maintaining
an educated electorate.
Informing and educating voters with relevant information about the candidates is
thus a recognized state interest, and the felony disclosure may be viewed as a reasonable
assist to that endeavor. The state is using the requirement to emphasize in a modest and
restrained manner that lawmaking and lawbreaking are, to put it gently, in tension. North
Carolina is not passing judgment on whether the electorate should ultimately vote for
Sharma or indeed for any candidate with a comparable history. The felony-disclosure
requirement simply allows voters to reach their own conclusions on a distinction that is, at
its core, the very essence of the rule of law. We therefore hold that the felony-disclosure
requirement survives Anderson/Burdick balancing.
IV.
We need not reach the merits of Sharma’s challenge to the address-disclosure
requirement as we lack jurisdiction over this claim. Our court may raise jurisdictional
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questions sua sponte at “any stage of proceedings.” United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d
535, 540 (4th Cir. 2013); see also North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Here,
we lack jurisdiction because the issue is now moot.
Upon registering to vote, Sharma, like all other North Carolina voters, disclosed the
address of his personal residence. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-82.7(c)-(f) (detailing the
State’s address verification process). Once a voter is registered, their verified address is
stored in the State’s publicly accessible voter-search database. Thus any individual with
internet access can currently locate a registered voter’s address.
Our jurisdiction under Article III is limited to “live” cases and controversies.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 496; accord Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 363 (4th Cir. 2003). Even
assuming a litigant establishes standing at the outset of litigation, the “case is moot if, at
any point prior to the case’s disposition, one of the elements essential to standing, like
injury-in-fact, no longer obtains.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Off. of Special Couns., 1
F.4th 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2021). If a plaintiff does not retain such a “‘personal stake in the
outcome of the lawsuit’ throughout the entire litigation,” this court lacks jurisdiction to
hear the case. United States v. Payne, 54 F.4th 748, 751 (2022) (quoting Campbell-Ewald
Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160-61 (2016)).
Because the 2024 primary election cycle has already concluded, Sharma lacks a
“concrete interest” in this Court’s disposition on his address-disclosure requirement.
Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local
1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)). While Sharma claims that the address-disclosure
requirement has a chilling effect on those running for office, he did indeed submit his notice
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of candidacy, run for office, and appear on the ballot. And on March 5, 2024, Sharma lost
the Republican primary election. Enjoining the state from publishing his address now will
not negate any past compelled speech or chilling effects, nor change the results of the
election. The deed has been done. Sharma “can no longer benefit from the relief he seeks.”
Payne, 54 F.4th at 752.
The issue is also not “capable of repetition.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (requiring “a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party will be subject to the same action again” (quoting Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998))). Future candidates will not be compelled to reveal their address.
The Board conceded at oral argument that North Carolina will not and cannot mandate that
candidates for federal office be registered voters because such a requirement would
constitute an unconstitutional additional qualification on officeholding. Thus any candidate
who objects to providing his address may simply cancel his voter registration or avoid
registering altogether. If a candidate still voluntarily enters or remains within the voter-
search database, he cannot reasonably claim that such speech was compelled, given that he
had a reasonable and easily accessible alternative. Any potential “chilling effect” will be
“self-inflicted,” and thereby untraceable to the Board’s requirements. See Clapper v.
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 418 (2013).
V.
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Over the past five years, North Carolina has been flooded with dozens of challenges
to the State’s electoral regulations. We understand that many of these challenges are
reasonably grounded in the law, and their gravity should not be understated. At the same
time, the constant pull to the courtroom leaves state election officials frequently operating
in a provisional state, never knowing if and when their procedures will be overturned.
This state of affairs is not conducive to the most efficient administration of elections.
“[R]unning a statewide election is a complicated endeavor. Lawmakers [] must make a host
of difficult decisions about how best to structure and conduct the election.” Democratic
Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 31 (2020) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in denial of application to vacate stay). Often, a board of elections must either
choose to forego policies that serve significant governmental interests in preserving
electoral integrity, or risk enforcing potentially unconstitutional measures that could throw
a shadow over an entire federal election. Neither option is desirable. “When an election is
close at hand, the rules of the road should be clear and settled.” Id. And some modicum of
stability assists candidates in knowing when and where they will run, and voters in knowing
who would represent them. These lines of communication are important to representative
government, and their value is among those things that courts may keep in mind. Both the
stability of state electoral procedures and the place of state governments in the Article I
elections scheme are under challenge in these sorts of cases, but here again the courts may,
under law, take account of both.
18
USCA4 Appeal: 23-2164 Doc: 71 Filed: 11/20/2024 Pg: 19 of 19
We affirm the district court’s holding that North Carolina’s felony-disclosure
requirement is constitutional. We vacate the judgment on the address-disclosure challenge
and remand that claim to the district court with instructions to dismiss it as moot.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
19