United States v. Leon Prater ( 2024 )

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEON PRATER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:10-cr-00041-JPB-JPM-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2024 Decided: November 7, 2024
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and BERNER, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brendan S. Leary, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant. William
Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Carly Cordaro Nogay, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Leon Prater appeals his 18-month revocation sentence. Counsel initially filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning whether Prater’s revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable. Prater was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he did
not do so. After reviewing the record, we ordered supplemental briefing to address:
(1) whether the district court correctly concluded that Prater’s violation for new criminal
conduct qualified as a Grade A violation; and (2) whether the district court considered
Prater’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lesser sentence. Because Prater’s revocation
sentence is plainly procedurally unreasonable, we vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release. [We] will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436
(4th Cir. 2020). To determine “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we
first must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable,”
applying the same general considerations used in evaluating original sentences, “with some
necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of supervised release
revocation sentences.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Only if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively
unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is plainly
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unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Patterson,
957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the parties agree that any error in the district court’s calculation of Prater’s
advisory policy statement range was harmless, we move on to whether the district court
considered Prater’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lesser sentence. We have repeatedly
stated that “we cannot effectively review the reasonableness of [a] sentence without the
assurance that the court considered any potentially meritorious arguments raised by [a
defendant] with regard to his sentencing.” Id. at 439 (cleaned up). And, although the
explanation requirement for revocation sentences “is a low bar, the record must reflect
some affirmation that the court considered the arguments in mitigation made by a
defendant.” Id. at 440. Thus, “where a court entirely fails to mention a party’s nonfrivolous
arguments in favor of a particular sentence, or where the court fails to provide at least some
reason why those arguments are unpersuasive, even the relaxed procedural requirements
for revocation sentences are not satisfied.” Id. at 438 (cleaned up).
During the revocation hearing, Prater’s counsel presented four nonfrivolous
arguments for a sentence of time served: (1) Prater had been on work release while serving
his state sentence and had maintained steady employment; (2) Prater completed numerous
self-improvement courses during his incarceration; (3) Prater had a solid release plan with
community support; and (4) the most serious violation reflected the same conduct for which
Prater had been sentenced in state court. Counsel supported these arguments with multiple
exhibits, and Prater followed up with a compelling allocution. For its part, the Government
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asked the district court to impose a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment with no
supervised release to follow.
The district court did not engage with Prater or counsel during the brief revocation
hearing or give any indication that it was seriously considering their detailed arguments for
a sentence of time served. And when imposing the 18-month sentence, the district court
did not address or acknowledge any of those arguments. This was plain error, as our
precedent is clear that the district court must, at a minimum, acknowledge that it has
considered the defendant’s arguments. See id. at 436-40; United States v. Ross, 912 F.3d
740, 746 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Plain errors exist if the settled law of the Supreme Court or this
[C]ircuit establishes that an error has occurred” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Government’s argument to the contrary is that, because the district court
allowed the parties to argue and imposed a sentence below Prater’s policy statement range,
the court must have considered Prater’s arguments. There are several problems with this
reasoning. First, we may not “assume that the court has silently adopted arguments
presented by a party.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Second, there is no evidence that the district court considered
the policy statement range at all when imposing its sentence. And, finally, the 18-month
sentence is the one the Government requested and was months longer than the sentence of
time served that Prater asked for.
Because Prater’s revocation sentence is plainly procedurally unreasonable, we
vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
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and argument would not aid the decisional process. The mandate shall issue forthwith so
that resentencing may proceed without delay.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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