United States v. Christopher Mitchell ( 2024 )

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 1 of 24
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4291
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LADARISS MITCHELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21–cr–00227–WO–3)
Argued: September 10, 2024 Decided: November 7, 2024
Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge Diaz
and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, PA, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Stephen Thomas Inman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sandra J. Hairston,
United States Attorney, Angela H. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 2 of 24
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Christopher Ladariss Mitchell appeals his sentence, which the district
court imposed after Mitchell pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs
Act robbery and one substantive count of Hobbs Act robbery. On appeal, he raises a single
challenge: that the district court erred when it included conspiracies to commit four
separate robberies in the calculation of his total offense level. Instead, he argues, it should
have considered only two robbery conspiracies. We affirm.
I.
In June 2021, a grand jury returned an eight-count indictment against Mitchell and
eight others. The indictment opened with “General Allegations,” which stated in relevant
part that, “[a]t all times material to th[e] Indictment,” “Company A” and “Company B”
were “wireless communication retailer[s]” with stores located at several identified
addresses, “among other locations within the Middle District of North Carolina, and
elsewhere.” J.A. 6–7. 1 “Company A” is Boost Mobile, and “Company B” is MetroPCS.
However, for ease of reference, we will continue to refer to them as Company A and
Company B.
Count One charged all nine defendants with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery. Specifically, it alleged that “[f]rom on or about August 16, 2020, continuing up
to and including on or about September 15, 2020,” Mitchell and his codefendants conspired
to rob “employees of Company A and Company B” of “property, including United States
1
Citations to the “J.A.” and “S.J.A.” refer, respectively, to the Joint Appendix and
Sealed Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
2
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 3 of 24
currency and wireless devices.” J.A. 7–8. Counts Two through Eight each brought a
substantive charge of Hobbs Act robbery, alleging that particular defendants had robbed a
particular location on a particular date. For example, Counts Two and Three alleged that
Mitchell and others had robbed Company A at, respectively, 121 National Highway in
Thomasville, North Carolina, on August 16, 2020, and 4411 West Gate City Boulevard in
Greensboro, North Carolina, on August 19, 2020. Counts Four through Eight also specified
robberies by date and location but did not implicate Mitchell. 2
In January 2023, Mitchell pleaded guilty to Counts One and Two pursuant to a
written plea agreement. The parties did not stipulate to a factual basis at the time Mitchell
entered his guilty plea.
The Probation Office prepared a draft presentence investigation report (“PSR”). In
a section titled “The Offense Conduct,” the PSR listed five robberies or attempted robberies
in which it stated Mitchell had directly participated: (1) a robbery of a Circle K store in
Salisbury, North Carolina, on August 14, 2020; (2) the Thomasville robbery of Company
A described in Count Two of the indictment; (3) the Greensboro robbery of Company A
described in Count Three; (4) a robbery of a Company B store in Kannapolis, North
Carolina, on August 21, 2020; and (5) an attempted robbery of a Company B store in
Sumter, South Carolina, on September 14, 2020. A table summarizing these robberies
follows:
2
To be more precise, Count Six named Mitchell as a participant in the robbery
described in that count. However, “subsequent investigation indicate[d] there [was] no
evidence he participated in th[at] robbery.” S.J.A. 122.
3
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 4 of 24
Date (2020) Location Company Indictment
August 14 Salisbury Circle K (not listed)
August 16 Thomasville Company A Count 2
August 19 Greensboro Company A Count 3
August 21 Kannapolis Company B (not listed)
September 14 Sumter Company B (not listed)
The PSR applied the 2021 United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“Guidelines”) to calculate Mitchell’s Guidelines range. First, the PSR noted that, under
§ 1B1.2(d) of the Guidelines, “[a] conviction on a count charging a conspiracy to commit
more than one offense shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted on a separate
count of conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired to commit.” S.J.A. 118
(quoting U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.2(d) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021)). The
PSR understood this Guideline to mean that Count One should be treated as if Mitchell
was convicted on a separate conspiracy count for each of the five aforementioned
robberies. It then noted that a multiple-count adjustment applied pursuant to § 3D1.4 of the
Guidelines. Specifically, the Guidelines instruct that, “[w]hen a defendant has been
convicted of more than one count, the court shall” group closely related counts, determine
the offense level for each group, and then consult the table in § 3D1.4 to deduce the
combined offense level. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1(a).
Applying these rules, Mitchell’s offense level was 26 plus an increase in offense
level based on the number of units (which in this case was five because the robberies were
not grouped together). Five units led to a four-level increase, bringing Mitchell’s offense
level to 30. Id. § 3D1.4. A three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility reduced the
4
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 5 of 24
total offense level to 27. Based on this offense level and Mitchell’s criminal history
category of V, the draft PSR calculated his Guidelines range as 120 to 150 months in prison.
Mitchell objected to the inclusion of the August 14, 2020, Circle K robbery as
outside the scope of the charged conspiracy. He further took the position that only those
robberies “identified in Count One as an object of the conspiracy offense alleged therein”
could be counted pursuant to § 1B1.2(d) and its commentary. S.J.A. 151. And he argued
that “[b]ecause Count One does not allege any specific robberies, the objects of that offense
should be limited to the two objects the Government did elect to allege: a robbery of
Company A and a robbery of Company B.” S.J.A. 156. He contended that the two robberies
that should count were the Greensboro and Kannapolis robberies. See S.J.A. 158. With
only those two robberies considered, the increase pursuant to § 3D1.4 would be two, rather
than four, levels, resulting in a total offense level of 25 rather than 27.
The Probation Office agreed that the Circle K robbery should not be included and
removed it from the revised PSR, but concluded that the other four robberies were properly
included. Four units, just like five units, produces a four-level increase in offense level
under § 3D1.4, so the revised PSR continued to calculate Mitchell’s total offense level as
27.
In his sentencing memorandum and during the sentencing hearing, Mitchell
reiterated his argument that § 1B1.2(d) and its commentary allowed for an offense-level
increase based only on “the two general offense/objects [the Government] did elect to
mention [in the conspiracy count, Count One]: a robbery of Company A and a robbery of
Company B.” S.J.A. 197. At times, however, he seemed to imply that the appropriate
5
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 6 of 24
robberies to consider were the Thomasville and Greensboro robberies—even though both
were of Company A—as those robberies (unlike the Kannapolis and Sumter robberies of
Company B) were specifically identified in the indictment. E.g., S.J.A. 198 (appearing to
object to the inclusion of the Kannapolis and Sumter robberies).
At sentencing, the district court confirmed with defense counsel and Mitchell
himself that he made no factual objection regarding his participation in all four robberies.
That is, Mitchell explicitly agreed that the court could appropriately find “that the
Government [could] prove beyond a reasonable doubt [his] participation in the commission
of the four robberies of the wireless stores.” J.A. 45–46. After hearing arguments related
to § 1B1.2(d), the district court rejected Mitchell’s view of that Guideline and adopted the
revised PSR, with its inclusion of all four robberies.
Although Mitchell’s Guidelines range was 120 to 150 months, the Government
argued for a downward variance to 108 months. The district court agreed and sentenced
Mitchell to 108 months on each count, to run concurrently. 3 Mitchell timely appealed. 4
3
The court later granted Mitchell’s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and reduced his sentence to 100 months.
4
We ordered supplemental briefing on the level of deference owed to the Guidelines
and their commentary and whether any error was harmless.
6
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 7 of 24
II.
Mitchell raises a single challenge on appeal: that the district court erred when it
increased his offense level by four (rather than two) levels pursuant to Guideline
§ 1B1.2(d). 5
“‘In assessing whether a sentencing court has properly applied the Guidelines, we
review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.’ Because this appeal
involves a purely legal question—interpretation of the Guidelines—we review de novo.”
United States v. Thompson, 874 F.3d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010)).
III.
A.
In the present appeal, the parties dispute the meaning of the applicable Guideline
and its accompanying commentary. We thus begin by setting forth the principles that shape
our interpretation of the Guidelines.
The Sentencing Commission promulgates the Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
which “contains text of three varieties”: the Guidelines themselves; policy statements; and
commentary on “both guidelines and policy statements.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S.
36, 41 (1993).
5
In a footnote in his Opening Brief, Mitchell also “submits that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable.” Opening Br. at 14 n.1. This “passing shot at the issue” is
insufficient to avoid forfeiture of the argument, so we do not consider it further. United
States v. Smith, 75 F.4th 459, 468 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mowery v. Nat’l Geospatial-
Intel. Agency, 42 F.4th 428, 433 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022)).
7
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 8 of 24
In 1993, the Supreme Court held in Stinson v. United States that “commentary in
the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it
violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous
reading of, that guideline.” Id. at 38. Thus, under Stinson, the interpretive weight owed to
the commentary did not turn on whether the Guideline was ambiguous. See id. at 44(“[C]ommentary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how even
unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice.”).
In so holding, Stinson analogized the commentary to “an agency’s interpretation of
its own legislative rules.” Id. at 45. Under so-called Seminole Rock (or Auer) deference,
such an agency interpretation was—at the time of Stinson—“given ‘controlling weight
unless it [was] plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’” or unless it
“violate[d] the Constitution or a federal statute.” Id. (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
In its 2019 decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, however, the Supreme Court reconsidered
the scope of Auer deference. While “uphold[ing]” the Auer doctrine, the Court
“reinforce[d] its limits.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 563 (2019). In particular, the Court
emphasized that “the possibility of [Auer] deference can arise only if a regulation is
genuinely ambiguous . . . . after a court has resorted to all the standard tools of
interpretation.” Id. at 573. Further, even if the regulation is genuinely ambiguous, “the
agency’s reading must still be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 575 (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)). And even then, “not every reasonable agency reading
of a genuinely ambiguous rule should receive Auer deference”; instead, courts “must make
8
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 9 of 24
an independent inquiry into whether the character and context of the agency interpretation
entitles it to controlling weight.” Id. at 576; see id. at 576–79 (setting forth aspects of the
agency’s interpretation to consider in undertaking this inquiry).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor left lower courts in limbo regarding how to
understand Stinson. True, Kisor did not explicitly mention the Guidelines context of
Stinson, and Stinson had relied on Auer deference as an “analogy” that was “not precise.”
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44. Nevertheless, Stinson also stated that the Court thought “the
Government [was] correct in suggesting that the [Guidelines] commentary be treated as an
agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rule,” id.; Stinson explicitly quoted Seminole
Rock, id. at 45; and Kisor cited Stinson as one of the Court’s pre-Auer “decisions
applying Seminole Rock deference,” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 568 n.3. So, while “it is th[e
Supreme] Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents,” State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997), Kisor’s alteration of the standard cited in Stinson raises the
question of whether it modified the test applicable to the Guidelines and its commentary.
The Circuits are deeply divided on the answer to this question. The Third, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Kisor limits the deference originally required
by Stinson, meaning courts must find a Guideline ambiguous before deferring to its
commentary. 6 The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, by contrast, have
6
See United States v. Nasir, 17 F.4th 459, 471 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc); United
States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th
648, 655 (9th Cir. 2023); United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2023)
(en banc).
9
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 10 of 24
concluded that the standard in Stinson continues to govern, unaltered by Kisor. 7 We are not
aware of published authority from the First or D.C. Circuits explicitly taking a position in
this dispute. 8
In United States v. Campbell, we adopted the first approach: reading Stinson through
the lens of Kisor. See United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438, 445 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2022)
(holding that “Kisor limited when courts will afford Seminole Rock/Auer deference” and
“ma[de] clear that [its] modifications to Seminole Rock/Auer deference apply equally to
judicial interpretations of the Sentencing Commission’s commentary”); United States v.
Boler, 115 F.4th 316, 322 (4th Cir. 2024) (noting that “Stinson’s analysis was altered by
Kisor” (citing Campbell, 22 F.4th at 445)).
Mitchell nevertheless argues that this Court has in fact adopted the approach of the
second group of circuits noted above: that Kisor does not apply to the Guidelines and their
commentary. He relies on United States v. Moses, which issued a short while after
7
See United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455, 475 n.5 (2d Cir. 2024); United States
v. Vargas, 74 F.4th 673, 678 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 828
(2024) (mem.); United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ---
S. Ct. ---, 2024 WL 4427289 (Oct. 7, 2024) (mem.); United States v. Donath, 107 F.4th
830, 838 (8th Cir. 2024); United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795, 809 (10th Cir. 2023), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 1035 (2024) (mem.).
8
See United States v. Gadson, 77 F.4th 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2023) (noting for purposes
of plain-error review that “even assuming that Kisor abrogated Stinson,” any related error
by the district court “was not ‘clear or obvious’”), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 823 (2024)(mem.); United States v. Lewis, 963 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 2020) (relying on pre-Kisor circuit
precedent to interpret a Guideline because nothing in Kisor would have altered that
precedent). Compare United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (citing
both Stinson and Kisor in the sentencing context), with United States v. Sargent, 103 F.4th
820, 822, 825 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (suggesting the question is open in the D.C. Circuit).
10
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 11 of 24
Campbell and stated that “Stinson continues to apply unaltered by Kisor.” United States v.
Moses, 23 F.4th 347, 349 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 640 (2023) (mem.).
To the extent there may be a conflict between Campbell and Moses, in this Circuit,
we follow the bright-line rule that the first-decided case controls. McMellon v. United
States, 387 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“When published panel opinions are
in direct conflict on a given issue, the earliest opinion controls, unless the prior opinion has
been overruled by an intervening opinion from this court sitting en banc or the Supreme
Court.”); accord Moses, 23 F.4th at 359–60 (King, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
the judgment).
But Mitchell contends that there is no direct conflict between Campbell and Moses
because Campbell’s application of Kisor was mere “dicta,” such that Moses must govern
even though Campbell was the first-decided case. Supp. Opening Br. at 3. That is simply
incorrect.
In Campbell, this Court initially analyzed the Guidelines question pursuant to
Stinson, and then made it clear that “if there were any doubt” of the result “under Stinson[,]
. . . the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kisor v. Wilkie renders this conclusion
indisputable.” Campbell, 22 F.4th at 444 (citation omitted). And across “nearly four pages”
of its opinion, Campbell discussed “the impact of Kisor on the question at issue.” United
States v. Moses, No. 21-4067, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7694, at *9 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 2022)
(Wynn, J., voting to grant rehearing en banc). In doing so, it “expressly relie[d] on Kisor to
hammer home its conclusion,” making its “repeated citations to Kisor . . . key analytical
building blocks that support its overall conclusion.” Id. at *9–10. Thus, Campbell
11
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 12 of 24
alternatively held that Kisor applies to the Guidelines. That’s “not dicta.” Gestamp S.C.,
L.L.C. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 769 F.3d 254, 262 n.4 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 346 n.4 (1986)); accord Moses, 2022
U.S. App. LEXIS 7694, at *14–15 (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc
and voting to grant rehearing en banc). Instead, that holding in Campbell is binding
precedent. E.g., United States v. Ford, 703 F.3d 708, 711 n.2 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Where a
court makes alternative holdings to support its decision, each holding is binding
precedent.”); Est. of Van Emburgh ex rel. Van Emburgh v. United States, 95 F.4th 795, 804
(4th Cir. 2024) (“We may, of course, sometimes issue alternative holdings that have
precedential effect.”).
In this Circuit, then, the opinion in Campbell controls on the question of whether
Kisor modified Stinson, unless and until the question is revisited by the Supreme Court or
this Court sitting en banc. 9
Accordingly, our first stop in analyzing the meaning of the relevant Guideline is
whether it is genuinely ambiguous. Boler, 115 F.4th at 323. If it is, “we next consider
whether the commentary’s [relevant] definition . . . falls within the ‘zone of ambiguity’
9
The Supreme Court has, to date, declined to address this issue, despite the deep
circuit split and numerous requests from litigants, amici, and lower courts for guidance.
E.g., Ratzloff v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 554 (2024) (mem.) (denying petition for writ of
certiorari regarding the impact of Kisor on Stinson); Vargas, 144 S. Ct. 828 (same); Maloid,
144 S. Ct. 1035 (same); Gadson, 144 S. Ct. 823 (same); United States v. Rivera, 144 S. Ct.
861 (2024) (mem.) (same); Moses, 143 S. Ct. 640 (same); Moses, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS
7694, at *6 (Niemeyer, J., supporting the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting that “the
Supreme Court’s advice on whether Stinson or Kisor controls the enforceability of and
weight to be given Guidelines commentary” would be “welcome,” as it is “an issue that
could have far-reaching results”).
12
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 13 of 24
such that it should be given deference.” Id. at 327 (quoting Kisor, 588 U.S. at 576, and
United States v. You, 74 F.4th 378, 398 (6th Cir. 2023)). And, if so, “we independently
inquire as to whether the commentary’s ‘character and context’ entitles it to ‘controlling
weight.’” Id. at 328 (quoting Kisor, 588 U.S. at 576). An ambiguous Guideline is also
subject to the rule of lenity. Campbell, 22 F.4th at 446.
If the Guideline is not genuinely ambiguous, however, we cannot defer to the
commentary. “If uncertainty does not exist, there is no plausible reason for deference. The
[Guideline] then just means what it means—and the court must give it effect, as the court
would any law.” Kisor, 588 U.S. at 574–75. For that reason, “when commentary is
inconsistent with an unambiguous guideline”—for example, if the commentary would
expand the application of a Guideline beyond its plain meaning—“‘the Sentencing Reform
Act itself commands compliance with the guideline.’” Campbell, 22 F.4th at 447 (emphasis
added) (quoting Stinson, 508 U.S. at 43).
The fact that commentary is not owed deference where the Guideline is
unambiguous does not, however, mean that courts must entirely ignore the commentary.
“Rather, commentary explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to how
even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in practice.” Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44. Put
another way, while an unambiguous Guideline “means what it means,” Kisor, 588 U.S. at
575, such that “we have no need to consider” commentary when a Guideline is
unambiguous, United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)
(emphasis added), and cannot defer to it, that does not mean “concrete” examples of how
that unambiguous Guideline applies are unhelpful, Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44.
13
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 14 of 24
B.
Having set forth the principles that are to guide our analysis, we turn to “[t]he ‘first
step in interpreting’ [the] guideline,” which “‘is to determine whether the language at issue
has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.’”
United States v. Sargent, 103 F.4th 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). In evaluating ambiguity, we must consider a term’s
“ordinary meaning” and employ “the various canons of statutory interpretation,” including
considering “‘the specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context
of the’ regulation as a whole.” Boler, 115 F.4th at 323, 325 (quoting Hurlburt v. Black, 925
F.3d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc)).
Under Guidelines § 1B1.2(d), “[a] conviction on a count charging a conspiracy to
commit more than one offense shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted on a
separate count of conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired to commit.” To
apply this Guideline, we must first understand the meaning of “more than one offense.”
Count One indisputably charged Mitchell with conspiring to violate a single statute (18
U.S.C. § 1951(a)) by means of multiple instances of the same type of criminal act
(robbery). If “more than one offense” requires conspiracy to violate multiple statutes, or to
commit multiple types of criminal acts, then the Guideline does not apply at all in
Mitchell’s case. If it refers merely to conspiracy to commit more than one criminal act,
however, the Guideline applies, and we must then determine how to apply it.
We conclude that, at least as to robbery, the Guideline unambiguously carries the
latter definition: § 1B1.2(d) applies where a defendant is convicted on a count charging a
14
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 15 of 24
conspiracy to commit more than one robbery, even if those underlying robberies would
constitute violations of the same statute. 10
Dictionary definitions of the term “offense” are of little help, as they could point to
either of the meanings noted above. 11 The same is true of Mitchell’s acknowledgment that
the term “unambiguously means a specific violation of federal criminal law.” Supp.
Opening Br. at 5. The context provided by the Guidelines as a whole, however, resolves
any ambiguity in this case. Chapter Two of the Guidelines, “Offense Conduct,” identifies
various “Offenses,” including “Basic Economic Offenses” such as “Robbery.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1. The inclusion of “Robbery” within Chapter Two indicates that the robbery itself
is the offense. Reviewing the Guidelines section on “Robbery” confirms this
understanding: it cites several statutory provisions under which a defendant might be
charged for that offense (demonstrating that the focus of the “offense” is on the act of
robbery, not the particular statute) and provides “Specific Offense Characteristics” that
relate to the facts of particular robberies (demonstrating that the focus of the “offense” is
on each individual robbery, not the class of robberies).
The commentary provides a relevant “concrete” example of how this
“unambiguous” Guideline, § 1B1.2(d), is “to be applied in practice” to robbery
10
We need not consider what constitutes a single “robbery” for purposes of this
Guideline—for example, whether a defendant who robs multiple victims within the same
store has committed one “offense” or several—because the robberies at issue in this case
were indisputably distinct, occurring on different dates at different locations.
11
E.g., Offense, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “offense” as “[a]
violation of the law; a crime, often a minor one”); Offense, Merriam-Webster.com,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/offense (last visited Nov. 3, 2024) (defining
“offense” in relevant part as “an infraction of law”) [https://perma.cc/PS7S-VXLD].
15
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 16 of 24
conspiracies. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44. Application Note 3 states that, “where a conviction
on a single count of conspiracy establishes that the defendant conspired to commit three
robberies, the guidelines are to be applied as if the defendant had been convicted on one
count of conspiracy to commit the first robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit the
second robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit the third robbery.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.2 cmt. n.3.
Our opinion in United States v. Gutierrez, 963 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2020), is not to
the contrary. That case involved a “conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering
activities, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(‘RICO’).” Id. at 328 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)). Although “[t]he racketeering activities
described in the indictment were numerous,” we concluded that § 1B1.2(d) did not apply.
Id.; see id. at 343. But that holding does not suggest that “offense” in § 1B1.2(d) should be
understood to refer to the statute, rather than the underlying criminal acts. Rather, our
decision in Gutierrez rested on the unique situation posed by RICO conspiracies, which by
their nature “are of the single-object variety, with the object being to engage in
racketeering.” Id. at 343 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 754 F.3d 460, 482 (7th Cir.
2014)). Further, RICO conspiracies are “specifically govern[ed]” by a different Guideline.
Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1(a)(2)). Accordingly, our treatment of RICO conspiracies in
Gutierrez has no bearing on how to understand § 1B1.2(d).
Turning back to the text of § 1B1.2(d), then, Mitchell has “[a] conviction on a count
charging a conspiracy to commit more than one offense”: he pleaded guilty to Count One,
which charged a conspiracy to commit more than one robbery (at least one against each
16
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 17 of 24
company, which had different locations). So we must next determine the meaning of the
remainder of the Guideline: such a conviction “shall be treated as if the defendant had been
convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired
to commit.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(d).
The question becomes what to make of the phrase “each offense that the defendant
conspired to commit.” “Offense” necessarily takes the same meaning as it does earlier in
the sentence: it refers to individual robberies. And “conspired” necessarily refers to the
“conspiracy” noted earlier in the sentence, thus limiting our consideration to “offenses”
falling within that “conspiracy.” For this reason, the Circle K robbery that the draft PSR
attributed to Mitchell for § 1B1.2(d) purposes was appropriately excluded from the final
PSR, as it did not fall within the conspiracy charged in Count One.
Still, the phrase “each offense that the defendant conspired to commit” raises at least
two questions: Must “each” of these offenses have been identified with particularity in the
“count charging a conspiracy”? And, if the plea or verdict does not plainly establish which
of multiple offenses a defendant “conspired to commit”—for example, because the
conspiracy charge did not identify the conspired-to offenses with particularity, or because
the conspiracy charge set forth a number of particular offenses allegedly conspired to, and
the plea or verdict did not indicate which offense or offenses were in fact implicated—
under what standard should a court determine “each offense that the defendant conspired
to commit”?
Regarding the first question, we conclude the answer is unambiguously “no.” It is
black-letter law that a “count” can “charg[e] a conspiracy to commit more than one
17
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 18 of 24
offense”—understood here as more than one robbery—without specifically identifying
each of the robberies, e.g., by date, location, and victim. Indeed, under certain
circumstances, the particular acts underlying a conspiracy charge need not be specified in
the indictment at all. See United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 270–71 (4th Cir. 2004)
(reversing district court’s ruling that evidence allowed to be presented on conspiracy count
was limited to overt acts described in other substantive charges in indictment); accord
United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying this principle in
a § 1B1.2(d) case). And while the word “each” turns our focus to the particular offenses
(robberies), it does so with the qualifier “that the defendant conspired to commit”—not,
for example, “that the defendant was specifically alleged to have conspired to commit.”
Accordingly, an “offense that the defendant conspired to commit” can only mean one that
the defendant did, in fact, conspire to commit.
This view finds support in other Guideline provisions, too. First, § 1B1.2(a) defines
“the offense of conviction” as “the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment
or information of which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). The fact that
the phrase “offense of conviction” refers to the specific acts alleged in the indictment
suggests that the more general “offense” used in § 1B1.2(d) refers to a broader range of
conduct. Second, § 1B1.2(c) requires a court sentencing a defendant who pleaded guilty to
treat the defendant as having been convicted for both any offenses of conviction and
“additional offense(s).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(c). This provision, which comes just before
§ 1B1.2(d), contemplates holding a defendant accountable for unindicted conduct, and so
supports a reading of “offense” in § 1B1.2(d) that also includes conduct not specifically
18
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 19 of 24
alleged. Third, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) provides that, “[u]nless otherwise specified,” base offense
levels, specific offense characteristics, and adjustments to the offense level—including the
multiple-counts provision of § 1B1.2(d)—must be calculated based on “all acts and
omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
willfully caused by the defendant.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This
language is not limited to conduct identified in the indictment.
These provisions suggest that “each offense that the defendant conspired to
commit,” as used within § 1B1.2(d), is not limited to offenses specifically alleged in the
indictment but refers to all offenses the defendant conspired to commit that fall within the
conspiracy that is alleged in the indictment. The Guideline thus instructs courts to
determine which offenses falling within the overall charge of conspiracy a defendant in
fact conspired to commit, and to treat each of those offenses as a separate conviction for
sentencing purposes.
This conclusion leads to the second question noted above: how to determine the
conspired-to offenses when the conviction itself (e.g., the plea or verdict) does not
explicitly establish which of various possible offenses should be considered. We have no
need to answer that question in this case, however, because the district court concluded that
the evidence supported Mitchell’s involvement in the four robberies under any standard,
including beyond a reasonable doubt, and Mitchell does not challenge that conclusion on
appeal. Cf. United States v. Dickerson, 27 F. App’x 236, 246 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)
(concluding, based on the commentary and Appendix C of the Guidelines, that “when
19
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 20 of 24
exercising its authority under § 1B1.2(d), the district court’s decision is governed by a
reasonable doubt standard”).
In sum, under the circumstances of this case, § 1B1.2(d) is unambiguous. Mitchell
has “[a] conviction on a count” (Count One) “charging a conspiracy to commit more than
one offense” (robberies of Company A or Company B that occurred from on or about
August 16, 2020, to on or about September 15, 2020). So, that conviction is to “be treated
as if” he was “convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for each” of the four robberies
he undisputably “conspired to commit”: (1) the August 16 robbery of a Company A store
in Thomasville; (2) the August 19 robbery of a Company A store in Greensboro; (3) the
August 21 robbery of a Company B store in Kannapolis; and (4) the September 14
attempted robbery of a Company B store in Sumter. Accordingly, for purposes of
sentencing, § 1B1.2(d) applies, and Mitchell’s conviction on Count One is to be treated as
if he were convicted of four robbery conspiracies. We therefore affirm the district court’s
calculation of Mitchell’s Guidelines range.
C.
Mitchell raises several arguments as to why only two robbery conspiracies, rather
than four, should be scored for purposes of § 1B1.2(d). None are persuasive.
Mitchell’s primary contention, relying on Application Note 4, is that under
§ 1B1.2(d), only those offenses “alleged in the conspiracy count” may be counted.
Opening Br. at 11 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.4). And he contends that Count One
charges a conspiracy to commit only two robberies: “one robbery of Company A and one
20
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 21 of 24
robbery of Company B.” Id. at 19; see id. at 26 (specifying that the two robberies to be
counted are the Greensboro and Kannapolis robberies).
This argument falls flat for several reasons. Because we have determined that the
Guideline is unambiguous on the relevant question, we do not owe deference to the
commentary on which Mitchell relies. Further, that reliance may be misplaced. The
commentary states that, where the “verdict or plea does not establish which offense(s) was
the object of the conspiracy,” § 1B1.2(d) “should only be applied with respect to an object
offense alleged in the conspiracy count if the court, were it sitting as a trier of fact, would
convict the defendant of conspiring to commit that object offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt.
n.4. Mitchell would like to read this commentary to mean, affirmatively, that the Guideline
can “only be applied with respect to an object offense alleged in the conspiracy count.” But
the statement is conditional: the Guideline can “only be applied with respect to an object
offense alleged in the conspiracy count if” certain evidentiary requirements are met. Id.
(emphasis added); see United States v. Robles, 562 F.3d 451, 454–55 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (noting that the commentary in question “places its emphasis not on the specificity
of the conspiracy charge but on the standard of proof that must be satisfied,” and upholding
the district court’s application of § 1B1.2(d) to count two robbery offenses that “were
charged as substantive offenses” but “were not specifically designated as the objects of the
conspiracy ‘in the conspiracy count’”); accord United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 659–
60 (6th Cir. 2014) (similarly rejecting Mitchell’s understanding of the commentary).
Even giving Mitchell the benefit of his premise, however, nothing in Count One
limits the conspiracy to a single robbery each of Company A and Company B. To the
21
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 22 of 24
contrary, under Count One’s plain terms, any robbery of any location of either company
within the specified time frame would qualify. See J.A. 6–8 (indictment alleging that,
“[f]rom on or about August 16, 2020, continuing up to and including on or about September
15, 2020,” Mitchell and others conspired to rob “employees of Company A and Company
B,” and incorporating “General Allegations” stating that the companies were “wireless
communication retailer[s] with store locations” at six identified addresses, “among other
locations within the Middle District of North Carolina, and elsewhere”).
Changing tack, Mitchell contends that this breadth of the indictment is itself a
problem. He argues that only those robberies identified with particularity (i.e., by date and
location) somewhere in the indictment—rather than all those falling within the broader
parameters set by Count One—may be counted. E.g., Opening Br. at 17 (suggesting that
only “robberies . . . identified in the Indictment” should be considered); id. at 20–21
(distinguishing Mitchell’s case from others in which the indictment somewhere listed the
offenses with particularity); id. at 25 (suggesting that due process requires that “evidence
of ‘object offenses’” must be “reflected by the allegations set forth in the indictment” to be
used “for sentencing purposes”). Under this approach, it is the two Company A robberies
(Thomasville and Greensboro) that should be counted, rather than one robbery of Company
A and one robbery of Company B (e.g., Greensboro and Kannapolis).
This second argument rests on concerns about notice and due process: that Mitchell
was not told up front, in the indictment, precisely which stores he was accused of
conspiring to rob, and when. See id. at 25. But Mitchell never challenged the indictment as
unconstitutionally vague; never moved for a bill of particulars under Federal Rule of
22
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 23 of 24
Criminal Procedure 7(f); 12 never sought to withdraw his plea; and, indeed, has explicitly
disclaimed on appeal any argument that the indictment was flawed or that his plea was
unknowing. See Oral Arg. at 11:19–12:44, 38:55–39:44, 40:44–41:24,
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/23-4291-20240910.mp3. And the
indictment did provide Mitchell with at least “broad” notice, Robles, 562 F.3d at 456: he
was informed that the Government was charging him with a conspiracy to commit a certain
crime (robbery) of certain materials (currency and wireless devices) from certain victims
(employees of Company A and Company B) between certain dates (on or about August 16
to on or about September 15, 2020) at locations that included several identified in the
indictment.
Further, the Supreme Court has made clear that while “[a]n indictment must set forth
each element of the crime that it charges . . . . [,] it need not set forth factors relevant only
to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.” Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998). Rather, this Court has held that the “notice . . .
necessary to give the defendant ‘an opportunity to contest the validity or applicability of
. . . [a] sentencing enhancement’” is “typically” provided through the PSR. United States
v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420, 427 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Moore, 208 F.3d
411, 414 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)); cf. United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 487
(4th Cir. 2012) (upholding enhancement where “the PSR provided notice that” the
12
See United States v. Am. Waste Fibers Co., 809 F.2d 1044, 1047 (4th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (rejecting the argument that the indictment was too vague, and noting that if
the defendant needed more “information to enable it to prepare its defense,” the “proper
course [was] to seek a bill of particulars”).
23
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4291 Doc: 50 Filed: 11/07/2024 Pg: 24 of 24
enhancement “was a factor relevant to sentencing and supplied a non-exhaustive list of”
facts “that amply supported application of the enhancement in and of themselves”).
We therefore conclude that where, as here, a defendant is convicted “on a count
charging a conspiracy to commit more than one” robbery, that conviction must “be treated”
at sentencing “as if the defendant had been convicted on a separate count of conspiracy for
each” robbery falling within that conspiracy, regardless of whether the robberies were
specifically identified by date and location in the indictment. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(d). In so
holding, we join the other circuits to have explicitly addressed this question in published
authority (albeit before Kisor). See Coleman, 349 F.3d at 1088; Ford, 761 F.3d at 658–59.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s calculation of Mitchell’s
Guidelines range and affirm Mitchell’s sentence.
AFFIRMED
24