Lawson v. Moore ( 1995 )


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  •                     IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    __________________
    No. 95-60232
    __________________
    JAMES BERNARD LAWSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    MICHAEL MOORE; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI;
    CYNTHIA SPEETJENS; WILLIAM F. COLEMAN,
    Circuit Judge; THOMAS FORTNER, Attorney;
    CITY OF CLINTON, MISSISSIPPI,
    Police Department,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    - - - - - - - - - -
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:94-CV-713
    - - - - - - - - - -
    July 18, 1995
    Before JOLLY, DAVIS and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    James     B.    Lawson's    motion   for   leave   to   proceed   in   forma
    pauperis (IFP) is hereby DENIED.
    A reviewing court will disturb a district court's dismissal of
    a pauper's complaint as frivolous only on finding an abuse of
    discretion.         A district court may dismiss such a complaint as
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
    that have no precedential value and merely decide particular
    cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes
    needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal
    profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published.
    No. 95-60232
    -2-
    frivolous "``where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
    fact.'"    Denton v. Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , 31, 33 (1992)(quoting
    Neitzke v. Williams, 
    490 U.S. 319
    , 325 (1989)).
    Lawson's claims that he was prosecuted maliciously implicate
    the State, Attorney General Moore, Assistant District Attorney
    Speetjens, and perhaps Judge Coleman. First, judges are absolutely
    immune from civil liability for their judicial activities unless
    they act in the "``clear absence of all jurisdiction.'"                  Stump v.
    Sparkman, 
    435 U.S. 349
    , 356-57 (1978)(citations omitted).                   Judge
    Coleman therefore was immune from Lawson's damages action.
    Second, prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages actions
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
       for   the   performance     of    prosecutorial
    functions.     Slavin v. Curry, 
    574 F.2d 1256
    , 1264 (5th Cir.),
    modified in part, 
    583 F.2d 779
     (5th Cir. 1978).                   Such functions
    include the initiation of prosecution and presentation of evidence,
    Imbler v. Pachtman, 
    424 U.S. 409
    , 431 (1976), and the collection,
    examination, and interpretation of documents.                Cook v. Houston
    Post, 
    616 F.2d 791
    , 793 (5th Cir. 1980).              Moore and Speetjens
    therefore were immune from Lawson's damages action.
    Third, the Eleventh Amendment protects states from damages
    actions.      Edelman     v.   Jordan,   
    415 U.S. 651
    ,    662-63     (1974).
    Mississippi has not waived its sovereign immunity.                 MISS. CODE ANN.
    § 11-46-5(4)(supp. 1994).          The State is immune from Lawson's
    damages action.
    Lawson contends that the defendants pressed forward with his
    prosecution despite knowing of various constitutional violations by
    police officers, but he does not allege how the City of Clinton was
    No. 95-60232
    -3-
    involved.     He has waived any contentions against the City of
    Clinton,    which       could    have   been   liable   only    for    the    police
    misconduct Lawson alleges.                By failing to brief his possible
    appellate issues against the City, Lawson has abandoned those
    issues.     See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir.
    1993).
    Lawson contends that the district court erred by dismissing
    his claims pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 
    114 S. Ct. 2364
     (1994).
    The district court applied Heck only to Lawson's claims against
    Attorney Fortner. Lawson does not repeat his conspiracy contention
    implicating Fortner.            Fortner is not a state actor and could not
    have violated       §    1983    absent    some   involvement   with    the    other
    defendants.     Polk County v. Dodson, 
    454 U.S. 312
    , 325 (1981).
    Because we may dispose of Lawson's claim against Fortner on the
    basis that Fortner is not a state actor, we need not reach Lawson's
    Heck contention.
    Finally, Lawson is warned that he will be sanctioned if he
    files frivolous appeals in the future.               See Smith v. McCleod, 
    946 F.2d 417
    , 418 (5th Cir. 1991); Jackson v. Carpenter, 
    921 F.2d 68
    ,
    69 (5th Cir. 1991).
    APPEAL DISMISSED.