Combs v. Exxon Mobil ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-30733     Document: 00515826381         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/19/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 19, 2021
    No. 20-30733
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar
    Clerk
    Viola Combs,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Exxon Mobil Corporation,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:18-CV-459
    Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant Viola Combs appeals the district court’s summary
    judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Exxon Mobil Corporation
    (“Exxon”). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-30733      Document: 00515826381           Page: 2    Date Filed: 04/19/2021
    No. 20-30733
    I. Facts & Procedural History
    In 1990, Combs, an African American woman, began working full-
    time for Exxon’s Baton Rouge refinery. In 1994, Combs became an Assistant
    Operator with the company. As an operator, Combs was responsible for
    monitoring highly flammable and toxic substances moving under high
    pressure through pipes and vessels. The processes for which she was
    responsible were potentially hazardous. If a procedure was not followed or an
    accident happened, Combs, other employees, and/or people living near the
    refinery could be harmed.
    According to Combs, she suffered from anxiety and depression and
    from January to March of 2015, she took sick leave to address these issues.
    Though she temporarily returned to work, she was soon briefly hospitalized
    and subsequently began receiving outpatient treatment for her anxiety and
    depression. In July of 2015, Combs’ psychiatrists, Dr. Mark Shoptaugh and
    Dr. Kelechi Ohayagha, recommended that she be allowed to take the
    prescription drug Xanax, a benzodiazepine, as needed. Exxon’s medical
    department became concerned that Combs was taking Xanax while working
    in a safety sensitive position. After a fitness for duty examination, Exxon
    determined that Combs was not fit to return to duty and should continue
    working on her recovery with her doctors. In February 2016, Combs was
    prescribed Vistaril, another medication used for the short-term treatment of
    anxiety.
    In late 2015, Exxon personnel determined that Combs was “totally
    and permanently” disabled. This was because her psychiatric conditions
    were only potentially controlled with sedatives that could place Combs, other
    employees, and the community at risk should she attempt to perform her job
    functions while taking them. Effective April 1, 2016, Exxon granted Combs
    long term disability benefits and treated her as a retiree which gave her instant
    2
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    No. 20-30733
    access to her pension. 1 Since Combs was a union member at the time of
    Exxon’s decision, the union grieved and the parties submitted to arbitration.
    After full arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator issued an opinion and award
    in Exxon’s favor finding that the disability retirement was proper.
    Additionally, the arbitrator determined that Exxon had not discriminated
    against or failed to accommodate Combs.
    In April of 2018, Combs filed suit against Exxon alleging that it had
    subjected her to unlawful discrimination and wrongful termination on
    account of her disability, race, sex, and age. After the district court partially
    granted Exxon’s motion to dismiss in August 2019, three claims remained:
    (1) discriminatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
    Act (“ADA”), see 
    42 U.S.C. § 12101
    , et seq.; (2) failure to accommodate in
    violation of the ADA; and (3) failure to promote based on race in violation of
    
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    . In February of 2020, Exxon filed a motion for summary
    judgment seeking dismissal of Combs’ remaining claims. In support of its
    motion, Exxon submitted a 149-paragraph list of “undisputed material facts”
    citing to record evidence. Relying on this evidence, Exxon contended that it
    was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Combs could not prove
    the merits of her claims.
    Combs’ opposition to Exxon’s summary judgment motion was due on
    March 2, 2020. Combs sought, and the district court granted, three
    extensions of this deadline. On May 7, 2020, Combs filed her opposition
    generally adopting the facts set forth by Exxon. She did not file an opposing
    statement contesting Exxon’s proposed undisputed facts. In her opposition,
    however, she attempted to argue that Exxon’s proposed facts were disputed.
    1
    Prior to this time, Exxon determined that Combs qualified for short term disability
    and gave her full pay and benefits for 26 weeks during her absence from work.
    3
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    No. 20-30733
    She then filed a motion to strike certain parts of Exxon’s evidence on grounds
    that it was submitted to her on the discovery cutoff date of January 6, 2020,
    claiming she did not have time to “properly vet” the evidence. Then on May
    12, 2020, she filed a motion for leave seeking three more days to file an
    opposing statement of material facts in opposition to Exxon’s motion for
    summary judgment. Months passed after Combs filed her motion for leave
    but she never supplemented the record with a proposed opposing statement
    of material facts.
    The district court first denied Combs’ motion to strike on grounds
    that she waited four months to challenge Exxon’s disclosures and offered no
    explanation or good cause for her late filing that was due within seven days of
    Exxon’s disclosures. See M.D. La. LR 26(d)(1). The district court also denied
    Combs’ motion for leave for noncompliance with Local Rule 56(c) because
    she belatedly suggested she would file a statement of material facts in
    opposition to Exxon’s but never followed through. See M.D. La. LR 56(c).
    Finally, the district court granted Exxon’s motion for summary
    judgment on grounds that Combs failed to come forth with competent
    summary judgment evidence addressing Exxon’s arguments or showing the
    existence of a genuine factual dispute. The district court then dismissed
    Combs’ suit with prejudice. Combs filed this appeal.
    II. Standard of Review
    “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Sanders v.
    Christwood, 
    970 F.3d 558
    , 561 (5th Cir. 2020). “Summary judgment is proper
    ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
    and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” 
    Id.
     (citing Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine” if the
    evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
    nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986).
    4
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    No. 20-30733
    “[U]nsubstantiated assertions may not be relied on as evidence by the
    nonmoving party.” Carnaby v. City of Hous., 
    636 F.3d 183
    , 187 (5th Cir.
    2011); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324 (1986). “The party
    opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the
    record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports
    his or her claim.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 
    136 F.3d 455
    , 458 (5th Cir.
    1998).
    III. Discussion
    On appeal, Combs argues that the district court erred in dismissing
    her failure to accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and failure to promote
    claims. 2 We disagree. As the district court stated in its Ruling and Order,
    “summary judgment is about evidence.” Because Combs failed to present
    any competent summary judgment evidence to the district court, she could
    not carry her burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact. Ragas, 
    136 F.3d at 458
    . Consequently, the district court did not err in granting Exxon’s
    summary judgment motion.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s summary judgment in
    favor of Exxon is AFFIRMED.
    2
    Combs also briefs arguments against Exxon’s claims of preemption and collateral
    estoppel, however, because the district court did not address these arguments, they are not
    properly before this court on appeal.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-30733

Filed Date: 4/19/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/19/2021