United States v. Aguilar ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50686 Document: 00516345507 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/06/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 6, 2022
No. 21-50686
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Severa Leann Aguilar,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:21-CR-11-1
Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: * 0F
Severa Leann Aguilar appeals the sentence imposed after her guilty
plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of
actual methamphetamine and for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime. Her sole appellate argument involves a challenge to a
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50686 Document: 00516345507 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2022
No. 21-50686
standard condition of supervised release. The condition set forth, inter alia,
that Aguilar’s probation officer may decide whether Aguilar presents a risk
to another person and, if so, may require Aguilar to notify the person of that
risk. According to Aguilar, this supervised-release condition constitutes an
impermissible delegation of judicial authority to the probation officer.
Without opposition, the Government has filed a motion for summary
affirmance. The Government contends that Aguilar’s claim is foreclosed by
our recent decision in United States v. Mejia-Banegas, 32 F.4th 450 (5th Cir.
2022).
In Mejia-Banegas, we rejected the specific argument that Aguilar raises
as to the risk-notification condition. Mejia-Banegas, 32 F.4th at 451-52. We
held that there was no error, plain or otherwise, because the condition “does
not impermissibly delegate the court’s judicial authority to the probation
officer.” Id. at 452. Accordingly, the Government is correct that summary
affirmance is appropriate. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d
1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
Thus, the Government’s unopposed motion for summary affirmance
is GRANTED, the Government’s alternative motion for an extension of
time to file a brief is DENIED, and the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
2