United States v. Paschal ( 2021 )

Case: 20-11056 Document: 00515826877 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/19/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 19, 2021
No. 20-11056 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Shawn Travis Paschal,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:20-CR-34-1
Before King, Smith, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Shawn Travis Paschal was sentenced to 78 months of imprisonment
followed by 20 years of supervised release after pleading guilty to possession
of child pornography involving a prepubescent minor in violation of
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-11056
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). The district court imposed a special
condition of supervised release that provided:
[t]he defendant shall have no unsupervised contact with
persons under the age of 18, nor shall the defendant loiter near
places where children may frequently congregate. The
defendant shall neither seek nor maintain employment or
volunteer work at any location and/or activity where persons
under the age of 18 congregate and the defendant shall not date
or befriend anyone who has children under the age of 18,
without prior permission of the probation officer.
On appeal, Paschal contends that the district court erred in
(1) prohibiting him from having unsupervised contact with minors for 20
years; (2) prohibiting him from dating or befriending anyone with children;
(3) forbidding him for 20 years from loitering near places where children may
congregate; and (4) engaging in impermissible judicial factfinding.
Because Paschal did not object to his sentence or the conditions of
supervised release when allowed to do so, we review these claims only for
plain error. See United States v. Dean, 940 F.3d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 2019). To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing “(1) an error
(2) that is clear or obvious, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Izaguirre, 973 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quoting United States v. Huor, 852 F.3d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 2017)).
The district court did not plainly err in prohibiting Paschal from
having unsupervised contact with minors for 20 years. Although he argues
that the special condition’s length renders it overbroad and that the
prohibition is plainly erroneous because there is no evidence that he engaged
in any sexual abuse or attempted to contact a child for such a purpose, we
routinely uphold conditions limiting a defendant’s ability to associate with
minors, particularly when the conditions are limited in scope and duration.
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See United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2015). Moreover,
because the images involved in this case depicted or suggested children
engaging in sexual conduct with adults, limiting unsupervised contact with
minors did not overly restrict Paschal’s liberty. See United States v.
Buchanan, 485 F.3d 274, 288 (5th Cir. 2007).
Likewise, the district court did not plainly err in prohibiting Paschal
from dating or befriending anyone with children. Paschal argues that this
provision is overbroad because there is no evidence that he has used an adult
relationship to gain access to children and that the condition is vague because
it is unclear what constitutes dating or friendship. While this prohibition may
not be related to his offense conduct or his personal history, the prohibition
on dating or befriending anyone with children is reasonably related to the
need “to advance deterrence, protect the public, and advance [Paschal’s]
correctional needs.” See Huor, 852 F.3d at 398. Additionally, this provision
is not unduly vague because it provides Paschal fair notice of when he must
notify and seek approval from his probation officer. See United States v. Ellis,
720 F.3d 220, 227–28 (5th Cir. 2013).
The district court also did not plainly err in prohibiting Paschal from
loitering near places where children congregate. Paschal is unable to
demonstrate that the imposition of this prohibition was clearly erroneous
because, again, the restriction on his loitering where children congregate is
reasonably related to the need “to advance deterrence, protect the public,
and advance [Paschal’s] correctional needs.” See Huor, 852 F.3d at 398.
Moreover, this court has upheld lifetime locational bans even in situations
where the defendant did not have a history of targeting children in public
places. See Ellis, 720 F.3d at 226.
Finally, the district court did not engage in impermissible judicial
factfinding when it relied on the number of images involved in determining
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No. 20-11056
Paschal’s sentence. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Tuma,
738 F.3d 681, 693 (5th Cir. 2013), because the number of images involved
here only influenced the judge’s judicial discretion and did not alter a
mandatory minimum sentence.
Based upon the foregoing, the district court did not err in sentencing
Paschal, much less plainly err. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
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