United States v. Brown ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-60950     Document: 00515832514         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/22/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 22, 2021
    No. 20-60950                           Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                              Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Jeffery Benard Brown,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 1:17-CR-22-1
    Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Jeffery Benard Brown pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
    agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to a
    within-guidelines, 120-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, Brown
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-60950      Document: 00515832514          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/22/2021
    No. 20-60950
    argues that the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to move
    for a substantial assistance departure or reduction. The Government moves
    to dismiss based on the appeal waiver in Brown’s plea agreement or,
    alternatively, for summary affirmance. In response, Brown argues that he did
    not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement.
    As part of a valid plea agreement, a defendant may waive his statutory
    right to appeal. United States v. Story, 
    439 F.3d 226
    , 231 (5th Cir. 2006). We
    review the enforceability of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v.
    Winchel, 
    896 F.3d 387
    , 388 (5th Cir. 2018). To determine whether the appeal
    waiver bars an appeal, we “conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the
    waiver was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether the waiver applies to the
    circumstances at hand, based on the plain language of the agreement.”
    United States v. Bond, 
    414 F.3d 542
    , 544 (5th Cir. 2005). For a waiver to be
    knowing and voluntary, the defendant must know that he has a right to appeal
    and that he is giving up that right. See United States v. McKinney, 
    406 F.3d 744
    , 746 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2005). Brown’s contention that his waiver was not
    knowing and voluntary is belied by the record. Brown was fully advised of his
    right to appeal and he acknowledged that he understood what the waiver
    connoted and its consequences. See 
    id.
    Brown asserts that the right to challenge a sentence should not be
    waivable and that appeal waivers are unfair contracts of adhesion. However,
    Brown has not identified any terms deemed unconscionable by this court.
    We have routinely upheld appeal waivers similar to Brown’s. See, e.g., United
    States v. Burns, 
    433 F.3d 442
    , 443-44, 449-50 (5th Cir. 2005); Bond, 
    414 F.3d at 543-45
    . Moreover, it is well-settled that a defendant may waive his right
    to appeal as part of a valid plea agreement. See Story, 
    439 F.3d at 231
    ; United
    States v. Melancon, 
    972 F.2d 566
    , 567 (5th Cir. 1992). Because Brown does
    not allege any other basis for attacking the appeal waiver, the waiver is valid
    and enforceable. See Bond, 
    414 F.3d at 544
    .
    2
    Case: 20-60950     Document: 00515832514           Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/22/2021
    No. 20-60950
    An appeal waiver does not prevent a defendant from raising a claim
    that the Government breached the plea agreement. See United States v.
    Casillas, 
    853 F.3d 215
    , 217 (5th Cir. 2017). We apply general principles of
    contract law in interpreting a plea agreement and consider “whether the
    [G]overnment’s conduct is consistent with the defendant’s reasonable
    understanding of the agreement.” United States v. Hinojosa, 
    749 F.3d 407
    ,
    413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the
    language of a plea agreement is unambiguous, we “generally will not look
    beyond the four corners of the document” to determine the intention of the
    parties. United States v. Long, 
    722 F.3d 257
    , 262 (5th Cir. 2013).
    Here, the terms of the plea agreement are clear and unambiguous that
    the Government had sole discretion to determine if Brown provided
    substantial assistance, as well as sole discretion to request a downward
    departure or sentence reduction even if Brown had provided substantial
    assistance. Brown does not allege any unconstitutional motivation for the
    Government’s conduct. See United States v. Aderholt, 
    87 F.3d 740
    , 743 (5th
    Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Brown has failed to show that the Government
    breached the plea agreement.
    Because the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable and the
    Government has invoked the waiver, Brown’s appeal is barred. See Story,
    
    439 F.3d at
    230 & n.5. The Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal is
    GRANTED, and its alternative motion for summary affirmance is
    DENIED. The appeal is DISMISSED.
    3