Alvarado-Ruiz v. Garland ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 19-60697     Document: 00515834945         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/23/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 23, 2021
    No. 19-60697                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                            Clerk
    Damaris Amarilis Alvarado-Ruiz; Cleverzon Jeovani
    Mendez-Alvarado,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A 208 748 356
    BIA No. A 208 748 357
    Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Damaris Amarilis Alvarado-Ruiz and her son Cleverzon Jeovani
    Mendez-Alvarado (“Petitioners”) are natives and citizens of Guatemala.
    They seek review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 19-60697      Document: 00515834945           Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/23/2021
    No. 19-60697
    dismissing their appeal of an order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that
    denied asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The petition for review is denied.
    To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show inability or
    unwillingness to return to his or her country as the result of persecution or a
    well-founded fear of persecution because of, inter alia, membership in a
    particular social group. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A). A particular social group
    must (1) consist of members who share a common immutable characteristic,
    (2) be defined with particularity, and (3) be distinct from other persons within
    society. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I & N Dec. 581, 581 (Att’y Gen. 2019); see also
    Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 
    936 F.3d 249
    , 251 (5th Cir. 2019). Whether a proposed
    group qualifies as a particular social group for asylum purposes is a legal
    question that is reviewed de novo. See Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 
    685 F.3d 511
    , 517-21 (5th Cir. 2012).
    A proposed social group must “exist independently of the harm
    asserted.” Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 
    938 F.3d 219
    , 230 (5th Cir. 2019). The
    proposed group of “Guatemalan women unable to leave a domestic
    relationship” does not exist independently from the alleged persecution. See
    id at 232. Additionally, “[w]hile the [BIA] has recognized certain clans and
    subclans as ‘particular social groups,’ most nuclear families are not
    inherently socially distinct and therefore do not qualify as ‘particular social
    groups.’” Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581. In this case, the proposed
    family-based social groups are broad rather than particularly defined.
    Compare Quintanilla-Miranda v. Barr, 781 F. App’x 344, 346 (5th Cir. 2019)
    (concluding that the proposed social group “Honduran sons in domestic
    familial relationships who are unable to leave” is not sufficiently particular).
    Neither does the record contain any evidence that Guatemalan society views
    either of the proposed family-based groups as distinct from society. Compare
    Solorzano-De Maldonado v. Sessions, 721 F. App’x 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2018)
    2
    Case: 19-60697        Document: 00515834945         Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/23/2021
    No. 19-60697
    (dismissing a petition for review when the record did not show that
    Salvadoran society viewed the proposed social group as socially distinct).
    The BIA correctly concluded that Petitioners are not eligible for
    asylum. The BIA’s opinion reflects that it fully considered all of Petitioners’
    contentions and correctly determined that they did not meet the asylum
    standard, and therefore failed to meet standard for withholding of removal.
    See Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 518.
    Finally, a claim for protection under the CAT requires the alien to
    show “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
    removed to the proposed country of removal.” 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c)(2). The
    applicant must establish that the government of his or her home country
    would instigate or consent to the torture. Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 
    794 F.3d 485
    , 493 (5th Cir. 2015). The alien “may satisfy his burden of proving
    acquiescence by demonstrating a government’s willful blindness of torturous
    activity.” Iruegas-Valdez v. Yates, 
    846 F.3d 806
    , 812 (5th Cir. 2017).
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioners
    are not eligible for protection under the CAT. See Revencu v. Sessions, 
    895 F.3d 396
    , 401 (5th Cir. 2018). They did not establish that it is more likely
    than not that they will be tortured on their return to Guatemala. Neither have
    Petitioners established that a person acting in an official capacity on behalf of
    Guatemala would torture them, acquiesce in their torture, or be willfully
    blind to their torture. Compare Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 
    303 F.3d 341
    , 354
    (5th Cir. 2002).
    The petition for review is DENIED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-60697

Filed Date: 4/23/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2021