United States v. Pina ( 2021 )

Case: 20-50979 Document: 00515839184 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/27/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
April 27, 2021
No. 20-50979
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Angel Vinicio Pina,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:08-CR-181-5
Before Jones, Costa, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Angel Pina is serving a 108-month sentence for cocaine trafficking (he
is scheduled for release later this year). Last year, after first unsuccessfully
seeking compassionate release from the prison warden, Pina asked the
district court for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Pina
cited the threat COVID-19 posed to him given his preexisting medical
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-50979 Document: 00515839184 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/27/2021
No. 20-50979
conditions as the “extraordinary and compelling reason[]” that might justify
his early release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied the
motion. Its order first lists each filing it received on the motion (three from
the defendant, one from the government) and then says: “After considering
the applicable factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the Court DENIES
the Defendant’s Motion[] on its merits.”
Pina appeals on the ground that the order lacked sufficient detail to
allow appellate review. Although the Supreme Court has not decided
whether a district court must explain its reason when ruling on a sentencing-
reduction motion, Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018)
(merely assuming that a court ruling on a reduction motion has “equivalent
duties” in terms of stating its reasons to those it has when first sentencing a
defendant), we recently stated that it must provide “specific factual
reasons,” United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). In
deciding whether a court has adequately justified a sentencing decision, we
consider not just its recent order but the entire record of the proceeding going
back to the original sentencing. Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1965. “In some
cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review that that judge
simply relied upon the record, while making clear that he or she has
considered the parties’ arguments and taken account of the § 3553(a) factors,
among others.” Id.
The district court’s explanation here, though brief, was sufficient.
Indeed, the district court provided essentially the same level of detail as the
form order that the Supreme Court found sufficient in Chavez-Meza. Id. at
1965, 1967–68. In that case, the district judge had “checked a box next to
preprinted language” stating that he had considered the statutory sentencing
factors and the policy statement in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1968
2
Case: 20-50979 Document: 00515839184 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/27/2021
No. 20-50979
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Here the district court included the same
statement in the order it drafted on its own.
The parties’ arguments to the district court help illuminate the
reasons the motion was denied. Id. at 1968 (explaining that the district
court’s “awareness of the arguments” the parties made can help reveal its
reasoning). The government opposed reducing Pina’s sentence for two
reasons. First, attaching medical records, it argued that Pina had not shown
extraordinary reasons that would warrant a reduction because his medical
conditions had improved due to treatment while he was in custody. Second,
it argued that a reduction was not warranted because Pina’s release would
not be consistent with the Guidelines’ policy statement that allows
sentencing reductions only when the defendant “is not a danger to the safety
of any other person or to the community. as provided in 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). Section 3142(g), in turn, directs a court to
consider many of the general statutory sentencing factors such as “the nature
and circumstances of the offense” and “the history and characteristics” of
the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). In noting that it was denying Pina’s
motion because of the policy statement in the Guidelines and the statutory
sentencing factors, the district court’s order thus was accepting the
government’s second argument.
For these reasons, there was enough to enable appellate review. See
Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967–68 (noting that a case’s “simplicity,” “the
judge’s awareness of the arguments,” and “his consideration of the relevant
sentencing factors” may be enough to make a judge’s bare-bones explanation
sufficient).
AFFIRMED.
3