Budri v. ARB ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-60574     Document: 00515844378         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/30/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    April 30, 2021
    No. 20-60574
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Adriano Budri,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    Administrative Review Board, United States
    Department of Labor,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of the Decision and Order of the
    United States Department of Labor, Administrative Review Board
    ARB Case No. 2020-0047
    ALJ Case No. 2020-STA-00037
    Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit
    Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    By petition for review filed in this court on July 3, 2020, Petitioner
    Adriano Budri (“Budri”) challenges the June 30, 2020 decision of the United
    States Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board (ARB). The
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-60574      Document: 00515844378          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/30/2021
    No. 20-60574
    ARB decision denied Budri’s administrative petition for review of an
    administrative law judge’s June 18, 2020 dismissal of Budri’s fourth
    complaint, which was filed on February 7, 2020, with the Department of
    Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Budri’s
    fourth OSHA complaint, which alleges claims arising under the Surface
    Transportation Assistance Act (STAA), 
    49 U.S.C. § 31105
    , is based on the
    same underlying facts as his prior complaints. This petition for review
    constitutes Budri’s fourth appearance before this court pertaining to the
    same facts.
    Also before this court are almost 50 pending motions filed by Budri,
    as well as Respondent’s request that this court issue an order enjoining Budri
    from future filings arising from the same operative facts as his previous
    claims—his employment at Firstfleet, Inc., and his February 17, 2017
    termination from employment. For the reasons stated herein, we deny
    Budri’s petition for review and his pending motions. We grant Respondent’s
    request for entry of an order restricting future filings by Budri to the extent
    stated herein and in the separate written order to be entered by the court.
    I.
    Budri briefly worked for Firstfleet as a commercial truck driver in
    early 2017. After hiring Budri on January 25, 2017, Firstfleet fired Budri less
    than a month later on February 17, 2017. In firing Budri, Firstfleet cited
    instances when Budri failed to deliver a time-sensitive order, caused cargo
    damage by failing to secure a load properly, and failed to report an accident
    in which Budri caused a door to be torn from a trailer.
    Since his February 2017 termination from employment by Firstfleet,
    Budri has previously filed and subsequently appealed three prior OSHA
    complaints stemming from the above-described facts. The procedural
    histories of those matters are described in our August 24, 2020 opinion
    2
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    affirming the dismissal of Budri’s third complaint. 1 In those OSHA
    complaints, Budri alleged that (1) Firstfleet terminated his employment in
    retaliation for his protected communications regarding an expired decal,
    hours-of-service violations, and a defective headlight bulb, in violation of the
    STAA’s whistleblower-protection provisions; and (2) Firstfleet further
    violated the STAA by disclosing negative employment information about
    him to Tenstreet, a company that provides hiring services to trucking
    companies.
    First OSHA Complaint
    Budri’s first OSHA complaint, filed March 20, 2017, was dismissed
    by OSHA and, subsequently, by ALJ Larry W. Price. 2 The ALJ’s February
    2, 2018 dismissal was affirmed by the ARB in June 19, 2018, 3 and by this court
    on April 9, 2019. 4 Budri also filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United
    States Supreme Court, which was denied on October 2019. 5
    Second OSHA Complaint
    While his first complaint was pending before the ALJ, Budri filed a
    second OSHA complaint on January 23, 2018, which also was dismissed by
    1
    Budri v. Admin. Review Bd., No. 20-60073, 825 F. App’x 178, 179 (5th Cir. Aug.
    25, 2020) (regarding ARB No. 2020-0021, ALJ No. 2019-STA-00071) (“Third Complt.”)
    (“Third Complt.”).
    2
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ALJ No. 2017-STA-0086 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2018) (“First
    Complt.”)
    3
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2018-0025, ALJ No. 2017-STA-0086 (ARB Jun.
    19, 2018) (“First Complt.”).
    4
    Budri v. Admin Review Bd., No. 18-60579, 764 F. App’x 431 (5th Cir. Apr. 9, 2019)
    (regarding ARB No. 2018-0025, ALJ No. 2017-STA-0086) (“First Complt.”).
    5
    Budri v. Admin Review Bd., 
    140 S. Ct. 386
     (2019) (“First Complt.”)
    3
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    OSHA and, on June 26, 2018, by ALJ Price. 6 Initially, on March 25, 2019,
    the ARB affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of the complaint, concluding the claim
    was not timely filed within 180 days of Budri’s discovery of the alleged
    violation, and thus, was untimely. 7 Later, however, on July 30, 2019, the
    ARB vacated its March 25, 2019 decision for lack of jurisdiction, 8 having
    discovered that Budri had timely filed suit in federal district court on
    February 19, 2019, 9 that is, while the ARB appeal was pending. On October
    29, 2019, the district court dismissed Budri’s suit, 10 and, on December 18,
    2019, we dismissed his appeal for want of prosecution. 11
    Third OSHA Complaint
    While his district court action was pending, Budri filed a third OSHA
    complaint, on August 30, 2019, which likewise was dismissed by OSHA and,
    6
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ALJ No. 2018-STA-0033 (ALJ June 26, 2018 and Aug. 1,
    2018) (“Second Complt.”)
    7
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2018-0055, 2018-STA-0033 (March 25, 2019)
    (“Second Complt.”).
    8
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2018-0055, 2018-STA-0033 
    2019 WL 3780911
    ,
    at *1 (July 30, 2019) (“Second Complt.”).
    9
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-409-N-BH (N. D. Tex.) (“Second
    Complt.”). See 
    49 U.S.C. § 31105
    (c); 
    29 C.F.R. §1978.114
     (allowing an action for de novo
    review in appropriate federal district court if no final order of Secretary has issued within
    210 days of filing of complaint and there is no showing of delay due to the bad faith of the
    complainant).
    10
    Because Budri’s STAA claim was dismissed for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction, the dismissal was without prejudice. See Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., Case No. 3:19-
    cv-409-N-BH, 
    2019 WL 5579971
    , *1 (N. D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2019) (“Second Complt.”)
    11
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., No. 19-11203, 
    2019 WL 8645418
     (5th Cir. 2019) (“Second
    Complt.”). Budri’s appeal was dismissed because he failed to heed the court’s November
    7, 2019 notice instructing that he sign and return his unsigned October 31, 2019 notice of
    appeal within thirty days. 
    Id.
    4
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    on December 16, 2019, by ALJ Patrick M. Rosenow. 12 On January 7, 2020,the
    ARB exercised its discretion to deny review of Budri’s petition. 13 Budri then
    filed a petition for review before this court on January 27, 2020. We denied
    that petition on August 25, 2020. 14
    Fourth OSHA Complaint
    While his January 27, 2020 petition for review was pending before this
    court, Budri filed his fourth OSHA complaint on February 7, 2020. It is the
    fourth complaint that is the focus of the instant petition for review. OSHA
    dismissed the complaint on February 28, 2020. On March 8, 2020, Budri
    objected to OSHA’s finding and requested a hearing before an ALJ. Budri’s
    fourth complaint asserted          one allegedly new adverse action, i.e., that
    sometime after June 12, 2017, Firstfleet disclosed new and additional
    negative employment information about him to Tenstreet. Upon referral to
    the ALJ, Budri was ordered to provide greater detail regarding his new
    allegation, to which he responded with additional factual allegations
    concerning the employment information previously disclosed to Tenstreet,
    as well as a series of non-responsive filings.
    On June 18, 2020, finding that Budri had failed to allege any new
    actionable adverse activity, the ALJ dismissed Budri’s complaint for failure
    to state a claim. 15 The ALJ also cited Budri’s “flagrant and defiant” litigation
    12
    Budri v. Firstfleet, ALJ No. 2019-STA-71 (ALJ Dec. 16, 2019) (“Third
    Complt.”).
    13
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2020-0021, ALJ No. 2019-STA-00071 (ARB
    Jan. 7, 2020) (“Third Complt.”).
    14
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 20-60073, 825 F. App’x 178, 179 (5th Cir. Aug.
    25, 2020) (regarding ARB Case No. 2020-0021, ALJ Case No. 2019-STA-00071) (“Third
    Complt.”).
    15
    Budri v. Firstfleet, ALJ No. 2019-STA-37 (ALJ June 18, 2020) (“Fourth
    Complt.”). The ALJ rejected the notion that an alleged disclosure to Budri on October 31,
    5
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    conduct as an alternative ground for dismissal. 16 On June 22, 2020, the ALJ
    concluded that Budri’s June 20, 2020 motion for reconsideration was moot,
    given the previous filing of a notice of appeal to the ARB thereby depriving
    the ALJ of jurisdiction. 17
    On June 30, 2020, the ARB issued an order declining to review the
    ALJ’s decision. 18 The instant petition for review followed on July 3, 2020.
    Fifth and Sixth OSHA Complaints
    Budri filed his fifth and sixth OSHA complaints on July 1, 2020, and
    August 6, 2020, which OSHA denied. ALJ Rosenow denied Budri’s fifth
    complaint on August 5, 2020. 19 On August 17, 2020, the ARB exercised its
    discretion to deny Budri’s petition for review of the ALJ’s August 5, 2020
    order. 20
    On September 8, 2020, ALJ Rosenow denied Budri’s sixth
    complaint. 21 On September 15, 2020, the ARB denied Budri’s petition for
    2019, and/or his February or March 2020 discovery of a social media website, constituted
    new or continuing adverse action sufficient to render his latest complaint timely.
    16
    
    Id.
    17
    Budri v. Firstfleet, ALJ No.2019-STA-37 (ALJ June 22, 2020) (“Fourth
    Complt.”).
    18
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2020-0047, ALJ No. 2020-STA-37 (ARB June
    30, 2020) (“Fourth Complt.”).
    19
    See Budri v. Firstfleet, ALJ No. 2019-STA-71 at 3 (ALJ Aug. 5, 2020) (“Fifth
    Complt.”).
    20
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2020-0021, ALJ No. 2019-STA-00071 (ARB
    Aug. 17, 2020) (“Fifth Complt.”).
    21
    See Budri v. Firstfleet, ALJ No. 2020-STA-108 (ALJ Sept. 8, 2020) (“Sixth
    Complt.”).
    6
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    review. 22 To date, no petitions for review have been regarding these
    complaints in this court.
    II.
    We review agency rulings under the standard of review established by
    the Administrative Procedure Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    . Applying that standard,
    we will affirm an ARB decision unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise contrary to law, or . . . not supported by substantial
    evidence.” Macktal v. United States DOL, 
    171 F.3d 323
    , 326 (5th Cir. 1999).
    We review an agency’s interpretations of caselaw de novo and its factual
    findings for substantial evidence. Ameristar Airways, Inc. v. Admin. Review
    Bd., 
    771 F.3d 268
    , 272 (5th Cir. 2014).
    III.
    In the instant petition for review, Budri disputes the ARB’s June 30,
    2020 decision on the merits and further argues that ALJ Rosenow was not
    properly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the United States
    Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl.2, 23 as required by Lucia v. Securities & Exchange
    22
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., ARB No. 2020-0065, ALJ No. 2020-STA-108 (ARB
    Sept.15, 2020) (“Sixth Complt.”).
    23
    The Appointments Clause states:
    [The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
    Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
    and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
    United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
    and which shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by Law vest
    the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
    President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
    U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
    7
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    Commission, 
    138 S. Ct. 2044
     (2018). Citing Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
    Company Accounting Oversite Board, 
    561 U.S. 477
    , 491 (2010), he also
    maintains that the “for cause” removal protections of the Administrative
    Procedures Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 7521
    (a), likewise are violative of the “at will”
    employment associated with the Appointments Clause.
    IV.
    We begin our analysis by considering the merits of the ARB’s
    decision. The ALJ concluded that Budri had failed to allege any new adverse
    action because “maintenance and/or re-disclosure by a third party of
    information provided by an employer does not constitute new or continuous
    adverse action.” We agree. Budri did not allege specific facts in his fourth
    complaint pertaining to any new information disclosure by Firstfleet. Rather,
    Budri’s fourth complaint merely reasserts issues raised in his prior three
    complaints, which have been fully litigated and resolved in Budri’s prior
    administrative and judicial proceedings. Thus, further litigation is precluded.
    See Budri, 825 F. App’x at 179 (third OSHA complaint “contains no new
    relevant facts, arguments, or claims not previously considered [] and rejected
    [] by an ALJ, the ARB, the district court, or this Court”); Comer v. Murphy
    Oil USA, Inc., 
    718 F.3d 460
    , 467 (5th Cir. 2013) (“A final judgment on the
    merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating
    issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”) (quoting Federated
    Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 
    452 U.S. 394
    , 398 (1981)). 24
    24
    Budri’s brief additionally complains regarding the ALJ’s handling of discovery.
    Such matters are within the ALJ’s discretion and it is not apparent to us that any abuse of
    that discretion occurred.
    8
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    V.
    In denying Budri’s petition for review, we do not address Budri’s
    Appointments Clause challenges. Because Appointment Clause challenges
    present “non-jurisdictional structural constitutional challenges,” they can be
    forfeited. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 
    737 F.3d 344
    , 351 (5th Cir. 2013)
    (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 
    501 U.S. 868
    , 878–79 (1991)). We find such
    forfeiture has occurred here, and decline to exercise our discretion to
    nevertheless consider Budri’s challenges, for several related reasons. 25
    25
    This court has not yet addressed whether Department of Labor’s ALJs have been
    properly appointed under Lucia or whether Lucia appointment challenges necessarily are
    forfeited if not first presented in the underlying administrative proceeding. Many of our
    sister circuits have considered these questions in the context of dismissals by the
    Department of Labor’s Benefits Review Board. See, e.g., Nat’l Mines Corp v. Conley, 790 F.
    App’x 716 (6th Cir. 2019); Elkhorn Eagle Mining Co. v. Higgins, 811 F. App’x 318 (6th Cir.
    2020); Zumwalt v. Nat’l Steel & Shipbuilding Co., 796 F. App’x 930 (9th Cir. 2019); Turner
    Bros., Inc. v. Conley, 757 F. App’x 697 (10th Cir. 2018); Energy W. Mining Co. v. Lyle ex rel.
    Lyle, 
    929 F.3d 1202
    , 1206 (10th Cir. 2019).
    And, less than two weeks ago, the Supreme Court determined that judicially
    created “issue-exhaustion rules” did not preclude judicial review of Appointments Clause
    challenges that were not first presented to Social Security Administration ALJs whose
    appointments had not yet been ratified by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
    Acting Administrator. See Carr v. Saul, No. 19-1442 (slip op. at 3, 6–10), 
    141 S. Ct. 1352
    (April 22, 2021). In support of this holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that governing
    regulations “expressly” render SSA administrative proceedings “‘inquisitorial rather than
    adversarial.’” 
    Id. at 6
     (quoting Sims v. Apfel, 
    530 U.S. 103
    , 110-111 (2000)). Furthermore,
    the Court emphasized, “[e]ven accepting that ALJ proceedings may be comparatively
    more adversarial than Appeals Council proceedings,” the scales “in the specific context of
    petitioners’ Appointments Clause challenges, . . . tip . . . decidedly against imposing an
    issue-exhaustion requirement[,]” because SSA ALJs are “ill-suited to address structural
    constitutional challenges . . . usually fall[ing] outside [their] areas of technical expertise.”
    Id. at 9. Additionally, given that ALJs are powerless to “remedy[] any defects in their own
    [preratification] appointments,” such administrative efforts fall within the “consistently
    recognized [] futility exception to exhaustion requirements.” Id. at 10-11. Lastly, in the
    absence of an administration exhaustion requirement, first-time judicial challenges to the
    ALJ appointments were not untimely. Id. at 11–12.
    9
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    As an initial matter, we note that, in December 2017, the Secretary
    of Labor issued a letter to ALJ Rosenow, dated December 21, 2017,
    “ratify[ing] the Department’s prior appointment of you as an Administrative
    Law Judge” with the “intent[] to address any claim that administrative
    proceedings pending before, or presided by [DOL ALJs] violate the
    Appointments Clause.” 26 Budri contends the Secretary’s letter fails to
    satisfy the Appointments Clause’s requirements relative to his 2019 and
    2020 proceedings before ALJ Rosenow. He fails, however, to cite controlling
    legal authority supporting his assertion.
    And, though the December 2017 ratification would not impact the
    “for cause” removal requirements about which he complains, severance of
    the offending statutory provision, if severance is possible and warranted,
    appears to be the appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin.
    Prot. Bureau, 
    140 S. Ct. 2183
    , 2209– 11 (2020); Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S.
    at 508–09; Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 
    941 F.3d 1320
    , 1335–38
    (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
    141 S. Ct. 236
     (2020); Collins v. Mnuchin, 
    938 F.3d 553
    , 591–95 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
    141 S. Ct. 193
     (2020). In any
    event, Budri has not shown the contrary to be true or addressed the
    possibility of severance. See, e.g., Brock Servs., L.L.C. v. Rogillio, 
    936 F.3d 290
    , 295 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Issues not raised or inadequately briefed on appeal
    are waived.”); L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs.,Inc., 
    17 F.3d 106
    ,
    113 (5th Cir. 1994) (issue was not adequately briefed where no authorities
    were cited in a one page argument).
    Importantly, on the current record, we do not have to decide the “forfeiture” and
    “exhaustion” questions decided by our sister circuits or the Supreme Court. Rather, in this
    instance, our forfeiture determination rests on broader grounds.
    26
    See Respondent Br., Exh. A.
    10
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    Furthermore, even putting aside the Secretary’s December 2017
    ratification letter, Lucia emphasizes that Appointments Clause challenges
    must be timely. Importantly, although the Supreme Court decided Lucia on
    June 21, 2018, and Free Enterprise in 2010, Budri’s first mention of Lucia, Free
    Enterprise, the Appointments Clause, or “for cause” removal protections
    was in the August 13, 2020 “Petitioner’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice”
    that he filed, post-briefing, while previously before this court (regarding his
    third OSHA complaint). Budri’s assertions also were repeated in the August
    30, 2020 petition for panel rehearing that he filed regarding our August 25,
    2020 opinion.
    Referencing the many motions that Budri had filed in that proceeding,
    our August 25, 2020 opinion, denying his petition for review, stated:
    Budri has filed multiple motions that reassert the
    arguments raised in his petition for review and also assert
    additional grounds for relief beyond those argued before the
    ARB or in his briefing. Although this court has granted several
    of Budri’s requests for procedural relief, we decline to address
    issues insufficiently briefed by Budri or raised for the first time
    on petition for review. See Craven v. Dir., Office of Worker’s
    Comp. Programs, 407 F. App’x 854, 859 (5th Cir. 2011) (per
    curiam) (unpublished) (stating that an argument raised for the
    first time on petition for review is waived) (citing Aetna Cas. &
    Sur. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 
    97 F.3d 815
    ,
    819 (5th Cir. 1996)). 27
    Our September 9, 2020 order denying Budri’s August 30, 2020
    petition for rehearing added:
    27
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 20-60073, 825 F. App’x 178 (5th Cir. Aug. 25,
    2020) (regarding ARB Case No. 2020-0021, ALJ Case No. 2019-STA-00071) (“Third
    Complt.”).
    11
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    IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is
    DENIED. Further, the multiple motions filed by petitioner
    during the pendency of his petition for rehearing lack merit and
    are also hereby DENIED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    In the instant review proceeding—concerning Budri’s fourth OSHA
    complaint—his Appointment Clause challenges were again not presented to
    the ALJ or ARB prior to the ALJ’s June 18, 2020 dismissal order, the ALJ’s
    June 22, 2020 order denying reconsideration, or the ARB’s June 30, 2010
    decision and order. They were, however, discussed in Budri’s original and
    reply briefs (dated October 5 and December 1, 2020), as well as certain of the
    numerous motions that Budri has filed during the course of this proceeding.
    Nevertheless, on the instant record, reflecting the numerous administrative
    and judicial opportunities that Budri had to present these challenges—long
    before filing the instant July 3, 2020 petition for appellate court review
    regarding his fourth OSHA complaint—but simply failed to do so.
    Accordingly, we, like the panel of this court addressing Budri’s January 2020
    petition for review, decline to consider these assertions. 28 See also Block v.
    Tanenhaus, 
    867 F.3d 585
    , 589 (5th Cir. 2017) (arguments that could have
    been raised on prior appeal, but were not, are forfeited for purposes of
    subsequent appeal).
    In addition to his four administrative proceedings before the DOL,
    Budri could have urged these challenges in the very first agency review
    proceeding that he filed in this court on August 16, 2018. 29 Although Lucia
    was decided just two months earlier, on June 21, 2018, briefing in the matter
    28
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 20-60073, 825 F. App’x 178 (5th Cir. Aug. 25,
    2020) (regarding ARB Case No. 2020-0021, ALJ Case No. 2019-STA-00071) (“Third
    Complt.”).
    29
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 18-60579, 764 F. App’x 431 (5th Cir. 2019)
    (regarding ARB Case No. 18-025, ALJ Case No. 2017-STA-086) (“First Complt.”).
    12
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    was not completed until January 2019. And, even after briefing was
    completed, a letter identifying additional authority could have been
    submitted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), prior to
    the court’s issuance of a decision in April 2019, or in support of the petition
    for panel rehearing that Budri thereafter filed.
    Presumably, Budri also could have urged his challenges as part of his
    appeal (associated with his second OSHA complaint) to this court that was
    filed on October 31, 2019, but then dismissed on December 18, 2019, for want
    of prosecution. 30 And, finally, Budri could have sufficiently briefed these
    assertions (including an explanation for why they were being asserted, for the
    first time, in this court), in connection with the petition for review that he
    filed in this court on January 2020. 31
    Instead, on the record before us, it is evident that Budri has instead
    chosen to do things in circuitous fashion, seemingly employing a “squeaky
    wheel” or “wear them down” legal strategy characterized by quantity,
    repetition, and obstinance, rather than quality, logic, and prudence, with little
    regard for legal requirements, efficiency, or conservation of resources. It
    likewise is apparent that Budri also seeks to utilize his pro se status as both a
    shield and sword thereby exhibiting a complete lack of respect for the legal
    process and those who strive to proceed in a manner that is expeditious, fair,
    and ethical. 32 Budri’s written submissions are extremely repetitive, replete
    30
    Budri v. Firstfleet, Inc., No. 19-11203, 
    2019 WL 8645418
     (5th Cir. 2019) (“Second
    Complt.”).
    31
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 20-60073, 825 F. App’x 178 (5th Cir. Aug. 25,
    2020) (regarding ARB Case No. 2020-0021, ALJ Case No. 2019-STA-00071) (“Third
    Complt.”).
    32
    For instance, the DOL attorney representing respondent reports that receiving
    “upwards of 950 emails” from Budri since July 2018. See Respondent Br., at 22 n. 11.
    13
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    with vague, conclusory, and unclear assertions, and lack citations to pertinent
    legal authority, the administrative record, and other identifying information.
    Furthermore, Budri’s numerous motions for the most part address
    substantive issues urged as part of his petition for review and quite likely are
    designated as motions in order to avoid the briefing requirements set forth in
    Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the restrictions on                          the
    supplemental letter submissions permitted by Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 28(j). Nor is Budri’s filing of numerous motions unique to the
    instant proceeding. He filed more than 20 motions in the proceeding
    instituted before this court regarding this third OSHA complaint, 33 and more
    than 9 in the proceeding regarding his first OSHA complaint. 34 Notably, the
    motion totals for Budri’s prior proceedings before this court exclude motions
    addressing purely administrative matters such as those seeking an extension
    of time or to exceed page limitations.
    Even worse, Budri persists in this pursuit despite have been warned
    multiple times, including by this court, against repetitive and abusive
    litigation and wasting of resources. Indeed, in concluding that dismissal of
    Budri’s fourth OSHA complaint was warranted as a sanction for failure to
    comply with court orders, as well as for failure to state a claim, AJL Rosenow
    reported:
    A strong argument could be made that the very act of
    filing this complaint constituted no more than an attempt to
    vex Respondent, given that nothing related to his three
    previous filings could have given any reasonable person cause
    33
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 20-60073, 825 F. App’x 178, 179 (5th Cir. Aug.
    25, 2020) (regarding ARB Case No. 2020-0021, ALJ Case No. 2019-STA-00071) (“Third
    Complt.”).
    34
    Budri v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 18-60579, 764 F. App’x 431 (5th Cir. 2019)
    (regarding ARB Case No. 18-025, ALJ Case No. 2017-STA-086) (“First Complt.”).
    14
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    No. 20-60574
    to believe he might have a good faith basis for filing a fourth.
    However, even Complainant understood that he was
    disregarding my orders in the manner in which he litigated his
    claim. Those orders were specifically designed to help him
    clearly articulate his allegations and further the interests of fair,
    but efficient, litigation. They were intended to prevent the
    waste of judicial resources in a time when a national health
    emergency made managing litigation and adjudicating disputes
    more difficult than ever. He filed dozens of documents and
    motions in direct defiance of my order. He did so using email
    addresses he was specifically told not to use.
    His actions resulted in a significant drain on resources
    that could have been better used in the service of other litigants
    with legitimate disputes, who did behave reasonably and in
    conformance with court orders. Thus, Complainant interfered
    significantly with the judicial process.
    Similarly,     Complainant’s          conduct,      perhaps
    intentionally, prejudiced Respondent by forcing it to spend
    time and money to respond to a frivolous claim and frivolous
    filings within that claim. Even allowing for Complainant’s
    status as a self-represented litigant and the possibility that he is
    simply unable to understand the legal principles involved, the
    record is clear that he acted in bad faith in terms of intentionally
    filing documents contrary to my specific orders. Those orders
    were clear and required neither legal training nor extraordinary
    intellectual acumen to comprehend. Indeed, he clearly did
    comprehend them and elected to ignore them.
    Every adjudicative authority he has attempted to invoke
    has instructed him that he is not entitled to any relief. Indeed,
    one court threatened him with sanctions if he returned with any
    claim related to the same employment issue. Consequently,
    the record allows no conclusion other than that he is acting in
    culpable bad faith. Although he may subjectively believe he
    was wronged and refuse to believe the law denies him justice,
    he appears to equally believe that his status as a victim relieves
    15
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    No. 20-60574
    him of the obligation to comply with procedural rules and
    orders. His repeated complaints and threats demonstrate that
    he also fails to appreciate that his is not the only case pending
    within the Department of Labor.
    If the district court decision threatening sanctions was
    not enough to put him on notice, I also specifically warned him
    on multiple occasions of the consequences of noncompliance.
    His conduct over the years of litigation of his multiple claims
    also clearly show that any lesser sanction short of dismissal
    would serve no useful purpose. Respondent’s request for
    additional sanctions is not unreasonable, but beyond the
    authority provided in the statute and the applicable regulations.
    All of the relevant factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
    Therefore, the complaint is denied for both
    Complainant’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
    granted and his flagrant and defiant actions. 35
    Given the foregoing, we decline to entertain Budri’s Appointments Clause
    challenges. See Freytag, 
    501 U.S. at
    894–95 (Scalia, J., conc.) (“‘Forfeiture’ is
    ‘not a mere technicality and is essential to the orderly administration of
    justice.’”) (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
    and Procedure § 2472, p. 455 (1971)).
    VI.
    As discussed above, Budri has filed approximately 50 motions in this
    matter, most of which are styled “Motion to Take Judicial Notice” and
    simply expound upon or repeat matters addressed in Budri’s briefs or other
    motions. Regarding these, we are aware of the motions and their content.
    Otherwise, Budri’s pending motions concern matters adequately addressed
    35
    See Budri v. Firstfleet, ALJ No. 2019-STA-37 (ALJ June 18, 2020) (“Order of
    Dismissal”) at 9-11.
    16
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    No. 20-60574
    by our treatment of the issues raised in Budri’s petition for review. Thus, all
    of Budri’s pending motions are DENIED.
    VII.
    Respondent’s brief includes a request that we issue an order enjoining
    Budri from future filings arising from the same operative facts as his previous
    claims—his employment at Firstfleet and his February 17, 2017 termination.
    “‘Federal courts have inherent powers which include the authority to
    sanction a party or attorney when necessary to achieve the orderly and
    expeditious disposition of their dockets.’” Matter of Carroll, 
    850 F.3d 811
    ,
    815 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Scaife v. Associated Air Ctr. Inc., 
    100 F.3d 406
    ,
    411 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v.
    Case (In re Case), 
    937 F.2d 1014
    , 1023 (5th Cir. 1991). “Such powers may be
    exercised only if essential to preserve the authority of the court and the
    sanction chosen must employ the least possible power adequate to the end
    proposed.”Nat’l Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, Inc.,
    
    86 F.3d 464
    , 467 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 
    19 U.S. 6
     Wheat.
    204 (1821)). A court must make a specific finding of bad faith in order to
    impose sanctions under its inherent power. See Chaves v. M/V Medina Star,
    
    47 F.3d 153
    , 156 (5th Cir. 1995). Federal courts also have authority to enjoin
    vexatious litigants under the All Writs Act, 
    28 U.S.C. § 1651
    . Matter of
    Carroll, 850 F.3d at 815 (citing Newby v. Enron Corp., 
    302 F.3d 295
    , 302 (5th
    Cir. 2002)).
    “When considering whether to enjoin future filings, the court must
    consider the circumstances of the case, including four factors:”
    (1) the party's history of litigation, in particular whether
    he has filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2)
    whether the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the
    litigation, or simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the
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    No. 20-60574
    burden on the courts and other parties resulting from the
    party's filings; and (4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.
    Matter of Carroll, 850 F.3d at 815 ((citing Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC,
    
    513 F.3d 181
    , 189 (5th Cir. 2008)). Pro se litigants are not excluded from such
    sanctions. 
    Id.
     (citing Farguson v. MBank Hous., N.A., 
    808 F.2d 358
    , 359 (5th
    Cir. 1986)).
    Of course, “[n]otice and a hearing are required if the district court sua
    sponte imposes a pre-filing injunction.” Qureshi v. United States, 
    600 F.3d 523
    , 526 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Baum, 
    513 F.3d at 189
    ); see also Baum, 
    513 F.3d at 193
     (“[Appellant] was given notice and an opportunity to be heard
    regarding the imposition of the pre-filing injunction, which satisfies the
    requirements of due process in this case.”). Here, a pre-filing injunction is
    not contemplated sua sponte but instead is considered upon the request of
    Respondent as set forth and discussed on pages 20-23 of its brief. Budri has
    responded in his reply brief.
    VIII.
    We have determined that the issuance of an order establishing certain
    restrictions and requirements for future filings in this court by Budri is
    warranted for the same reasons that we have declined to consider Budri’s
    forfeited Appointments Clause challenges and denied Budri’s many pending
    motions. Accordingly, as will also be set forth in a separate written order, IT
    IS ORDERED that:
    (1) Any future filings in this court by Adriano Budri (“Budri”), except
    briefs filed in strict compliance with the Federal Rules of Appellate
    Procedure, must not exceed 5 pages in length unless prior leave of court is
    sought and granted upon good cause shown. Any such request for leave must
    itself be limited to no more than 5 pages in length.
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    Case: 20-60574     Document: 00515844378            Page: 19   Date Filed: 04/30/2021
    No. 20-60574
    (2) Unless otherwise ordered by this court, no more than three
    motions may be filed in any future proceeding in this court to which Budri is
    a party. Additionally, all motions filed by Budri must strictly comply with the
    Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, as well as the Fifth Circuit Rules and
    Internal Operating Procedures.
    (3) Any future filings in this court by Budri must include proper
    citations of legal authority and proper citations to the applicable court or
    agency records, including pertinent case names, docket numbers, dates of
    filing or issuance of orders, decisions, and any other relevant documents, as
    well as all pertinent page numbers.
    (4) Budri must file a copy of the above-referenced separate written
    order in any future proceedings instituted in this court relating in any way to
    his 2017 employment by Firstfleet and/or his termination from that
    employment.
    (5) Any material violations of the provisions of this court’s order(s)
    shall result in appropriate sanctions, including the striking of pleadings,
    dismissal, and/or the imposition of substantial monetary sanctions.
    (6) Any future filings in this court by Budri must include a signed
    certification by Budri confirming that the filing is made in good faith, is not
    repetitive of a prior filing, and that Budri understands that any material
    violations of the provisions of this court’s order(s) shall result in appropriate
    sanctions, including the striking of pleadings, dismissal, and/or the
    imposition of substantial monetary sanctions.
    IX.
    As stated herein, the petition for review is DENIED and all pending
    motions are DENIED. We GRANT Respondent’s request for entry of an
    19
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    No. 20-60574
    order restricting future filings by Petitioner Budri to the extent stated herein
    and in the separate written order to be issued by this court.
    20