In Re: Stanley Price ( 2021 )

Case: 20-30419 Document: 00515845507 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/03/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 3, 2021
No. 20-30419
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
In re: Stanley Price,
Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:20-MC-1448
Before Dennis, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Stanley Price moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in
this appeal from an order of the district court that prohibits future filings
and/or submissions made by or on behalf of Price unless he first obtains
authorization from a district judge. As noted by the district court, Price has
developed a pattern of filing civil actions against federal and state judges
based on their unfavorable judicial decisions, and he has done so even though
he has been made aware that “judges enjoy absolute immunity for judicial
acts performed in judicial proceedings.” Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110
(5th Cir. 1996) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)).
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-30419
By moving to proceed IFP on appeal, Price has challenged the district
court’s certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith. Baugh
v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Our inquiry into whether the
appeal is taken in good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal
points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Howard
v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). If we uphold the district court’s certification that the
appeal is not taken in good faith, Price must pay the appellate filing fee or the
appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202.
Alternatively, “where the merits are so intertwined with the certification
decision as to constitute the same issue,” we may deny the IFP motion and
dismiss the appeal sua sponte if it is frivolous. Id. at 202 & n.24; see 5th
Cir. R. 42.2.
Price contends that the filing restrictions infringe on his constitutional
rights. We have recognized a constitutional right of access to the courts,
see Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-73 (5th Cir. 1983). However, “[t]he
right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional and there is
no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is
frivolous or malicious.” Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 193
(5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, we
have determined that barring a litigant from filing future complaints without
the consent of the court is an appropriate sanction for filing multiple meritless
lawsuits. See Balawajder v. Scott, 160 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998).
Next, Price contends that the district judge who issued the instant
sanction order is personally biased against him, and he argues that the judge
has violated her oath of office because she has allowed judicial officials to
violate his rights; further, he contends that the judge should recuse herself
from hearing any cases involving him or his family. However, Price’s
assertions of judicial bias are seemingly based on the orders issued in the
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No. 20-30419
instant case, as well as adverse judicial rulings issued by other judges in cases
already concluded. Price’s contentions are thus unavailing, as judicial
rulings, standing alone, almost never constitute a valid basis for recusal. See
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
Finally, when his pro se filings are liberally construed, see Morrow
v. FBI, 2 F.3d 642, 643 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993), Price seems to contend that the
district court abused its discretion in imposing the filing restrictions. He
asserts that other judges did not conclude that sanctions were warranted.
In determining whether to impose a pre-filing injunction, “a court
must weigh all the relevant circumstances,” including the following factors:
(1) the party’s history of litigation, in particular whether he has
filed vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits; (2) whether
the party had a good faith basis for pursuing the litigation, or
simply intended to harass; (3) the extent of the burden on the
courts and other parties resulting from the party’s filings; and
(4) the adequacy of alternative sanctions.
Baum, 513 F.3d at 189.
Here, the district court explicitly considered the enumerated factors,
and it also took into account other relevant circumstances. Price has made
no showing that the district court abused its discretion in deciding to issue a
pre-filing injunction. See Qureshi v. United States, 523, 524 (5th Cir. 2010).
Price has not demonstrated that his appeal involves “legal points
arguable on their merits.” Howard, 707 F.2d at 220. Thus, his motion for
leave to proceed IFP is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED as
frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 & n.24; 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
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