Derrick Scott v. Lonnie Nail , 589 F. App'x 297 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-30291      Document: 00512894776         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/08/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-30291
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 8, 2015
    DERRICK SCOTT,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    LONNIE NAIL; JAMIE FUSSELL; ANGIE HUFF; JAMES M. LEBLANC,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 5:10-CV-1776
    Before PRADO, OWEN, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Derrick Scott, Louisiana prisoner # 126372, appeals the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment for the defendants in this 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action.
    Scott alleged that he had been denied due process during a prison disciplinary
    proceeding when he was not allowed to call witnesses, that he was denied due
    process because the prison disciplinary rule at issue failed to provide fair
    warning that his conduct could result in a violation, and that the defendants’
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-30291     Document: 00512894776      Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/08/2015
    No. 14-30291
    denial of his request to call witnesses was in retaliation for previous litigation
    he had filed.
    As an initial matter, Scott moved to strike the defendants’ brief or for an
    extension of time to file a reply brief because he had not yet received a copy of
    the defendants’ brief.    Scott has submitted a proposed reply brief, which
    indicates that he did receive the defendants’ brief; therefore, we deny his
    motion to strike. However, Scott’s proposed reply brief was submitted almost
    two weeks after it was due, making it untimely. See FED. R. APP. P. 31(a)(1).
    Although Scott has requested an extension of time to file a reply, this court
    “greatly disfavors all extensions of time for filing reply briefs.” 5TH CIR. R.
    31.4.4.   Scott’s proposed reply brief effectively repeats the substantive
    arguments that he set forth in his primary brief. Because his reply brief would
    not assist in the resolution of the instant appeal, the motion for an extension
    of time to file a reply also is denied. See 5TH CIR. R. 31.4.4.
    We review the district court’s summary judgment dismissal de novo,
    under the same standards used by the district court. See Hernandez v. Yellow
    Transp., Inc., 
    670 F.3d 644
    , 650 (5th Cir. 2012). “Summary judgment is proper
    if the pleadings and evidence show there is no genuine issue of material fact
    and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see FED.
    R. CIV. P. 56(a). We may affirm summary judgment on any ground evident in
    the record. Jones v. Lowndes County, Miss., 
    678 F.3d 344
    , 348 (5th Cir. 2012).
    A prisoner who seeks to invoke the Due Process Clause’s procedural
    protections must establish that his life, liberty, or property is at stake.
    Wilkinson v. Austin, 
    545 U.S. 209
    , 221 (2005). A prisoner’s protected liberty
    interests are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
    exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
    protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes
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    No. 14-30291
    atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
    incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 484 (1995) (internal
    citations omitted. In the instant case, Scott’s disciplinary conviction resulted
    in ten days of disciplinary segregation. We have held that “administrative
    segregation, without more, does not constitute a deprivation of a
    constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.” Luken v. Scott, 
    71 F.3d 192
    , 193
    (5th Cir. 1995).     Because this punishment did not trigger due process
    protections, Scott has not shown that his due process rights were violated. See
    Harper v. Showers, 
    174 F.3d 716
    , 719 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Scott also alleged that the defendants denied his request to call
    witnesses in retaliation for his prior litigation activities, including suits filed
    against these same defendants. A prison official may not retaliate against an
    inmate for accessing the courts or using a prison grievance procedure. See
    Gibbs v. King, 
    779 F.2d 1040
    , 1046 (5th Cir. 1986). To state a valid claim for
    retaliation under § 1983, a prisoner must allege (1) his invocation of a specific
    constitutional right, (2) the defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner
    due to his exercising that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) a causal
    connection. Jones v. Greninger, 
    188 F.3d 322
    , 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999). Claims
    of retaliation are regarded with skepticism and are carefully scrutinized by the
    courts. Woods v. Smith, 
    60 F.3d 1161
    , 1166 (5th Cir. 1995). Conclusional
    assertions of retaliation are insufficient; to establish a claim for retaliation, a
    prisoner must produce either direct evidence of retaliation or at least “allege a
    chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” See 
    id.
    Although Scott presented some evidence of past litigation involving these
    defendants, he failed to present evidence establishing the existence of a
    genuine issue of material fact regarding whether these defendants were aware
    of any litigation pending against them at the time of the disciplinary hearing.
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    No. 14-30291
    We also conclude that Scott has not shown that the refusal of his request to
    call live witnesses at a disciplinary hearing constituted a retaliatory adverse
    act sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her
    constitutional rights. See Morris v. Powell, 
    449 F.3d 682
    , 686 (5th Cir. 2006).
    Finally, we conclude that Scott has not shown that the defendants had an
    intent to retaliate against him by presenting direct evidence of retaliatory
    intent or a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be
    inferred. See Woods, 
    60 F.3d at 1166
    .
    AFFIRMED; MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLEES’ BRIEF DENIED;
    MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE REPLY BRIEF DENIED.
    4