Hudson v. Shields ( 1999 )


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  •                        IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-60711
    Summary Calendar
    In the Matter Of:               N. HANEY HUDSON
    Debtor.
    N. HANEY HUDSON,
    Appellant,
    versus
    H. ALEX SHIELDS, JR.,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 4:98-CV-85-LN
    August 3, 1999
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant N. Haney Hudson appeals the district court’s September 18, 1998 order
    dismissing his Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. After a thorough review of the record and briefs, we
    affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 1989, Defendant-Appellee H. Alex Shields (“Shields”) agreed to sell 148 acres to the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    Debtor N. Haney Hudson (“Hudson”) for the sum of $350,000.00. Shields personally financed the
    sale to Hudson who, in turn, executed a deed of trust in favor of Shields for the full amount of the
    indebtedness. The deed of trust was duly filed in the land records office of the Chancery Court of
    Clarke County, Mississippi, on May 15, 1989. On July 2, 1990, Hudson sought relief from his debts
    pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy code. A subsequent addendum to Hudson’s
    plan reorganization required him to make payments to Shields. Hudson’s failure to make payment
    led Shields to conduct a foreclosure sale of Hudson’s property on July 31, 1991. Hudson was
    successful in preventing the foreclosure on the property.
    Since then, the parties have been involved in a protracted legal dispute in which Shields has
    primarily sought to foreclose on the property and collect on the debt Hudson owes him. On July 14,
    1997, Hudson filed a motion in the bankruptcy court to lift an order which was holding various
    motions in abeyance pending the resolution of all issues in state court. The bankruptcy court granted
    this motion on July 25, 1997. On March 4, 1998, the bankruptcy court held a trial on Shields’s
    motion to dismiss the chapter 11 claims or convert them to chapter 7 claims. The bankruptcy court
    dismissed the chapter 11 claims in a May 8, 1998 order and the district court subsequently affirmed
    in a September 18, 1998 order. Hudson now appeals.
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    We review a bankruptcy court's decision to dismiss a Chapter 11 petition for abuse of
    discretion. See In re Elmwood Development Co., 
    964 F.2d 508
    , 509 (5th Cir. 1992). We review the
    district court’s determinations of law de novo. See In re Martin, 
    880 F.2d 857
    , 858 (5th Cir. 1989).
    DISCUSSION
    Hudson endeavors to bring a plethora of issues before this court yet it is clear from the record
    that resolution of this case requires us to address a sole issue: whether the district court abused its
    discret ion in affirming the dismissal of Hudson’s chapter 11 case. After a thorough review of the
    record, the briefs and the applicable law, we agree with the district court and affirm.
    It is beyond dispute that Hudson has failed to make any plan payments to creditors, as
    2
    required by 
    11 U.S.C. § 1101
     (2)(c) following the June 1991 confirmation of his plan. Hudson also
    made only one plan payment to Shields in May 1991 as required by the addendum to his plan. Cause
    for dismissal exists where, as here, (1) t he debtor exhibits an “inability to effectuate substantial
    consumation of a confirmed plan;” and (2) the debtor is in material default with respect to a
    confirmed plan. See 
    11 U.S.C. § 1112
    (b)(7)-(8). On this basis, we agree with the district court and
    find no abuse of discretion.
    We further find that the court below properly dismissed this action rather than convert it into
    a chapter 7 case. Hudson’s sparse assets which are already encumbered cannot convey any benefit
    to the estate or any creditors; therefore, there was no basis for conversion. Finding no error, we
    affirm.
    CONCLUSION
    We agree with the district court and adopt its reasoning as our own. AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-60711

Filed Date: 8/12/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021