Taylor Walker v. Skalka ( 2021 )

Case: 20-20216 Document: 00515858080 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/11/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 11, 2021
No. 20-20216 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Marilyn J. Taylor Walker,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Ben Skalka, Fraud Investigator; Carla Venzor, Hearing Officer;
The Houston Housing Authority,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-2736
Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Marilyn J. Taylor Walker, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of her motions for default judgment and its dismissal of her
civil rights complaint. With the benefit of liberal construction, she argues
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-20216 Document: 00515858080 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/11/2021
No. 20-20216
that she was entitled to default judgment because she was not properly served
with the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of The Houston Housing Authority
and its employees Ben Skalka and Carla Venzor (collectively, the
defendants).
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for default judgment
for abuse of discretion. Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001).
Generally, a plaintiff may seek default judgment when a defendant fails to
defend against a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. The defendants in this
case timely filed and served their motion to dismiss on Taylor Walker via
certified mail to her last known address. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(D);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Although Taylor Walker contends she did not
ultimately receive the mailing, service was complete as of the mailing date.
See Fed. R Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). In arguing that she was not properly served,
Taylor Walker relies entirely on Texas state rules and state case law, which
are inapposite. Because the defendants did not default, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor Walker’s motions for default
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.
Taylor Walker has abandoned, by failing to brief, any challenge to the
district court’s dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a claim and to
its award of costs to the defendants. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-
25 (5th Cir. 1993). To the extent that she seeks to raise any new claims for
the first time on appeal, we decline to consider them. See id. at 225.
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
2