Phillips v. State of TX ( 2021 )

Case: 20-50347 Document: 00515864778 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/17/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
May 17, 2021
No. 20-50347
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Robert Phillips,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
State of Texas; Steve Christian, Individual Capacity
and Official Capacity, SAPD Officer; Yvonne Jaramillo,
Individual Capacity and Official Capacity, 911
Communication Unit Officer; Susan D. Reed, Individual
Capacity and Official Capacity, Criminal District
Attorney; Daryl Harris, Individual Capacity and
Official Capacity, Assistant Criminal District
Attorney; James Brian Peplinski, Individual Capacity
and Official Capacity, Lead Attorney; Raymond
Angelini, Individual Capacity and Official Capacity,
Honorable Judge, 187th District Court; Rebecca C.
Martinez, Individual Capacity and Official Capacity,
Justice; Sandee Bryan Marion, Individual Capacity and
Official Capacity, Justice; Catherine Stone, Individual
Capacity and Official Capacity, Chief Justice; Richard
E. Langlois, Individual Capacity and Official Capacity,
Appellant Attorney,
Defendants—Appellees.
Case: 20-50347 Document: 00515864778 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/17/2021
No. 20-50347
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western Division of Texas
USDC No. 5:19-CV-1261
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Dennis and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Robert Phillips brings this pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a
number of defendants, alleging misconduct arising predominantly from a
2011 altercation with law enforcement. We affirm the district court’s
judgment dismissing Phillips’s complaint.
I
In early 2011, Phillips was arrested, then subsequently indicted and
prosecuted, for one count of Coercion of a Public Servant and one count of
Terroristic Threats for threatening comments Phillips made during 911 calls.
On the evening in question, Phillips made a series of abusive 911 calls to
report a child custody order violation, despite being repeatedly informed that
this was a civil matter. 1 The jury convicted Phillips, 2 and the San Antonio
Court of Appeals affirmed that conviction. 3
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
1
See Phillips v. State, 401 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet.
ref’d).
2
Id. at 286.
3
Id. at 293.
2
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Here, Phillips named as defendants the State of Texas, a San Antonio
police officer, a 911 Communication Unit Officer, the District Attorney and
Assistant District Attorney involved in his indictment and prosecution,
multiple state court judges involved in his trial and appeal, and his own
counsel. Phillips challenges his conviction and other actions taken by the
named defendants, averring widespread prosecutorial, judicial, official, and
professional misconduct before, during, and after his trial. Phillips alleges,
inter alia, that the arresting officers assaulted and falsely arrested him, his
conviction was the unlawful result of a double jeopardy violation, his trial
counsel conspired with the District Attorney to convict him, the District
Attorney publicly disclosed private facts about him, his appellate counsel
conspired to defraud the United States, and the then-Chief Justice of the San
Antonio Court of Appeals violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution
and her oath of office. The district court dismissed Phillips’s suit for failure
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
II
A district court is directed to dismiss a claim by an inmate or in forma
pauperis litigant if the complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 4 “A dismissal of a civil rights complaint for
failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo, using the same standard applicable
to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” 5 Phillips filed
this civil rights suit in forma pauperis, and thus this court may consider
4
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
5
Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citing
Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (summary calendar) (per curiam)).
3
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affirmative defenses sua sponte. 6
We first note that the Heck rule bars most all of Phillips’s claims. In
Heck v. Humphrey, 7 the Supreme Court adopted the favorable termination
rule, 8 holding that a § 1983 suit must be dismissed if a judgment in the
plaintiff’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence” and the plaintiff cannot show that his “conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.” 9 In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 10 the Supreme Court
clarified that a “§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no
matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of
the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison
proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of confinement or its duration.” 11 This court performs a Heck
analysis by asking “whether the claims are necessarily inconsistent with the
conviction, or whether they can coexist with the conviction or sentence
without calling it into question.” 12
Phillips’s claims consist largely of direct challenges to his conviction.
In his prayer for relief, for example, Phillips specifically requests that this
court overturn his allegedly unlawful conviction and expunge his criminal
record. Heck bars such a challenge. Further, the Heck bar extends to
6
Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990) (summary calendar).
7
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
8
See id. at 484 n.4.
9
Id. at 487.
10
544 U.S. 74 (2005).
11
Id. at 81-82 (emphasis in original).
12
Smith v. Hood, 900 F.3d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 400-01 (5th Cir. 2006)).
4
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Phillips’s claims against his counsel, Peplinksi and Langlois. Phillips alleges
that Peplinksi and Langlois conspired with the prosecution to unlawfully
convict him. Assuming without deciding that his counsel qualified as state
actors for § 1983 purposes, Phillips’s claims against them fall squarely within
Heck’s purview because a favorable judgment would imply the unlawfulness
of his conviction. Heck also bars the bulk of Phillips’s claims against the
District Attorney and Assistant District Attorney. Phillips seeks damages for
their alleged prosecutorial misconduct that led to his unlawful conviction.
Again, success on this claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his
conviction.
Additionally, immunity forecloses many of Phillips’s claims. Judicial
immunity bars Phillips’s claims against Judge Angelini, Justice Martinez,
Justice Marion, and Chief Justice Stone. 13 Likewise, the Eleventh
Amendment bars Phillips’s § 1983 claim against the State of Texas.14
Similarly, prosecutorial immunity bars most all of Phillips’s claims against
District Attorney Reed and Assistant District Attorney Harris. Prosecutors
enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for actions falling within their
role as an advocate, 15 and all of Phillips’s claims fall within this sphere, save
13
See Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Absolute judicial
immunity extends to all judicial acts which are not performed in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978))).
14
Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The
Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
(citing Farias v. Bexar Cnty. Bd. of Trs. for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d
866, 875 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991))).
15
See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)).
5
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perhaps Reed’s comments to the media disclosing private facts. 16 This
privacy-based claim is discussed below.
Next, Phillips’s claims against San Antonio Police Officer Christian
and 911 Communication Unit Officer Jaramillo are time-barred. Phillips
alleges that Officer Christian assaulted and falsely arrested him in July of
2010, and that both officers did the same in February of 2011. This court
looks to the forum state’s general personal injury limitations period to
determine the period applicable to a § 1983 suit. 17 In Texas, that period is
two years. 18 The accrual date of a § 1983 suit, though, is a question of federal
law. 19 Generally, and applicable to this assault claim, a cause of action
accrues when the claimant becomes aware of his injury or has sufficient
information to know he has been injured. 20 The statute of limitations for a
false arrest claim “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained
pursuant to legal process.” 21 Here, Phillips filed suit on October 24, 2019—
more than two years after each of these claims accrued. 22 The claims are
barred by limitations on their face.
16
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277 (“Fitzsimmons’ statements to the media are not entitled
to absolute immunity.”).
17
Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1990) (summary calendar) (first citing
Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989); and then citing Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416,
418 (5th Cir. 1989) (summary calendar)).
18
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).
19
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007).
20
See King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 762 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 574 (5th Cir. 2010)).
21
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 397.
22
See generally Phillips v. State, 401 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013,
pet. ref’d).
6
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Finally, we consider Phillips’s claim that District Attorney Reed
“knowingly breach[ed] the veil of secrecy” by publicly disclosing private
facts about him. While Heck may not bar this claim, limitations does. Phillips
alleges that this misconduct occurred in February 2011. Assuming that such
a claim is even cognizable in a § 1983 suit, 23 and assuming further that
Texas’s two-year limitations period would apply to this claim for invasion of
privacy 24—as opposed to the shorter one-year period for defamation 25—
limitations has run.
* * *
In sum, Phillips’s claims are barred by either Heck, immunity, or
limitations. The district court’s judgment dismissing Phillips’s complaint is
AFFIRMED.
23
But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) (holding that a privacy-based
defamation claim, standing alone, is not actionable in a § 1983 suit).
24
Wood v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas’s
two-year general personal injury limitations statute to a claim for invasion of privacy).
25
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.002(a).
7