James Evans v. Jamie Baker , 442 F. App'x 108 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 11-10248     Document: 00511607279         Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/20/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 20, 2011
    No. 11-10248
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    JAMES NATHANIEL EVANS, also known as James N. Evans,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    JAMIE BAKER, Warden; MARTHA MAES, Sergeant; THERESA HENDRICKS,
    Captain,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:10-CV-226
    Before WIENER, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff-Appellant James Nathaniel Evans, Texas prisoner # 652108,
    appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint as
    frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Evans
    argues that he was denied due process in connection with disciplinary action
    taken against him and the confiscation of his property. He is seeking the
    expungement of a disciplinary conviction for extortion and monetary damages.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 11-10248   Document: 00511607279      Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/20/2011
    No. 11-10248
    We review de novo a district court’s determination that a complaint is
    frivolous and fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, applying the
    same standard of review as is applicable to dismissals pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
    P. 12(b)(6). Geiger v. Jowers, 
    404 F.3d 371
    , 373 (5th Cir. 2005). Evans’s
    contention that the magistrate judge erred in relying on Hudson v. Palmer, 
    468 U.S. 517
     (1984), and Parratt v. Taylor, 
    451 U.S. 527
     (1981), overruled in part on
    other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 
    474 U.S. 327
    , 330 (1986) is erroneous. The
    magistrate judge correctly recognized that the Parratt/Hudson doctrine did not
    bar Evans’s § 1983 claim because the prison officials’ actions in this case were
    taken pursuant to routine administrative directives. See Allen v. Thomas, 
    388 F.3d 147
    , 149 (5th Cir. 2004).      Further, Evans received the due process
    protections required when he received notice of the basis for the confiscation of
    the subject property and a fair opportunity to rebut the allegations concerning
    his ownership of the property at the hearing and in his grievances.           See
    Wilkinson v. Austin, 
    545 U.S. 209
    , 225-26 (2005). The district court did not err
    in dismissing this claim as frivolous.
    Relying on Muhammad v. Close, 
    540 U.S. 749
    , 751 (2004), Evans contends
    that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint under
    the Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 
    520 U.S. 641
     (1997) doctrine because he filed an amended complaint withdrawing his
    claim to have his good time credits restored. The district court did not err in
    determining that his § 1983 complaint is barred, as expungement of his
    disciplinary proceeding would result in restoration of his good time credits.
    Further, if Evans is not eligible for release on mandatory supervision as he
    asserted, he has no liberty interest in his good time credits or other punishments
    imposed as a result of the disciplinary hearing; thus, he may not complain about
    the denial of due process. See Arnold v. Cockrell, 
    306 F.3d 277
    , 279 (5th Cir.
    2002); Madison v. Parker, 
    104 F.3d 765
    , 768 (5th Cir. 1997).
    2
    Case: 11-10248    Document: 00511607279     Page: 3    Date Filed: 09/20/2011
    No. 11-10248
    Last, Evans contends that the prison disciplinary rules created a liberty
    interest in particular procedural guidelines that were not followed before he was
    placed in restrictive confinement, his good time credits were revoked, and he was
    punished for possession of unauthorized property. The failure to comply with
    prison regulations does not constitute a per se constitutional violation when
    other constitutional safeguards have been employed. See Jackson v. Cain, 
    864 F.2d 1235
    , 1251-52 (5th Cir. 1989). Further, the pleadings and exhibits filed
    show that Evans received timely notice of the charged violation, participated in
    the hearing, and was provided with reasons for the finding of guilt. Thus, Evans
    received adequate due process protection during the proceedings. He has not
    shown that any violation of the prison rules or regulations gave rise to a
    constitutional denial of due process during the disciplinary proceedings. The
    district court did not err in dismissing this claim as frivolous.
    The district court did not err in dismissing the complaint with prejudice
    as frivolous pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(B)(i). Accordingly, the judgment of
    that court is AFFIRMED.
    3