United States v. Braddy ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50185 Document: 00516351000 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/09/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
June 9, 2022
No. 21-50185
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Marshall Lee Braddy,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. 5:19-CR-264
Before Smith, Wiener, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Marshall Braddy pleaded guilty of conspiring to distribute cocaine and
methamphetamine. He also pleaded true to a sentencing enhancement owing
to a prior conviction. At a hearing, the district court sentenced Braddy to ten
years of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. But the written
judgment imposed twenty-seven conditions of supervised release not stated
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circum-
stances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50185 Document: 00516351000 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/09/2022
No. 21-50185
at the hearing. Seventeen of those are standard conditions from a standing
order of the Western District of Texas. 1 This appeal decides the fate of those
seventeen discretionary conditions.
A district court must pronounce discretionary sentencing conditions
so that the defendant has “notice and an opportunity to object.” United States
v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Braddy and the gov-
ernment agree that the district court did not satisfy that requirement: At
sentencing, the court did not state the seventeen conditions. Nor did it adopt
the Western District’s standing order, which lists those conditions, or the
presentence report, which advised their imposition.
The parties are correct: The district court abused its discretion. That
leaves the question of remedy.
Braddy and the government ask us to instruct the district court to
excise the seventeen conditions from Braddy’s sentence. That is our usual
approach, 2 from which we have no reason to depart. We direct the district
court to strike those discretionary conditions from the written judgment so
that it conforms to the oral sentence. With those instructions, the judgment
of sentence is VACATED and REMANDED.
1
Conditions of Probation & Supervised Release (W.D. Tex. as amended Nov. 28,
2016), https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/Standing%20Orders/District
/Conditions%20of%20Probation%20and%20Supervised%20Release.pdf.
2
See, e.g., Diggles, 957 F.3d at 563 (“Our caselaw does not generally give the district
court [a] second chance when it fails to pronounce a condition . . . .”); United States v.
Omigie, 977 F.3d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558 (5th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Rodriguez, 852 F. App’x 810, 811–12 (5th Cir. 2021) (per cur-
iam); United States v. Smith, 852 F. App’x 780, 789 & n.36 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam);
United States v. Davalos, 810 F. App’x 268, 276 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); United States
v. Saldana-Cordero, 735 F. App’x 134, 134–35 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
2