United States v. Coats ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-10419     Document: 00515892837          Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/09/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 9, 2021
    No. 20-10419                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Garmon Coats,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:93-CR-128-1
    Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    Garmon Coats filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A)(i) (“Motion”), which the district court denied. We
    AFFIRM.
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 20-10419       Document: 00515892837             Page: 2      Date Filed: 06/09/2021
    No. 20-10419
    I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In 1994, a jury convicted Coats of one count of bank robbery in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2113
    (d), three counts of obstructing commerce by
    robbery in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
    , and three counts of using and
    carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). Coats received a total sentence of 802 months.
    In April 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Coats
    filed the Motion pro se, arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons
    warrant a sentence reduction or commutation of his sentence for two reasons.
    First, because the First Step Act altered (albeit non-retroactively) how
    § 924(c) sentences are consecutively stacked, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 
    132 Stat. 5194
    , 5221–22 (2018), Coats asserted that his prison sentence would
    have been reduced by 30 years had he been sentenced under the Act. 1
    Second, relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), Coats
    contended that his 262-month prison term for the bank robbery conviction
    was predicated on factual findings that were improperly made by the district
    court.
    The district court denied the Motion, reasoning that Coats had not
    presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction as described
    in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. It added that even “[i]f the court is mistaken and
    movant has spelled out extraordinary and compelling reasons for his early
    release, the court still would not reduce his sentence” because the factors
    listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) weigh against granting relief.
    Coats timely appealed.
    1
    More specifically, instead of the 540-month mandatory sentence he received for
    the three § 924(c) convictions, he would have received a 180-month sentence.
    2
    Case: 20-10419      Document: 00515892837           Page: 3    Date Filed: 06/09/2021
    No. 20-10419
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Thompson, 
    984 F.3d 431
    , 433 (5th Cir. 2021).
    III. DISCUSSION
    “Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court may reduce the
    defendant’s term of imprisonment, after considering the applicable 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, if the court finds that (1) ‘extraordinary and compelling
    reasons warrant such a reduction’ and (2) ‘a reduction is consistent with
    applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” United
    States v. Okpalobi, 831 F. App’x 715, 715 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting
    § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). This court has previously considered § 1B1.13 an
    applicable policy statement when the prisoner, rather than the Bureau of
    Prisons, moves for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See, e.g., id.; United States
    v. Chambliss, 
    948 F.3d 691
    , 693 (5th Cir. 2020).
    In United States v. Shkambi, this court joined our sister circuits in
    holding that § 1B1.13 does not actually apply to § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions
    brought by the inmate. See 
    993 F.3d 388
    , 393 (5th Cir. 2021). And in United
    States v. Cooper, the court remanded a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion
    in light of Shkambi so that “the district court [could] consider, in the first
    instance, whether the nonretroactive sentencing changes to [the
    defendant’s] § 924(c) convictions, either alone or in conjunction with any
    other applicable considerations, constitute extraordinary and compelling
    reasons for a reduction in sentence.” 
    996 F.3d 283
    , 289 (5th Cir. 2021). At
    first glance it might appear that we should remand this case as the court did
    in Cooper since the district court there, like here, incorrectly found itself
    bound by § 1B1.13 when considering whether the First Step Act’s non-
    retroactive modifications to § 924(c) constitute an extraordinary and
    3
    Case: 20-10419        Document: 00515892837             Page: 4      Date Filed: 06/09/2021
    No. 20-10419
    compelling reason justifying a shortened sentence. See id. at 288. 2 But
    remand in Cooper was proper since it was not “a case where, notwithstanding
    the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons, the district court
    nonetheless determined that § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors militate against a
    sentence reduction.” See id. As noted, this is such a situation.
    Thus, even assuming the post-sentencing legal developments on
    which Coats relies could be considered as extraordinary and compelling
    reasons for a sentence reduction, we must affirm the district court’s denial of
    the Motion unless the lower court “base[d] its decision on an error of law or
    clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence” when applying and balancing
    the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693 (citation
    omitted). Coats’s “disagree[ment] with how the district court balanced the
    § 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for reversal.” See id. at 694.
    Nor would be ours. See United States v. Nguyen, 
    854 F.3d 276
    , 283 (5th Cir.
    2017).
    The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and sufficiently
    articulated reasons for denying the Motion, in particular the seriousness of
    Coats’s offenses and the need to protect the public. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d
    at 693–94. Specifically, the district court noted that Coats (1) was tried by a
    jury and convicted on seven counts related to four robberies; (2) “threatened
    to blow [a victim’s] brains out” with a gun during one robbery; (3) shoved a
    “big bore automatic pistol” in another victim’s face during a second robbery;
    (4) did not accept responsibility for his crimes and attempted to flee from
    custody after the verdict was read; (5) oversaw the criminal activity at issue;
    and (6) participated in other serious offenses, including aggravated robbery
    2
    The same could perhaps be said for Coats’s reliance on Apprendi since this court
    has not previously ruled on whether the change in law espoused by that case may be
    considered an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction.
    4
    Case: 20-10419     Document: 00515892837          Page: 5   Date Filed: 06/09/2021
    No. 20-10419
    and aggravated kidnapping. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district
    court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against a sentence
    reduction. See id. Given this, the district court did not err in denying the
    Motion.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-10419

Filed Date: 6/9/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/9/2021