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Hudgins v. Catoe ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-40355     Document: 00515905481         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/18/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 20-40355                             June 18, 2021
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Isreal Hudgins,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Warden Jeffrey Catoe; Michael Britt; Michael Collum;
Julie D. Bales; Susan A. Mullinax; Blair Pack; Deborah
Roden; Rebecca Cox; Jean Sparks; Jose Gonzales;
Michael McNeil,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:19-CV-403
Before Clement, Elrod, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Isreal Hudgins, Texas prisoner # 1649033, moves for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s orders dismissing
his
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-40355      Document: 00515905481            Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/18/2021
No. 20-40355
denying his motion for reconsideration. Hudgins raised numerous claims
against the defendants, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by
denying him due process and the right to redress in connection with the
prison disciplinary proceedings, retaliating against him for seeking redress,
subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by placing him in
administrative segregation based on a void disciplinary conviction and
denying him access to courts. The district court dismissed some claims as
barred by Heck v. Humphrey,
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994), and dismissed the
remainder of the claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. In denying Hudgins’s IFP motion, the district court certified that
the appeal is not taken in good faith.
By moving to proceed IFP, Hudgins is challenging the district court’s
certification. See Baugh v. Taylor,
    117 F.3d 197
    , 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus,
his request “must be directed solely to the trial court’s reasons for the
certification decision.”
    Id.
     Our inquiry into an appellant’s good faith “is
limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits
(and therefore not frivolous).” Howard v. King,
    707 F.2d 215
    , 220 (5th Cir.
1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Hudgins provides no argument challenging the district court’s
reasons for certifying that his appeal is not taken in good faith. Further, while
he states that defendants denied him access to courts and that his continued
housing in administrative segregation implicates a protected liberty interest,
he does not address the district court’s reasons for dismissing those claims
or identify any error with the district court’s resolution of those claims.
Although we liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants, see Grant v. Cuellar,
    59 F.3d 523
    , 524 (5th Cir. 1995), Hudgins has abandoned any challenge to the
certification decision and has failed to show that he will raise a nonfrivolous
issue for appeal by failing to point to any error in the district court’s decision.
2
Case: 20-40355     Document: 00515905481         Page: 3   Date Filed: 06/18/2021
No. 20-40355
See Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th
Cir. 1987); Howard,
    707 F.2d at 220
    .
Further, although he challenges the denial of his motion for the
appointment of counsel in the district court, he has not made an arguable
showing of exceptional circumstances and, thus, has not shown a
nonfrivolous basis for contending that the ruling was a “clear abuse of
discretion.” Cupit v. Jones,
    835 F.2d 82
    , 86 (5th Cir. 1987); see Ulmer v.
Chancellor,
    691 F.2d 209
    , 212 (5th Cir. 1982). He has also failed to show
extraordinary circumstances warranting the appointment of appellate
counsel, see Ulmer,
    691 F.2d at 212
    , and his motion for the appointment of
appellate counsel is therefore DENIED.
Accordingly, Hudgins’ motion to proceed IFP on appeal is
DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS.
3