Weinhoffer v. Davie Shoring ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 20-30568     Document: 00516174177         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/20/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 20, 2022
    No. 20-30568
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    David Weinhoffer, as liquidating trustee of Offshore Specialty
    Fabricators L.L.C.,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Davie Shoring, Incorporated,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:19-CV-11175
    Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Engelhardt, Circuit
    Judges.
    Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
    David Weinhoffer and Davie Shoring, Inc., dispute the terms of an
    online auction. We review whether evidence of the terms was properly
    admitted. Because the district court abused its discretion by improperly
    admitting evidence and taking judicial notice of the terms, we reverse the
    judgment of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings.
    Case: 20-30568        Document: 00516174177              Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/20/2022
    No. 20-30568
    I.
    Offshore Specialty Fabricators L.L.C. (“OSF”) was subject to a
    Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan administered by liquidating trustee David
    Weinhoffer. OSF contracted with Henderson Auctions to auction off a large
    housing module. Henderson advertised and hosted the auction on its website,
    but when auction participants clicked on the link to bid, they were directed
    to Proxibid, a third-party website, where they could view the auction’s terms
    and conditions and place their bids. Among these terms was a term declaring
    that bidders would be liable for only 20% of the bid price in the event of a
    breach of contract. Instead of using the website, Warren Davie, Davie
    Shoring’s principal, placed the winning bid of $177,500 on a phone call with
    a Henderson employee. After the auction concluded, Davie Shoring refused
    to pay for the module when it proved difficult to remove from storage.
    Weinhoffer brought suit as OSF’s liquidating trustee, seeking
    recovery of Davie Shoring’s bid of $177,500. Weinhoffer’s breach of sale
    contract claim was tried in a bench trial. Davie Shoring argued that the terms
    of the auction limited the damages to 20% of the winning bid, here $35,500.
    Davie testified that he read the auction terms, including the 20% damages
    limitation, on Henderson’s website before bidding. At trial, Davie Shoring
    introduced the auction terms and conditions in two forms: (1) as an internet
    printout labeled “Exhibit 41” and (2) as an archived webpage from a website
    known as the “Wayback Machine,” an online archive of web pages. 1
    Davie Shoring introduced Exhibit 41 through the testimony of Renita
    Martin, Henderson’s office manager. However, Martin testified that Exhibit
    1
    “The Wayback Machine is an online digital archive of web pages. It is run by the
    Internet Archive, a nonprofit library in San Francisco, California.” Mojave Desert Holdings,
    LLC v. Crocs, Inc., 844 F. App’x 343, 346 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
    2
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    41 had not been in Henderson’s possession “because the auction was no
    longer up on [Henderson’s] website.” Instead, Martin searched for the
    auction terms on Proxibid’s website to produce them in response to the
    subpoena. Martin explained that even if the auction page were still live on
    Henderson’s website, the terms and conditions would only be accessible if
    one clicked on the link to Proxibid’s separate website.
    Weinhoffer objected to Exhibit 41, contending that it was irrelevant,
    unauthenticated, and hearsay. The district court ruled that Martin had
    properly authenticated Exhibit 41 because, although she was not its author,
    her job description indicated that she was a proper custodian. The district
    court also ruled that Exhibit 41 was within one of Federal Rule of Evidence
    803’s hearsay exceptions.
    Davie Shoring’s counsel requested that, in addition to admitting
    Exhibit 41, the district court take judicial notice of the same terms in an
    archived version of the Proxibid webpage, available on the Wayback
    Machine. The district court took judicial notice of the terms and conditions
    as they appeared in the archived webpage, explaining that the archived
    webpage was a “source[] whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”
    under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
    The district court relied on Exhibit 41 to determine that the “Special
    Terms” provided “plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy” for breach,
    limiting Weinhoffer’s recovery to 20% of Davie Shoring’s bid. The district
    court entered judgment for Weinhoffer in the amount of $35,500 plus costs.
    Weinhoffer timely appealed.
    II.
    “We review evidentiary rulings only for abuse of discretion and will
    reverse a judgment on the basis of evidentiary rulings only if the challenged
    3
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    ruling affects a substantial right of the party.” 2 We apply the same standard
    when reviewing a district court’s use of judicial notice. 3 “In a bench trial,
    reversal is only warranted if all of the competent evidence is insufficient to
    support the judgment, or if it affirmatively appears that the incompetent
    evidence induced the court to make an essential finding which it otherwise
    would not have made.” 4
    III.
    We first address whether the admission of Exhibit 41 was proper
    under the Federal Rules of Evidence. As Exhibit 41 was not properly
    authenticated, we reverse the district court.
    A.
    Authentication is a condition precedent to admissibility. 5 The party
    offering an exhibit must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that
    the item is what the proponent claims it to be. 6 Where a website or electronic
    source is concerned, “testimony by a witness with direct knowledge of the
    source, stating that the exhibit fairly and fully reproduces it, may be enough
    to authenticate.” 7 Although a witness need not be a document’s author to
    authenticate it for purposes of Rule 901, 8 we have observed that a witness
    2
    S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Chabert, 
    973 F.2d 441
    , 448 (5th Cir. 1992).
    3
    Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 
    704 F.3d 413
    , 422 (5th Cir.
    2013).
    4
    S. Pac. Transp. Co., 
    973 F.2d at 448
    .
    5
    United States v. Jackson, 
    636 F.3d 687
    , 693 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Evid.
    901(a)).
    6
    
    Id.
    7
    Thompson v. Bank of America Nat. Ass’n, 
    783 F.3d 1022
    , 1027 (5th Cir. 2015).
    8
    United States v. Duncan, 
    919 F.2d 981
    , 986 (5th Cir. 1990).
    4
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    attempting to authenticate online content as evidence was unlikely to have
    the requisite direct knowledge where that content was created and
    maintained by a third party. 9
    Martin’s testimony is the only way Davie Shoring attempted to
    authenticate Exhibit 41. However, Martin had no personal knowledge of the
    terms applicable to the auction. Martin had to search a third party’s website
    to obtain the terms because Henderson did not have them in its possession.
    Moreover, Martin’s testimony indicates that she was unfamiliar with
    Proxibid’s website and that she needed the assistance of a colleague to locate
    the terms. Thus, Martin’s authentication testimony only amounts to an
    affirmation of her memory that Exhibit 41 is what she found on the internet.
    Although the standard for authentication is low, Martin had
    inadequate direct knowledge to authenticate Exhibit 41. Davie Shoring could
    have avoided running afoul of Rule 901 by calling someone with more direct
    knowledge of Proxibid’s recordkeeping. The district court abused its
    discretion by relying on inadmissible evidence when it reduced Weinhoffer’s
    damages; we accordingly reverse its ruling.
    B.
    Although Exhibit 41 was inadmissible due to improper authentication,
    we write further for the benefit of the parties and the district court following
    remand. At trial, Weinhoffer’s counsel also objected to Exhibit 41 as hearsay.
    Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible, but Rule 803 provides exceptions
    to this prohibition. 10 The district court ruled that Exhibit 41 “fits under
    Federal Rule of Evidence 803” because Martin was a proper custodian who
    
    9 Thompson, 783
     F.3d at 1027.
    10
    Fed. R. Evid. 803.
    5
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    gave testimony at trial regarding the exhibit’s origins. The district court did
    not specify which exception applied, but the business records exception in
    Rule 803(6) is the only exception Davie Shoring cites on appeal.
    Rule 803(6)(D) requires that a custodian or qualified witness testify as
    to an exhibit’s ability to qualify as a business record. Weinhoffer argues that
    Martin was not a proper custodian or qualified witness for Exhibit 41. This
    Court has explained that a “qualified witness is one who can explain the
    record keeping system of the organization and vouch that the requirements
    of Rule 803(6) are met.” 11 This requires the witness to be “familiar with the
    record keeping procedures of the organization” 12
    Martin is not a proper custodian or qualified witness as to Exhibit 41
    as a business record. Martin was Henderson’s employee, but Henderson did
    not have custody of the record contained in Exhibit 41; Proxibid did. Martin
    was not familiar with Proxibid’s record keeping procedures and cannot testify
    that the other requirements of the Rule 803(6) are met. Because the district
    court’s ruling that Exhibit 41 “fit under 803” was a legal error, it was an
    abuse of discretion. 13
    IV.
    In addition to admitting Exhibit 41 into evidence, the district court
    took judicial notice of the terms from an archived webpage on the premise
    that the Wayback Machine constitutes a source whose accuracy cannot
    reasonably be questioned as required by Rule 201(b)(2). None of our sister
    circuits have squarely addressed whether archival internet sources like the
    11
    United States v. Iredia, 
    866 F.2d 114
    , 120 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
    12
    United States v. Brown, 
    553 F.3d 768
    , 793 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations
    omitted).
    13
    Marlin v. Moody Nat. Bank, N.A., 
    533 F.3d 374
    , 377 (5th Cir. 2008).
    6
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    Wayback Machine possess the “high degree of indisputability [that] is the
    essential prerequisite” of judicial notice. 14 A brief Federal Circuit order
    denied a motion to take judicial notice of content from the Wayback Machine
    because it was not first offered to the district court. 15 Many district courts
    have since relied on that Federal Circuit decision to justify taking judicial
    notice of an archived webpage, even though the Federal Circuit did not hold
    that taking judicial notice of archived information was appropriate. 16
    However, other district courts have held that evidence from the Wayback
    Machine “is not so reliable and self-explanatory that it may be an appropriate
    candidate for judicial notice.” 17 In this circuit, a district court found that
    documents from the Wayback Machine were not appropriate for judicial
    notice, citing the Wayback Machine’s terms of use which disclaim any
    guarantees of accuracy regarding content stored there. 18
    A more recent Federal Circuit decision discussed whether Wayback
    Machine content was publicly accessible. 19 At issue was whether an exhibit
    was authenticated as identical to the document viewed by the patent
    14
    Fed. R. Evid. 201 (advisory committee notes to the 1972 amendments).
    15
    Juniper Networks, Inc. v. Shipley, 394 F. App’x 713 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Juniper cited
    O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 
    499 F.3d 1218
     (10th Cir. 2007), but the object of
    judicial notice in O’Toole was historical data actively available on the defendant’s website,
    not information coming from an internet archive.
    16
    See e.g. Pohl v. MH Sub I, LLC, 
    332 F.R.D. 713
    , 716 (N.D. Fla. 2019); In re Methyl
    Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 07 CIV. 10470, 
    2013 WL 6869410
    , at *4
    (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2013).
    17
    My Health, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 15-CV-80-JDP, 
    2015 WL 9474293
    , at *4
    (W.D. Wis. Dec. 28, 2015); see also Nassar v. Nassar, No. 3:14-CV-1501-J-34MCR, 
    2017 WL 26859
    , at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2017).
    18
    Ward v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-00371-O, 
    2020 WL 8300505
    , at *1 (N.D.
    Tex. Oct. 16, 2020).
    19
    Valve Corp. v. Ironburg Inventions Ltd., 
    8 F.4th 1364
     (Fed. Cir. 2021).
    7
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    examiner and whether the exhibit could be prior art. There, the Federal
    Circuit held that judicial notice of the Wayback Machine could be used to
    establish that an otherwise authenticated exhibit was publicly accessible on
    the webpage’s archive date as determined by a patent examiner who was
    “trained and required to determine publication dates.” 20 Here, the Wayback
    Machine content containing the auction terms has not been otherwise
    authenticated.
    Beyond the context of judicial notice, our sister circuits have allowed
    district courts to rely on archived webpages where someone with personal
    knowledge of the reliability of the archive service has been authenticated
    pursuant to Rule 901. 21 This reliance on personal knowledge indicates that
    exhibits derived from these sources are not inherently or self-evidently
    reliable in the same way as documents designated as self-authenticating by
    Rule 902.
    Here, there was no testimony to authenticate the archived webpage. 22
    Our sister circuits’ decisions that the Wayback Machine is not self-
    authenticating are persuasive in the context of judicial notice. In sum, the
    district court erred in taking judicial notice of the terms because a private
    internet archive falls short of being a source whose accuracy cannot
    reasonably be questioned as required by Rule 201.
    20
    
    Id.
     at 1374–75.
    21
    See United States v. Gasperini, 
    894 F.3d 482
    , 490 (2d Cir. 2018); Specht v. Google
    Inc., 
    747 F.3d 929
    , 933 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bansal, 
    663 F.3d 634
    , 667–68 (3d
    Cir. 2011).
    22
    The Wayback Machine’s “Using The Wayback Machine” webpage instructs
    users on how to request affidavits to authenticate Wayback Machine pages as “certified
    records for use in legal proceedings.” See Internet Archive, Using the Wayback Machine,
    http://help.archive.org/hc/en-us/articles/360004651732-Using-The-Wayback-Machine
    (last visited January 20, 2022).
    8
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    V.
    Finally, we turn to whether these errors affected Weinhoffer’s
    substantial rights. 23 The district court relied on Exhibit 41, judicial notice of
    the Wayback Machine, and Martin’s testimony as the primary bases for its
    decision. While the testimony of Warren Davie may have further supported
    the district court’s decision, it affirmatively appears that incompetent
    evidence induced the district court to make an essential finding regarding the
    auction terms that it otherwise would not have made. 24 Accordingly, the
    errors were not harmless and they affected Weinhoffer’s substantial rights. 25
    VI.
    We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND
    the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    23
    Bocanegra v. Vicmar Servs., Inc., 
    320 F.3d 581
    , 584 (5th Cir. 2003).
    24
    S. Pac. Transp. Co., 
    973 F.2d at 448
    .
    25
    Carlson v. Bioremedi Therapeutic Sys., Inc., 
    822 F.3d 194
    , 202 (5th Cir. 2016).
    9