Garcia-Gonzalez v. Garland ( 2022 )

Case: 20-60581 Document: 00516179937 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/25/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 25, 2022
No. 20-60581
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Maria Garcia-Gonzalez,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A206 364 468
Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Maria Garcia-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions
for review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing
her appeal from the denial of her application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-60581 Document: 00516179937 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/25/2022
No. 20-60581
We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and its
legal determinations de novo, considering the immigration judge’s decision
to the extent it influenced the BIA. Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442,
444 (5th Cir. 2001); Singh v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2018).
Under the substantial evidence standard, we can only overturn a factual
finding if the evidence compels a contrary result. Martinez-Lopez v. Barr, 943
F.3d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 2019).
Garcia-Gonzalez argues that the BIA erred by concluding that she
does not qualify for asylum. To qualify for asylum, an applicant must
establish that she “is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, [her home] country
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see id. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Garcia-
Gonzalez seeks asylum on account of her partner’s domestic abuse. Asylum
applicants seeking to establish persecution based on violent conduct of a
private actor must show that their “government is unable or unwilling to
control” that private actor. Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th
Cir. 2006); see also Shehu v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2006);
Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th Cir. 2019). The BIA found that
Garcia-Gonzalez did not demonstrate that the Salvadoran authorities were
unable or unwilling to control her abusive partner. Given that the record
indicates that Salvadoran police arrested and detained Garcia-Gonzalez’s
partner for a month after they received a report of his abuse, we cannot say
that the evidence compels a contrary finding. Accordingly, substantial
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evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Garcia-Gonzalez is not
eligible for asylum.1
Garcia-Gonzalez next argues that the BIA abused its discretion by
failing to fully analyze her withholding of removal claim. However, the BIA
“does not have to ‘write an exegesis on every contention. What is required is
merely that it consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms
sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought
and not merely reacted.’” Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 908 (5th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Becerra–Jimenez v. INS, 829 F.2d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1987)). In
this case, the BIA correctly concluded that because Garcia-Gonzalez “did
not meet her burden of proof for asylum, it follows that she cannot meet the
higher standard for withholding of removal.” See Dayo v. Holder, 687 F.3d
653, 658–59 (5th Cir. 2012) (“An applicant ‘who has failed to establish the
less stringent “well-founded fear” standard of proof required for asylum
relief is necessarily also unable to establish an entitlement to withholding of
removal.’” (quoting Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2008))).2
Because further analysis was unnecessary, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion by declining to analyze Garcia-Gonzalez’s withholding of removal
claim further.
Finally, Garcia-Gonzalez argues that the BIA erred by affirming the
IJ’s finding that she is ineligible for protection under the CAT. An applicant
1
Because Garcia-Gonzales does not qualify for asylum for this reason alone, we do
not review the BIA’s alternative grounds for denying her asylum.
2
Garcia-Gonzalez argues that applicants for withholding of removal have a lower
burden of proof for showing a “nexus” between their protected characteristic and their
persecution. However, the BIA did not make a nexus determination when it concluded that
Garcia-Gonzalez is not eligible for asylum and withholding of removal. Because the burden
of proof for showing a nexus between persecution and a protected characteristic is not at
issue in this case, we do not address this argument.
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for CAT protection must show “that it is more likely than not that he or she
would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Efe v.
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).
Further, the CAT “requires ‘a public official’ or ‘person acting in a public
capacity’ to ‘inflict,’ ‘acquiesce,’ or ‘give consent’ to the torture.” Tamara-
Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 2006). The BIA agreed with
the IJ’s finding that Garcia-Gonzalez has not shown that a public official will
acquiesce in her torture. Though the documentary evidence Garcia-
Gonzalez submitted regarding domestic violence in Central America weighs
against this finding, we cannot say that it compels a contrary result, especially
given that, as stated above, Salvadoran police arrested and detained Garcia-
Gonzalez’s partner for a month after they received a report of his abuse.
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Garcia-Gonzalez is not entitled to relief under the CAT.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.
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