Anadarko E&P v. California Union Ins ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-20548     Document: 00516352369         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/10/2022
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 10, 2022
    No. 21-20548
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C.,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    California Union Insurance Company;
    Century Indemnity Company, solely as successor-in-
    interest to CIGNA Specialty Insurance Company,
    formerly known as California Union Insurance
    Company,
    Defendants—Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:21-CV-1743
    Before Jones, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
    Per Curiam:*
    This insurance case poses questions about removal, contract
    interpretation, and arbitration. We have carefully considered the appeal in
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
    Case: 21-20548      Document: 00516352369           Page: 2     Date Filed: 06/10/2022
    No. 21-20548
    light of the briefs, oral argument, and the record and AFFIRM for
    essentially the reasons stated by the district court.
    California Union Insurance Company, now Century Indemnity
    Company, (“Insurers”) issued excess umbrella liability insurance policies to
    the corporate predecessor of Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC. The first policy
    was effective from April 1, 1979 to April 1, 1980 while the second had effect
    from April 1, 1980 to April 1, 1981. Both provide that “[i]f limits of liability
    of the underlying insurance are exhausted because of . . . property
    damage, . . . [the Insurers] have the right and duty to defend any suit against
    the Insured seeking damages on account of such . . . property damage.”
    They also contain a service-of-suit provision that states:
    [I]n the event of the failure of [the Insurers] to pay any amount
    claimed to be due hereunder, [the Insurers] hereon, at the
    request of the Insured, will submit to the jurisdiction of any
    court of competent jurisdiction within the United States of
    America and will comply with all requirements necessary to
    give such Court jurisdiction . . . .
    In 2007, Anadarko and its Insurers entered into a settlement
    agreement that, in relevant part, covered “private action claims” involving
    “property damage, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death resulting
    therefrom allegedly caused from exposure to environmental conditions
    stemming from Anadarko’s facilities, operations, or products prior to
    January 1, 1986.” With respect to these claims, the Insurers agreed to “pay
    Anadarko a portion of . . . future defense costs that [it] incurr[ed] following
    the effective date of [the] agreement.” Future defense costs are defined,
    without limitation, as “the reasonable and necessary fees, costs, and
    expenses incurred in the investigation and defense of . . . private action
    claims.” Critically, the parties also agreed that:
    2
    Case: 21-20548        Document: 00516352369              Page: 3       Date Filed: 06/10/2022
    No. 21-20548
    Any controversy or claim between [them] relating to the
    payment, non-payment, or reimbursement by either party of
    any . . . future defense costs . . . , and any controversy or claim
    concerning this agreement, shall be settled by arbitration . . . .”
    The settlement and defense costs agreements “contain the entire agreement
    between the parties as respects their subject matter.”
    Ten years later, the parties entered into an addendum to the
    settlement agreement to resolve Anadarko’s claims for defense costs
    associated with the “Louisiana Parish lawsuits,” which alleged that
    Anadarko caused property damage during the policy periods. The 2017
    addendum “incorporated [the 2007 agreement’s terms] by reference, except
    as otherwise provided . . . .”         Anadarko did not, however, “release or
    discharge [its Insurers] from any claim, demand, cause of action, damage, or
    liability . . . relating to or arising out of any defense costs or indemnity costs
    relating to the Louisiana Parish Lawsuits not expressly included in the
    definition of past defense costs provided in this addendum[.]” Thus, post-
    September 2016 defense costs lie outside the addendum’s scope.
    In 2021, Anadarko brought this action against its Insurers in Texas
    state court, asserting that they breached the policies and violated the Texas
    Insurance Code by failing to “pay any defense expenses incurred by
    Anadarko from September 2016 forward[.]” The Insurers removed the
    action before moving to dismiss and compel arbitration. Anadarko then
    moved to remand.
    The district court denied the motion to remand, granted the motion
    to compel, and dismissed the action without prejudice. In doing so, the court
    made three dispositive determinations. 1 We review each de novo. See
    1
    Aside from the merits, the district court ruled that Anadarko had standing to bring
    its breach of contract claim and that diversity jurisdiction exists because the parties are
    3
    Case: 21-20548        Document: 00516352369           Page: 4      Date Filed: 06/10/2022
    No. 21-20548
    Halliburton Energy Servs. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 
    921 F.3d 522
    , 529-30
    (5th Cir. 2019).
    First, the district court found that the 2007 agreement superseded the
    original policies. We agree. Anadarko presently seeks “future defense
    costs” as defined by the 2007 agreement because they are associated with
    “private action claims” pursuing redress for alleged property damage. The
    2007 agreement therefore mandates arbitration. The policies’ service of suit
    provisions, by contrast, broadly allow Anadarko to select any forum to
    adjudicate this dispute. These provisions point in opposite directions. Such
    an irreconcilable inconsistency gives rise to “a presumption that the second
    superseded the first.” IP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C.,
    
    116 S.W.3d 888
    , 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)
    (citing Willeke v. Bailey, 
    189 S.W.2d 477
    , 479 (Tex. 1945)). And Anadarko
    has not overcome that presumption, so Anadarko cannot rely on the service-
    of-suit clause to contest removal. Further, the 2007 agreement’s merger
    clause only reinforces its eclipse of the policies in this regard. See Rieder v.
    Woods, 
    603 S.W.3d 86
    , 94 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist.
    v. City of Fort Worth, 
    22 S.W.3d 831
    , 840 (Tex. 2000)).
    Second, the district court ruled that the 2017 addendum to the 2007
    agreement did not supersede the latter’s arbitration clause. That is correct.
    The 2017 addendum expressly incorporated by reference all the defined
    terms from the 2007 agreement except as otherwise provided. As to the
    arbitration clause, it did not affect the application of the 2007 agreement to
    post-September 2016 defense costs incurred by Anadarko. Such costs are at
    issue here and remain subject to the 2007 agreement’s arbitration clause.
    completely diverse. No party challenges these rulings on appeal, and after supplemental
    briefing we conclude that this controversy is justiciable in federal court.
    4
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    No. 21-20548
    Moreover, any attempt by Anadarko to choose the forum for future defense
    cost disputes under the 2017 addendum was a nullity because it had already
    relinquished that right in 2007 and incorporated that relinquishment into the
    addendum.
    Third, the district court found that the 2007 agreement’s arbitration
    clause was valid and that this dispute fell within its scope. It was right to do
    so. A two-step analysis determines whether to compel parties to arbitrate.
    Kubala v. Supreme Prod. Servs., Inc., 
    830 F.3d 199
    , 201 (5th Cir. 2016).
    “First, the court asks whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and,
    second, whether the current dispute falls within the scope of a valid
    agreement.” Edwards v. Doordash, Inc., 
    888 F.3d 738
    , 743 (5th Cir. 2018)
    (citation omitted).   Anadarko does not dispute that it entered a valid
    agreement to arbitrate with its Insurers. And, for reasons already explained,
    this dispute falls within the scope of the 2007 agreement. That determination
    is further warranted because “as a matter of federal law, any doubts
    concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
    arbitration[.]” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
    460 U.S. 1
    , 24-25, 
    103 S. Ct. 927
    , 941 (1983).
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-20548

Filed Date: 6/10/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/10/2022