United States v. Pedraza ( 2022 )

Case: 21-50221 Document: 00516468097 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/12/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 12, 2022
No. 21-50221 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Juan Martinez Pedraza,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 2:19-CR-831-1
Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Juan Martinez Pedraza was convicted by a jury of one count of
conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and sentenced to 120 months of
imprisonment and three years of supervised release. He now appeals his
conviction.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50221 Document: 00516468097 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/12/2022
No. 21-50221
First, Martinez Pedraza contends that the Government’s failure to
correct allegedly false trial testimony regarding his co-conspirator Edwin
Flores-Guerra’s plea agreement constituted a violation of Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). The Due Process Clause forbids the Government
from knowingly using or failing to correct false testimony. See Napue, 360
U.S. at 269. To demonstrate a due process violation based on the
Government’s failure to correct false testimony under Napue, Martinez
Pedraza must demonstrate that: (1) the testimony was false, (2) the
Government knew that the testimony was false, and (3) the testimony was
material. See United States v. Stanford, 823 F.3d 814, 838-39 (5th Cir. 2016).
Because Martinez Pedraza did not present this issue in the district court, we
review for plain error. See United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 696 & n.13 (5th
Cir. 2017); see also Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
Martinez Pedraza does not make the requisite showing.
While Flores-Guerra testified that the Government did not promise
him anything in exchange for his testimony, he did acknowledge that he
“possibly” hoped that his testimony would be considered for sentencing
purposes. Martinez Pedraza’s issue lies with what Flores-Guerra omitted:
i.e., he did not state that the Government could move for a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
sentence reduction based on his substantial assistance. However, there is
nothing to indicate that Flores-Guerra failed to mention plea provisions
“with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S.
87, 94 (1993). But even assuming Flores-Guerra testified falsely regarding
his plea agreement, “the Government can discharge its responsibility under
Napue . . . to correct false evidence by providing defense counsel with the
correct information at a time when recall of the prevaricating witnesses and
further exploration of their testimony is still possible.” Beltran v. Cockrell,
294 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation
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No. 21-50221
omitted). Here, defense counsel was provided with Flores-Guerra’s plea
agreement and sealed plea addendum, which included the full recitation of
the promises made by the Government to the witness, and counsel could have
questioned Flores-Guerra as to the full gamut of those promises. Moreover,
some of the testimony that Martinez Pedraza now complains of was elicited
on cross-examination, so there was no material falsehood that the
Government had a duty under Napue to correct; it was Martinez Pedraza’s
duty to correct the testimony. See Stanford, 823 F.3d at 840; United States v.
Fields, 761 F.3d 443, 477 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d
885, 895 (5th Cir. 1997). Insofar as the Government made any inaccurate
statements concerning Flores-Guerra’s plea agreement during its closing
argument, any “falsehoods were sufficiently exposed before the jury to
enable the jury to weigh those falsehoods in its deliberations.” O’Keefe, 128
F.3d at 896.
Martinez Pedraza additionally argues that the district court admitted
impermissible profile evidence. He contends that through U.S. Border Patrol
Agent Joe Bonilla, the Government offered certain testimony suggesting that
Martinez Pedraza was guilty of the charged offense because his actions were
consistent with the typical behavior of an organizer of an alien trafficking
enterprise. According to Martinez Pedraza, the testimony violated Federal
Rule of Evidence 704(b) and our caselaw prohibiting testimony that amounts
to an opinion on whether the defendant had a mental state or condition that
is an element of a crime. Martinez Pedraza concedes that he did not object
to this testimony in the district court, so our review for is plain error. See
United States v. Montes-Salas, 669 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2012).
Most of the testimony disputed by Martinez Pedraza appears to be on
the safe side of the line between testimony as to methods of operation unique
to the business of alien trafficking and testimony comparing his conduct to a
generic profile of a participant in that business. See id. at 250; United States
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v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 363-64 (5th Cir. 2010). However, even
if some of Agent Bonilla’s testimony was problematic, and assuming that any
error in allowing the testimony was clear or obvious error, Martinez Pedraza
has not met his burden of showing that his substantial rights were affected.
See United States v. Morin, 627 F.3d 985, 998-1000 (5th Cir. 2010); Gonzalez-
Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 367-68. Even setting aside any improper elements of
Agent Bonilla’s testimony and references thereto, the record supports that
the jury was presented with substantial other evidence of Martinez Pedraza’s
role in an alien trafficking operation. Because there is no reasonable
probability that his conviction hinged on the challenged testimony, he has not
shown reversible plain error. See Morin, 627 F.3d at 998-1000; Gonzalez-
Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 367-68.
Finally, Martinez Pedraza contends that the cumulative effect of both
errors requires reversal. The cumulative effect doctrine “provides that an
aggregation of non-reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate
reversal and harmless errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to
a fair trial, which calls for reversal.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320,
343-44 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Martinez Pedraza’s claims of error, taken individually or together, do not cast
doubt on the verdict, given the record as a whole.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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