United States v. Christopher Brown , 597 F. App'x 269 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-30558      Document: 00512968357         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/13/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-30558
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 13, 2015
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER L. BROWN,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 3:13-CR-146-1
    Before PRADO, OWEN, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Christopher L. Brown pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent
    to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 846; possession
    of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(c)(1)(A); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, see U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1). The convictions arose from a sting operation involving a putative
    robbery of a fictitious stash house. Brown appeals his 270-month cumulative
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-30558     Document: 00512968357      Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/13/2015
    No. 14-30558
    sentence, which consisted of concurrent 210-month terms each on the
    conspiracy and felon-in-possession convictions and a consecutive 60-month
    term on the conviction for possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug
    trafficking crime. Pretermitting the question whether this appeal is barred by
    the appeal waiver in the plea agreement, we affirm. See United States v.
    Rodriguez, 
    523 F.3d 519
    , 525 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Story, 
    439 F.3d 226
    , 230-31 (5th Cir. 2006).
    To the extent that Brown may be understood to assert a procedural
    challenge under the bifurcated process for reasonableness review, the
    challenge fails.   See Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46, 49-50 (2007).
    Because he did not raise a procedural issue in the district court, Brown is
    required to show plain error. See Puckett v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135
    (2009). If he does, we may exercise our discretion “to remedy the error . . . if
    the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
    proceedings.” 
    Id. A claim
    “subject to reasonable dispute” cannot constitute
    plain error. Id.; United States v. Ellis, 
    564 F.3d 370
    , 377-78 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Brown cites no precedent of this circuit for his contentions that it was
    error and a miscarriage of justice to ascribe 12 kilograms of cocaine to him
    when calculating his guidelines range under the 2013 edition of the Sentencing
    Guidelines. Brown stipulated that he conspired to steal 12 to 25 kilograms of
    cocaine.   A conspiracy defendant is accountable for the drug quantity
    foreseeable by him. United States v. Quiroz-Hernandez, 
    48 F.3d 858
    , 870 (5th
    Cir. 1995); cf. United States v. Burke, 
    431 F.3d 883
    , 886 (5th Cir. 2005).
    Because Brown’s contentions are subject to reasonable dispute, there can be no
    plain error. See 
    Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
    ; 
    Ellis, 564 F.3d at 377-78
    .
    We reject also Brown’s contention that the sentence is substantively
    unreasonable because the district court ought to have sentenced him below the
    2
    Case: 14-30558     Document: 00512968357     Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/13/2015
    No. 14-30558
    guidelines range in light of what he deems to be the Government’s arbitrary
    selection of drug quantity. Brown cites no circuit precedent to support his
    contentions. Moreover, the district court emphasized that drug quantity was
    hardly the most important consideration when selecting Brown’s sentence,
    given Brown’s insistence that murdering all occupants of the stash house was
    a necessity. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
    Because his sentence is “within a properly calculated Guideline range,”
    an inference arises that the district court considered “all the factors for a fair
    sentence set forth in the Guidelines.” United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    ,
    519 (5th Cir. 2005). Such a sentence “is presumptively reasonable.” United
    States v. Alonzo, 
    435 F.3d 551
    , 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Brown’s suggestion that a
    below-guidelines variance sentence would have been reasonable is not basis
    enough “to justify reversal of the district court.” 
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    3