Andres Juarez v. Anderson , 598 F. App'x 297 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-40485      Document: 00512977672         Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/23/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-40485
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 23, 2015
    ANDRES JUAREZ,
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    MR. ANDERSON, Correctional Officer, TDCJ Ramsey One Unit,
    Defendant-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:13-CV-189
    Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Andres Juarez, Texas prisoner # 1340121, pro se and in forma pauperis
    (IFP), filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
    a correctional officer forced him to work in unsafe conditions, causing him to
    injure his spine. He further alleged that although he underwent two spinal
    surgeries, he continues to endure severe chronic pain for which the Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice has provided inadequate treatment and
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-40485       Document: 00512977672    Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/23/2015
    No. 14-40485
    denied recommended physical therapy.             The district court sua sponte
    dismissed    the      complaint   as   time   barred   pursuant   to   28   U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
    IFP claims that are time barred are properly dismissed as frivolous
    pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and such dismissals are reviewed for an abuse
    of discretion. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 
    157 F.3d 1016
    , 1019-20 (5th Cir. 1998);
    Martin v. Scott, 
    156 F.3d 578
    , 580 (5th Cir. 1998). District courts may raise
    the defense of limitations sua sponte in an action proceeding under § 1915.
    Gartrell v. Gaylor, 
    981 F.2d 254
    , 256 (5th Cir. 1993). Before entering a sua
    sponte dismissal on limitations grounds, “a court must accord the parties fair
    notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” Day v. McDonough, 
    547 U.S. 198
    , 210 (2006). The district court in the instant proceeding did not
    provide notice that it was considering the limitations issue, nor did it provide
    Juarez an opportunity to present his position on the issue. See 
    id. The district
    court determined that Juarez’s complaint, which was filed
    in May 2013, was filed at least eight months late. Therefore, the district court’s
    analysis suggests that the governing two-year limitations period may have
    accrued in September 2010 and expired in September 2012. See Wallace v.
    Kato, 
    549 U.S. 384
    , 387 (2007); Hitt v. Connell, 
    301 F.3d 240
    , 246 (5th Cir.
    2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a). However, the opinion is
    not explicit on this point.
    Juarez has attached to his brief a document indicating that he submitted
    legal mail with the address of the U.S. District Court in Galveston to the prison
    mail room on August 27, 2012, and that it was mailed via U.S. postal mail on
    the same date. If Juarez is correct that he deposited a complaint with prison
    officials for mailing on August 27, 2012, then pursuant to the prison mailbox
    rule, his complaint would be deemed filed on that date for purposes of the
    2
    Case: 14-40485     Document: 00512977672    Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/23/2015
    No. 14-40485
    limitations analysis. See Houston v. Lack, 
    487 U.S. 266
    , 271-72 (1988); Cooper
    v. Brookshire, 
    70 F.3d 377
    , 379-80 (5th Cir. 1995). Because the district court
    did not provide Juarez notice that it was considering the limitations issue, or
    afford Juarez the opportunity to present his position on the limitations issue,
    see 
    Day, 547 U.S. at 210
    , the record is insufficiently developed for a
    determination by this court on the limitations issue. Accordingly, a remand
    for further factual development is appropriate. See Stoot v. Cain, 
    570 F.3d 669
    ,
    672 (5th Cir. 2009).
    For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court
    and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.             We
    express no opinion regarding proper resolution of this matter.
    3