United States v. Hernan Gomez-Valdiva , 697 F. App'x 833 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 15-41463      Document: 00514173083         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/27/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 15-41463
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 27, 2017
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    HERNAN GOMEZ-VALDIVA,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:15-CR-541-1
    Before DAVIS, GRAVES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Hernan Gomez-Valdiva appeals his eight-level upward adjustment
    under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (2014). He contends
    that the district court plainly erred by finding that a prior Georgia “theft by
    taking” conviction constitutes an aggravated felony for § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)
    purposes. Because the district court did not err, we AFFIRM the district court’s
    judgement.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-41463     Document: 00514173083     Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/27/2017
    No. 15-41463
    I.
    Gomez-Valdiva pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry into the United States
    in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2). In accordance with the
    Presentence Report (“PSR”), the district court determined Gomez-Valdiva’s
    guildeline range to be 12 to 18 months, based on a criminal history category of
    I and a total offense level of 13. This offense level also included an eight-level
    enhancement for a prior “aggravated felony,” based on Gomez-Valdiva’s 2007
    Georgia “theft by taking” conviction. See Ga. Code Ann. § 16-8-2. The district
    court sentenced Gomez-Valdiva to a within-guidelines sentence of 12 months
    and no term of supervised release. From that sentence, Gomez-Valdiva timely
    appeals.
    II.
    We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the United
    States Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Medina-Torres, 
    703 F.3d 770
    , 773 (5th Cir. 2012). Because Gomez-Valdiva failed to object to the
    PSR before the district court, we review his claim for plain error. 
    Id. at 773-74.
    Under plain-error review, Gomez-Valdiva must demonstrate that: “(1) the
    district court committed error, (2) the error was plain or obvious, (3) the error
    affected his substantial rights, and (4) the error ‘seriously affect[ed] the
    fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” See United
    States v. Williams, 
    620 F.3d 483
    , 493-94 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States
    v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993)).
    Gomez-Valdiva contends that the district court erred by finding that his
    Georgia “theft by taking” conviction was an aggravated felony for U.S.S.G. §
    2L1.2(b)(1)(C) purposes. To determine whether the district court erred, we ask
    “whether the [Georgia] offense is comparable to and categorically fits within
    the generic federal definition of the corresponding crime of theft.” United States
    v. Rodriguez-Salazar, 
    768 F.3d 437
    , 438 (5th Cir. 2014). “[A] state offense is a
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    No. 15-41463
    categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state
    offense necessarily involved . . . facts equating to the generic federal offense.”
    Moncrieffe v. Holder, 
    133 S. Ct. 1678
    , 1684 (2013).
    As previously stated, Gomez-Valdiva was convicted under Ga. Code Ann.
    § 16-8-2, which states that “[a] person commits the offense of theft by taking
    when he unlawfully takes or, being in lawful possession thereof, unlawfully
    appropriates any property of another with the intention of depriving him of the
    property, regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or
    appropriated.” The generic definition of theft is “a taking of property or an
    exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to
    deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation
    is less than total or permanent.” 
    Rodriguez-Salazar, 768 F.3d at 438
    (quoting
    Burke v. Mukasey, 
    509 F.3d 695
    , 697 (5th Cir. 2007)).
    In arguing that that Georgia “theft by taking” does not categorically
    match the generic theft definition, Gomez-Valdiva relies on Vassell v. U.S.
    Attorney General, 
    839 F.3d 1352
    (11th Cir. 2016). In that case, the Eleventh
    Circuit held that § 16-8-2 does not match the generic theft definition because
    it does not require that the victim withhold consent, and thus is broader than
    the generic theft definition, which includes a “without consent” element. 
    Id. at 1359-60.
    The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the government’s contention that
    fraudulently obtained consent could satisfy the “without consent” element,
    because then “[a]ll fraud could become an exercise of control over[] property
    without consent’ at whatever point the fraudulently obtained consent expires.”
    
    Id. at 1363
    (quotation omitted).
    However persuasive the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Georgia’s
    “theft by taking” statute may be, our decision in 
    Rodriguez-Salazar, 768 F.3d at 438
    , appears to foreclose Gomez-Valdiva’s claim of error. In that case, we
    expressly rejected arguments similar to his regarding whether a Texas theft
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    No. 15-41463
    statute categorically matched the generic theft definition, stating that “the
    definition of theft we have followed does not limit the crime to consent withheld
    when a guilty person takes possession of the property from the owner.” 
    Id. We also
    rejected that “generic theft is distinctly different from fraud because
    generic theft is committed by obtaining property without the victim’s consent
    whereas fraud is committed with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent.”
    
    Id. (distinguishing Martinez
    v. Mukasey, 
    519 F.3d 532
    (5th Cir. 2008)). Instead,
    we stated that generic theft merely requires that “the owner denies consent to
    the wrongdoer who takes or exercises control of property,” regardless of when
    consent is denied. 
    Id. Because Gomez-Valdiva’s
    claim of error is foreclosed by Rodriguez-
    Salazar, we AFFIRM.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-41463

Citation Numbers: 697 F. App'x 833

Judges: Davis, Graves, Costa

Filed Date: 9/27/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024