United States v. Jarred Boone ( 2019 )

Case: 18-50889 Document: 00515060788 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/02/2019
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 18-50889 August 2, 2019
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
JARRED LYNN BOONE, also known as Jarred Boone,
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:18-CR-71-1
Before BARKSDALE, HAYNES, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Jarred Lynn Boone pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and
distribution of such material, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (4). He was
sentenced to, inter alia, a within-Guidelines term of 300-months’
imprisonment and 10 years’ supervised release. In addition to the mandatory
and standard conditions for supervised release, the district court imposed the
following four special conditions: (1) participation in a sex offense-specific
* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
R. 47.5.4.
Case: 18-50889 Document: 00515060788 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/02/2019
No. 18-50889
treatment program with periodic polygraph testing to ensure his compliance
with the requirements of the program and his overall supervision; (2)
prohibition of direct contact with any child under the age of 18 without the
probation officer’s permission; (3) prohibition of viewing or possessing any
visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256; and
(4) submission of his “person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers,
computers . . . , other electronic communications or data storage devices or
media, or office” to a reasonable search conducted by a probation officer.
Boone contends these four special conditions must be vacated, claiming:
the court failed to state the reasons supporting their imposition; and, those
reasons were not apparent in the record. As he concedes, his challenge is
reviewed only for plain error because he did not object to the special conditions
in district court. See United States v. Alvarez, 880 F.3d 236, 239 (5th Cir.
2018). Under that standard, Boone must show a forfeited plain (clear or
obvious) error that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States,
556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he does so, we have the discretion to correct the
error, but should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id.
“A district court must set forth factual findings to justify special
probation conditions in terms of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [sentencing] factors.”
United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, even in the absence of
such findings, we may affirm a special condition if the court’s reasons justifying
the condition can be inferred from the record. Id. Because the court’s reasons
are apparent from our review of the record, there was no clear or obvious error
in imposing the four special conditions.
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Case: 18-50889 Document: 00515060788 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/02/2019
No. 18-50889
In the alternative, Boone contends the third special condition should be
vacated because the term “sexually explicit conduct” is too vague and overly
broad. He has failed to show the requisite clear or obvious error in this regard
because he has not cited to any binding precedent specifically supporting his
challenge. See United States v. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 230–31 (5th
Cir. 2009). Moreover, our precedent regarding this issue reflects he cannot
demonstrate clear or obvious error on this basis. See United States v. Miller,
665 F.3d 114, 136–37, 137 n.120 (5th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.
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