United States v. Ronald Norman ( 2018 )


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  •      Case: 16-20088      Document: 00514576752         Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/30/2018
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 16-20088
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                         July 30, 2018
    Lyle W. Cayce
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                      Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    RONALD RAY NORMAN, also known as Ronnie Ray Norman,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:14-CR-219-1
    Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Ronald Ray Norman appeals his resentencing under the Armed Career
    Criminal Act (ACCA) to 235 months in prison for being a felon in possession of
    a firearm. Relying upon Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    (2015), and
    Mathis v. United States¸ 
    136 S. Ct. 2243
    (2016), Norman contends that the
    district court erred by holding that his prior Texas conviction for aggravated
    robbery constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-20088    Document: 00514576752       Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/30/2018
    No. 16-20088
    and (2)(B). Even if we afford Norman’s arguments de novo review, see United
    States v. Massey, 
    858 F.3d 380
    , 382 (5th Cir. 2017), the district court did not
    err by holding that Norman’s conviction under Texas Penal Code § 29.03(a)(2)
    constitutes a violent felony. See United States v. Lerma, 
    877 F.3d 628
    , 636
    (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
    2018 WL 1912585
    (May 29, 2018) (No. 17-8588);
    § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
    We review the district court’s interpretation of the scope of our remand
    order de novo. See United States v. Lee, 
    358 F.3d 315
    , 320 (5th Cir. 2004). The
    district court did not err by holding that it was precluded by the mandate rule
    from considering Norman’s objection, which he was required to have raised
    during his original sentencing proceedings, to the assessment of a criminal
    history point based upon his February 2014 conviction for evading arrest. See
    United States v. Marmolejo, 
    139 F.3d 528
    , 531 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining that
    the mandate rule “serves both justice as well as judicial economy [by]
    requir[ing] a defendant to raise all relevant and appealable issues at the
    original sentencing”).   The Supreme Court’s decision in Molina-Martinez
    v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 1338
    (2016), has no bearing on Norman’s failure to
    object at his original sentencing and does not constitute an intervening change
    of law excepting his argument from the mandate rule. See United States
    v. Matthews, 
    312 F.3d 652
    , 657 (5th Cir. 2002).
    AFFIRMED.
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