Chance v. Rice University ( 1993 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the Fifth Circuit
_____________________________________
No. 91-6187
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DR. JANE CHANCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
RICE UNIVERSITY AND ALAN GROB,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
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(April 12, 1993)
ON SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion February 25, 1993, 5th Cir., ____F.2d___)
Before WISDOM AND DUHÉ, Circuit Judges, and DOHERTY,1 District
Judge.
DUHÉ, Circuit Judge:
Dr. Jane Chance petitions this Court for rehearing, arguing
that we erred in failing to apply the "disparate impact" standard
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to her claim that Rice
University sexually discriminated against her in violation of Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Because we find that Dr.
Chance could not prevail on her Title IX claim under the "disparate
impact" standard, we need not decide which standard applies, and we
deny her petition for rehearing.
1
District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
BACKGROUND
In 1988, Dr. Chance sued Rice University (Rice) and Dr. Alan
Grob, alleging that Rice violated Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 19722 (Title IX) as well as the Equal Pay Act,3 and
that Dr. Grob intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her.
The district court directed a verdict in favor of Dr. Grob, and
ultimately granted judgment in favor of Rice.
Dr. Chance appealed, arguing inter alia that the district
court incorrectly analyzed her Title IX claim under the
"intentional discrimination" standard set forth in Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 We affirmed the district court. See
Chance v. Rice University, 984 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1993).
Dr. Chance has filed a Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, again
raising the argument that her Title IX claim was analyzed
incorrectly.
ANALYSIS
Dr. Chance argues that her Title IX claim should have been
analyzed under the "disparate impact" standard of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Application of this standard would
require Dr. Chance to show that certain "facially neutral
employment standards operated more harshly on one group than
another" in order to establish a prima facie case of sexual
discrimination. Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1367
2
20 U.S.C. § 1681.
3
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
4
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 2000d-7.
2
(5th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992)
(No. 92-737); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 706
F.2d 608, 621 (5th Cir. 1983). Dr. Chance claims that the
subjective determination of compensation and promotion within her
department at Rice is a process controlled by males and has the
effect of denying her equal compensation and promotions compared to
her male colleagues.
The district court specifically found that no statistically
significant salary differential existed between tenured or tenure
track men and women in the Humanities Division at Rice (which
includes Dr. Chance's department) during 1987-88 and 1989-90, that
the Humanities Division actually pays tenured or tenure track women
more than tenured or tenure track men, and that all faculty members
within the same rank are treated equally in terms of assignment and
compensation. The court also found that the failure to grant Dr.
Chance the promotions she sought (two endowed chairs within the
English Department), and any differential in pay among professors
were in no way related to sexual discrimination. These findings
are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
In light of the court's factual findings, we conclude that Dr.
Chance could not establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
sexual discrimination, as that standard is applied to her Title IX
claim, and we therefore need not decide whether her claim should
have been analyzed under that standard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Chance's petition for rehearing
3
is DENIED and no member of this panel nor Judge in regular active
service on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on
rehearing en banc (Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local
Rule 35) the Suggestion For Rehearing En Banc is DENIED.
4