Charles v. United States ( 1994 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 92-3651
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JERRY CHARLES, SR., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
JERRY CHARLES, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
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(February 18, 1994)
Before KING and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges, and COBB,*
District Judge.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
We withdraw our original opinion, reported at 7 F.3d 78, and
reconsider our prior holding in light of the Louisiana Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 617 So. 2d
482 (La. 1993). We now vacate and remand for further proceedings
consistent with Brown.
The plaintiff, Jerry Charles, Sr., sued the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1988), for injuries he suffered while working on a painting and
*
District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
sandblasting crew which was constructing a ship for the United
States Navy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the government, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, on the grounds that the
government was Charles's employer, and therefore it was immune from
suit under the Louisiana worker's compensation statute. See La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1993). Charles appeals,1
arguing that the government is not immune because he has received
benefits, procured by his employer McDermott, Inc., under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1988).
Charles left the Navy vessel on which he was working and was
walking across McDermott's shipyard when a Navy employee ran into
him with a Navy van. The FTCA makes the United States liable in
tort
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the law of the
place where the alleged act or omission occurred))the law of the
state of Louisiana))immunized the government from suit even though
Charles had received benefits under the LHWCA. The government is
immune from suit under the Louisiana law because construction of
1
Intervenor McDermott, Inc. also appeals, adopting the brief submitted
by Charles. For the sake of convenience, we refer only to Charles in discussing
the arguments raised on appeal.
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the ship on which Charles was working was part of the Navy's trade,
business or occupation.2 However, under the LHWCA the government
is not Charles' employer, and therefore is not immune from suit.3
In granting summary judgment, the district court relied on several
decisions of the Louisiana courts of appeals which gave effect to
Louisiana's statutory immunity defense even though the plaintiff
had received benefits under the LHWCA. See Griffis v. Gulf Coast
Pre-Stress Co., Inc., 563 So. 2d 1254, 1254-55 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1054 (1990); Crater v. Mesa Offshore Co.,
539 So. 2d 88, 90-91 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 542 So. 2d 1382
(La.), writ denied, 543 So. 2d 4 (La.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 905,
110 S. Ct. 264, 107 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1989); Lewis v. Modular
Quarters, 508 So. 2d 975, 980-82 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
2
In Thomas v. Calavar Corp., 679 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1982), we stated:
Under the law of Louisiana . . . the principal for whom a contractor
is performing work is not liable in tort for negligent injuries
suffered by the contractor's employees if the work is part of the
principal's "trade, business, or occupation." In those
circumstances, the principal, as the "statutory employer" of the
injured employees, is liable to them only under Louisiana's
Workmen's Compensation Law. This rule applies . . . to the United
States . . . .
Id. at 419 (citing La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1032) (other citations omitted). On
the day of the accident Charles was working on a torpedo test craft which
McDermott was constructing for the Navy. According to the affidavit of a Navy
official, vessels of that kind are "essential to the Navy's mission of
constructing and deploying modern weapons systems to defend the United States
from attack, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 7310." See 10 U.S.C. § 7310 (West Supp.
1993) (directing the Navy to "develop plans and programs for the construction and
deployment of weapons systems . . . that are more survivable, less costly, and
more effective than those in the Navy on October 20, 1978").
3
See 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (providing that "the liability of an employer
prescribed in [the LHWCA] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability
of such employer to the employee"); id. § 904 (providing that "every employer
shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees" of
compensation payable under the LHWCA). The government does not contend that it
is Charles' employer under the LHWCA, or that it is entitled to immunity from
suit under that Act.
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514 So. 2d 127 (La. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1226, 108 S. Ct.
2886, 101 L. Ed. 2d 920 (1988).
While this appeal was pending, however, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana overruled those decisions, holding in Brown v. Avondale
Industries, Inc. that immunity under the Louisiana worker's
compensation statute is not available to an employer where its
employee has elected to receive benefits under the LHWCA:
Because the employee elected benefits under the [LHWCA],
the state Act was not implicated. Defendant, even if it
would be a statutory employer under the state Act, cannot
claim the tort immunity provided to principals by that
Act, because the conflicting provisions of the federal
Act selected by the employee control.
Id., 617 So. 2d 482. Since Brown, the law of the State of Louisiana
no longer provides statutory immunity in cases such as this one.4
The government contends that Brown does not represent the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred because "the FTCA
adopts state law without regard to whether that state law conflicts
with, or has been preempted by, any other federal law," such as the
LHWCA. According to the government, the "law of the place" to
which the FTCA refers is the state law immunity provision, and not
any conflicting federal law which the Louisiana courts may apply in
its stead. We disagree. In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1,
82 S. Ct. 585, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1962), the Supreme Court held that
the law of the place referred to by the FTCA is "the whole law of
4
"Generally, unless a decision specifies otherwise, it is given both
retrospective and prospective effect." Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585, 587
(La. 1982). The Supreme Court of Louisiana did not specify in Brown that that
decision should be applied only prospectively. Brown applies to this case, which
was pending on appeal when Brown was decided.
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the State where the act or omission occurred." Id. at 11, 82 S.
Ct. at 592. The plaintiffs in Richards were the personal
representatives of individuals killed in an American Airlines crash
in Missouri. Id. at 3, 82 S. Ct. at 588. They sued the United
States under the FTCA in federal district court in Oklahoma,
alleging that the government, through the Civil Aviation Agency,
negligently failed to enforce federal laws and regulations at
American Airlines' overhaul depot in Tulsa. Id. The question
arose whether the "law of the place" referred to in the FTCA was
the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act or the Missouri Wrongful Death Act.
See id. at 3-4, 82 S.Ct. at 588. Oklahoma courts would have
applied the Missouri law under Oklahoma's choice of law rules
because Missouri was the place where the alleged negligence had its
operative effect. See id. at 4, 82 S. Ct. at 588. The Richards
Court held that the "law of the place" referred to by the FTCA is
the whole law of the state, including the state's choice of law
rules, such that Missouri law controlled the case. Id. at 16, 82
S. Ct. at 594-95. The Court relied on the FTCA's command that the
government be held liable "under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable," and reasoned that
application of the state's choice of law rules would be most
consistent with that mandate. Id. at 11-12, 82 S. Ct. at 592.
By the same token, if the government is to be liable "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable," we must apply the LHWCA's immunity rule if that is the
rule which the courts of Louisiana would apply. See Caban v.
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United States, 728 F.2d 68, 72 (2nd Cir. 1984) ("Applying the
state's ``whole law' requires that we look to whatever law,
including federal law, the state courts would apply in like
circumstances involving a private defendant." (citations
omitted)).5 Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court's holding in
Richards that "the whole law of the state" must be applied under
the FTCA, the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Brown represents
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Because
the district court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of
the government is inconsistent with Brown, we vacate and remand for
further proceedings.
5
In Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978), we held
that, despite Richards' holding that the whole law of the state applies under the
FTCA, federal courts in FTCA cases should apply federal rules of res judicata and
collateral estoppel in determining the preclusive effect of a prior federal
judgment. See id. at 612. We distinguished Richards on the grounds that "its
holding . . . concerned conflicts of laws principles))principles that affect the
substantive liability of parties to an action." Id. at 611. We further noted
that, "while it has been widely held . . . that state law governs the liability
of the parties in Federal Tort Claims actions, these cases overwhelmingly concern
the elements of causes of action, defenses, or damages that a party may claim,
rather than issues of internal court procedure or the relationships between
courts." Id. Because the issue in this case concerns the availability of
statutory immunity from suit, which plainly "affect[s] the substantive liability"
of the parties, we are guided by Richards rather than Johnson.
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