Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bright ( 1994 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 94-10344
Summary Calendar.
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William A. BRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.
Oct. 10, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas.
Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:
Defendant-Appellant William A. Bright ("Bright") appeals the
district court's March 10, 1994 order denying his Motion to Vacate
or Reconsider Order Granting Summary Judgment and Declaring Moot
Motion for Leave to Amend pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) and 15(a).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Bright's motion to reopen his case. AFFIRM.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Bright was the majority shareholder, president and director of
Horn-Williams Ford, Inc. ("Horn-Williams"), a Ford dealership in
Dallas, Texas. Horn-Williams participated in a "floor-plan"
financing agreement with Plaintiff-Appellee Ford Motor Credit
Company ("Ford Credit"), through which Ford Credit financed the
purchase of new cars by Horn-Williams, receiving payment upon the
sale of the cars by Horn-Williams.
In 1988, Horn-Williams obtained a capital loan of $600,000
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from Ford Credit. The loan was renewed on May 9, 1990 for the
balance of $370,056.36. Bright, in his individual capacity,
executed a continuing guaranty covering all monies loaned to Horn-
Williams, and executed individual unconditional guaranties on the
capital loan and its renewal.
After experiencing financial difficulties, Horn-Williams
defaulted on its obligations under the capital loan renewal and
floor plan financing agreements. On August 6, 1991, Horn-Williams
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, which was subsequently
converted to a liquidation under Chapter 7 on January 31, 1992.
Ford Credit made a demand for payment on Bright as guarantor
of the Horn-Williams debt. When no payment was forthcoming, Ford
Credit filed suit on January 20, 1993 to recover debts on the
unconditional guaranties signed by Bright in connection with the
loans made by Ford Credit to Horn-Williams.
On November 10, 1993, Ford Credit filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment. The district court granted Bright an extension of time
to respond to Ford Credit's motion due to the sudden death of
Bright's counsel. On February 25, 1994, the court granted summary
judgment for Ford Credit on the grounds that Bright relied on a
defense that he failed to raise in his answer to Ford Credit's
complaint. The court entered Final Judgment against Bright for a
total of $1,565,755.13, plus attorneys' fees. On March 7, 1994,
Bright filed a motion to vacate or for reconsideration pursuant to
Rule 59(e) and a motion for leave to file an amended answer
pursuant to Rule 15(a). On March 10, 1994, the district court
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denied Bright's Rule 59(e) motion, and declared moot Bright's Rule
15(a) motion. Bright appeals the court's March 10, 1994 order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to vacate or for reconsideration filed pursuant to
FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e) allows a losing party to seek the trial court's
reconsideration of its order granting summary judgment if served
within 10 days of the rendition of judgment. See Lavespere v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173-74 (5th
Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S. Ct. 171, 126 L. Ed. 2d
131 (1993). If the party seeking reconsideration attaches
additional materials to its motion that were not presented to the
trial court for consideration at the time the court initially
considered the motion for summary judgment, the court may consider
the new materials in its discretion. Fields v. City of South
Houston, Texas, 922 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir.1991) (citing
Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 172-75). If the court considers the
materials but still grants summary judgment, the appellate court
may review all materials de novo. Fields, 922 F.2d at 1188 (citing
Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 177-78). "On the other hand, if the
district court refuses to consider the materials, the reviewing
court applies the abuse of discretion standard." Fields, 922 F.2d
at 1188. "Under this standard, the district court's decision and
decision-making process need only be reasonable." Midland West
Corp. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 911 F.2d 1141, 1145 (5th
Cir.1990). Because the district court did not consider the
materials Bright submitted with his Rule 59(e) motion, we review
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the court's order for an abuse of discretion. In addition, we
review the district court's denial of Bright's motion to amend his
complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a) for an abuse of discretion.
See Southern Constructors Group, Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d
606, 611 (5th Cir.1993).
DISCUSSION
Bright's answer to Ford Credit's complaint did not plead a
defense under TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE § 9.504(c). However, in response
to Ford Credit's summary judgment motion, Bright argued that he was
not liable on the guaranties because he did not receive a notice of
the sale of the collateral, and because Ford Credit did not dispose
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. The
district court granted summary judgment, finding that because
Bright failed to specifically deny notification or commercially
reasonable disposition in his answer, there existed no triable
issue of fact as to Bright's liability on the guaranties.
In its order denying Bright's Rule 59(e) motion and Rule
15(a) motion, the district court stated that the "alleged
"professional carelessness' of Bright's previous counsel does not
merit reinstatement of his case." Our review of the record reveals
no abuse of discretion. Bright failed to plead a defense pursuant
to § 9.504(c) in his answer to Ford Credit's complaint. He also
failed to seek leave to amend his answer to include the defense
before the district court entered summary judgment against him. A
court considering a Rule 59(e) motion requesting reconsideration
may take into consideration an attorney's conduct in determining
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whether to reopen a case. See Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 175.
Therefore, the court's decision regarding whether to reopen a case
must be reviewed in light of all the relevant circumstances on a
case-by-case basis. Id. In this case, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bright's Rule 59(e)
motion. Further, we find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Bright's Rule 15(a) motion as moot. AFFIRM.
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