Hirras v. Natl RR Psngr Corp , 39 F.3d 522 ( 1995 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
______________
No. 92-5753
______________
SANDY DIANA HIRRAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
and
On Remand from the Supreme Court
of the United States
__________________________________________________
(January 31, 1995)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, REAVLEY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit
Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation's Petition for
Rehearing is DENIED; and no member of this panel nor judge in
active service on the Court having requested that the Court be
polled on rehearing en banc, the Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc
is also DENIED. However, we withdraw our prior opinion, Hirras v.
National Railroad Passenger Corp., 39 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 1994), and
substitute the following:
This matter is on remand from the United States Supreme Court
for further consideration in light of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 129 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1994).1
In Hirras v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142 (5th
Cir.), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2732, 129 L. Ed. 2d 855
(1994), we affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sandy Diana
Hirras' Title VII,2 state-law intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and state-law negligent infliction of emotional distress
claims. In light of the Court's recent decision in Hawaiian
Airlines, we now reverse the district court's rulings as to Hirras'
intentional infliction of emotional distress and Title VII claims.3
I
Hirras alleges that her employer, the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), "failed to provide her with a
non-hostile workplace." (R. on Appeal at 552.) She complains of
verbal abuse from her co-workers and abusive telephone calls,
notes, and graffiti from anonymous sources. Amtrak contends that
it initiated a thorough, if unsuccessful, investigation of the
anonymous acts.
Hirras sued Amtrak in federal district court for Title VII
1
See Hirras v. National R.R. Passengers Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.
Ct. 2732, 129 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1994).
2
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
3
Texas does not recognize the tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993). Thus, we do not
disturb the district court's dismissal of Hirras' negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim.
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violations, and for negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court dismissed the state-law
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim on the grounds
that Texas does not recognize such a claim. The court further held
that Hirras' Title VII and state-law intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act
("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Hirras appealed the district
court's dismissal of both her federal and state-law claims.
II
First, Hirras argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hawaiian Airlines supports her contention that her state-law claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not preempted by
the mandatory arbitration provisions of the RLA. Hirras contends
that her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is not
a "minor dispute" for the purposes of the RLA because it is
grounded in rights and obligations that exist independent of the
collective-bargaining agreement ("CBA") that governed the terms of
her employment.
Generally, all disputes growing out of "grievances" or out of
the interpretation or application of a CBA are preempted by the
RLA's mandatory arbitration provisions. See 45 U.S.C. § 151a. One
of the goals of the RLA is to "provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay,
rules, or working conditions." Id. Because such disputes concern
an existing CBA, they "seldom produce strikes" and are known as the
-3-
"minor disputes of the railway labor world." Elgin, J. & E. Ry.
Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 1290, 89 L.
Ed. 1886 (1945), aff'd on reh'g, 327 U.S. 661, 66 S. Ct. 721, 90 L.
Ed. 928 (1946). Minor disputes are to be contrasted with "major
disputes," which "present the larger issues about which strikes
ordinarily arise" because they "seek to create rather than to
enforce contractual rights," see id., and with those disputes that
seek neither to create nor enforce the contractual rights created
by a CBA. Under the RLA, only minor disputes "may be referred by
petition of the parties or by either party to the appropriate
division of the [National Railroad] Adjustment Board" ("NRAB") for
arbitration. Id. (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 151a).
The language of § 151a thus limits the RLA's preemption of
claims, including state-law claims, to those involving the
interpretation or application of a CBA. Hawaiian Airlines, ___
U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 129 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1994). While § 151a
governs "disputes growing out of grievances or out of the
interpretation or application [of CBA's]," 45 U.S.C. § 151a
(emphasis added), the Supreme Court held in Hawaiian Airlines that
"the most natural reading of the term `grievances' in this context
is as a synonym for disputes involving the application or
interpretation of a CBA." Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at
2245.4 This interpretation is consistent with previous Supreme
4
In our previous opinion, we relied on a Supreme Court decision
containing contradictory language. In Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co. v.
Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 65 S. Ct. 1282, 89 L. Ed. 1886 (1945), the Court included
in the category of minor disputes those disputes "founded upon some incident of
the employment relationship, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the
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Court decisions. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299, 305, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2482,
105 L. Ed. 2d 250 (1989) ("The distinguishing feature of [a minor
dispute] is that the dispute may be conclusively resolved by
interpreting the existing [CBA]"); Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co.
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 501 n.12, 109 S.
Ct. 2584, 2592 n.12, 105 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1989) ("Minor disputes are
those involving the interpretation or application of existing
contracts.").
The Court in Hawaiian Airlines noted that claims involving
only factual questions "about an employee's conduct or an
employer's conduct and motives" do not require an interpretation of
the CBA. Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct at 2248. The Court cited
for support its decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988), in
which it held that when the elements of a cause of action are
"purely factual questions" that pertain to "the conduct of the
employee and the conduct and motivation of the employer," no
interpretation of the CBA is necessary.5 Id. at 407, 108 S. Ct. at
collective bargaining agreement, e.g. claims on account of personal injury." Id.,
325 U.S. at 723, 65 S. Ct. at 1290. However, the Court in Hawaiian Airlines noted
that because the dispute in Burley did involve the interpretation of a CBA, any
references to disputes independent of a CBA were dicta. Hawaiian Airlines, ___
U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2250. The Court went on to "expressly disavow any
language in Burley suggesting that minor disputes encompass state-law claims that
exist independent of the collective-bargaining agreement."
5
Although Lingle involved the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA")
and not the RLA, the Court held that "th[e] convergence in the preemption
standards under the two statutes [led it to] conclude that Lingle provides an
appropriate framework for addressing pre-emption under the RLA, and we adopt the
Lingle standard to resolve claims of RLA pre-emption." Hawaiian Airlines, ___
U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2249.
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1882. Lingle involved a state-law claim of retaliatory discharge,
requiring the plaintiff to set forth the following facts: "(1) he
was discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's
motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter
him from exercising his rights under the Act or to interfere with
his exercise of those rights." Id. The Court concluded that
"neither element requires a court to interpret any term of a
collective-bargaining agreement. . . . Thus, the state-law remedy
in this case is `independent' of the collective-bargaining
agreement . . . : resolution of the state-law claim does not
require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court held that "substantive protections
provided by state law, independent of whatever labor agreement
might govern, are not pre-empted under the RLA." Hawaiian
Airlines, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2246. The Court noted
that state laws "have long regulated a great variety of conditions
in transportation and industry," a number of which might be the
subject of a dispute "which would have such an effect on interstate
commerce that federal agencies might be invoked to deal with some
phase of it." Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting Terminal
R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 6-7, 63 S.
Ct. 420, 423, 87 L. Ed. 571 (1943)). "But it cannot be said that
the minimum requirements laid down by state authority are all set
aside. We hold that the enactment by Congress of the [RLA] was not
a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions
themselves." Id. (quoting Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 318 U.S. at 7, 63
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S. Ct. at 423).
The Court in Hawaiian Airlines discussed three examples of
state-law substantive protections that it considered to be
independent of any labor agreement for the purposes of the RLA. A
claim based on a state law prohibiting employers from firing
employees "in violation of public policy or in retaliation for
whistleblowing," does not require an interpretation of a CBA, and
thus is not preempted, id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2246,6 even if the
CBA in question contained provisions that could be interpreted to
justify the termination, id at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2251. Similarly,
a claim based on a state law requiring cabooses on all trains is
not preempted by the RLA, even if the CBA required cabooses only on
some trains. See id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2246 (citing Terminal
R.R. Ass'n). Finally, a claim based on a state law "regulating the
number of workers required to operate certain [railroad] equipment"
is not preempted, see id. (citing Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 51 S. Ct. 458, 75 L. Ed. 1010, modified on
other grounds, 283 U.S. 809, 51 S. Ct. 652, 75 L. Ed. 1428 (1931)),
even if the railroad's agreement with the union allows it to employ
a smaller crew, id. at 254, 51 S. Ct. at 461.
The Court also provided an example of a case in which it held
that preemption by the RLA was justified. In Andrews v. Louisville
& N.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 92 S. Ct. 1562, 32 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1972),
6
"The parties' obligation under the RLA to arbitrate disputes arising
out of the application or interpretation of the CBA [does] not relieve
petitioners of [their] duty" not to violate a state law against firing employees
in violation of public policy or in retaliation for whistleblowing. Id.
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a railroad employee challenged his employer's decision not to
restore him to his regular duties after being injured in a car
accident. Id. The Court held that "a state law claim of wrongful
termination was pre-empted, not because the RLA broadly pre-empts
state law claims based on discharge or discipline," but because the
employee conceded that the "only source" of his right to be
reinstated after such an injury was the CBA. Hawaiian Airlines,
___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2246.
As these examples demonstrate, a claim is preempted by the RLA
only if it relies on the interpretation of a provision of the CBA;
if the claim is brought under state law without any reference to
the CBA, then it is not preempted. Thus, where an employer has a
state-law obligation "wholly apart from any provision of the CBA,"
claims brought to enforce the state-law obligation are not
preempted by the RLA. Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2247. A state-law
claim is independent "even if dispute resolution pursuant to a
collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on
the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of
facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without
interpreting the agreement itself . . . ." Id. at ___, 114 S. Ct.
at 2249 (quoting Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408, 108 S. Ct. at 1883).
Hirras contends that her intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim does not rely on any provision of the CBA, and thus
its resolution does not require an interpretation of the CBA.
Amtrak, on the other hand, argues that we must interpret the CBA in
order to determine whether its handling of the harassment was
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"outrageous."7 To prove intentional infliction of emotional
distress, Hirras must demonstrate that: "(1) the defendant acted
intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct was extreme and
outrageous, (3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff
emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff was severe." Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.
1993) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). Amtrak
contends that whether its handling of the harassment was
substandard to the point of outrageousness, a necessary finding,
turns on what standard it was expected to meet under the CBA.
However, this Circuit has unequivocally stated that "outrageous
conduct is that which `[goes] beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and [is] regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
a civilized community.'" See Daniels v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of United States, 35 F.3d 210, 216 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d).
Texas state courts have held that an individual's conduct will
not be considered outrageous for the purposes of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim "if he does no more than
insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way." Wieler v.
United Sav. Ass'n, 887 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex. App.))Texarkana, Sept.
20, 1994, writ requested); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
7
Amtrak cites as support for its position the Sixth Circuit's holding
in a "post-Hawaiian Airlines" case involving LMRA preemption of an emotional
distress claim based on the manner in which an investigation of charges of sexual
harassment was conducted. (Appellant's Br. at 6 (citing DeCoe v. General Motors
Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994)). Although DeCoe was decided a month after
Hawaiian Airlines, the Sixth Circuit makes no reference to the Supreme Court
decision. DeCoe is also factually distinguishable from this case. See infra
note 12.
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§ 46, cmt. g. Accordingly, we held in Baker v. Farmers Electrical
Co-op, Inc., 34 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1994), that if a CBA could be
interpreted to give an employer the right to engage in conduct that
is the subject of an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim, an interpretation of the rights granted by the CBA is
necessary to the resolution of the state-law claim. See id.
(holding that interpretation of reassignment provisions of CBA was
"inextricably intertwined with resolution of the question whether
[reassignment] was extreme and outrageous").
Hirras' claim is easily distinguishable from that in Baker.
In Baker, we noted that Baker did not allege any "instances of
harassment, discrimination, physical abuse, or other conduct which
would provide grounds for an emotional distress claim."8 Baker, 34
F.3d at 280. We concluded that: "The terms of the CBA are relevant
to this issue, because the CBA expressly grants management rights
over the business of Farmers and its employees which could be
interpreted to include the right to reassign an employee's
duties."9 Id. Baker's counsel even conceded at oral argument that
reference to the CBA was necessary to the resolution of Baker's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at 280
8
Baker's employer, an electric company, moved him from the position
of journeyman lineman, a position he had held for fourteen years, to the
"demeaning" job of custodian/yardman. Id. at 277.
9
See also Thomas v. LTV, 39 F.3d 611 (5th Cir. 1994). In Thomas, we
held that an employee's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based
on his dismissal for excessive absences was preempted by the LMRA. Id. at 619.
Our holding was based on the fact that the employee had signed an employment
agreement that "qualifie[d] as a CBA" for the purposes of preemption, id. at 618,
and that gave his employer the right to discharge him if his total number of
absences exceeded a certain percentage of his scheduled work days, id. at 614.
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n.5.
In contrast, Hirras does make claims of harassment. (R. on
Appeal at 552.) Unlike Baker, Hirras contends that the terms of
the CBA are irrelevant to her state-law claim. (Appellant's Br. on
Remand at 12.) We agree.10 The terms of the CBA at issue in this
case are not relevant to the resolution of Hirras' claim because
the CBA contains no provision related to sexual harassment,11 much
less any provision that could be interpreted to give Amtrak the
right to accommodate sexual harassment or Hirras the right to work
in a non-hostile environment.12 Hirras' intentional infliction of
10
Even if the resolution of Hirras' claim involved a reference to the
rights and duties created by the CBA, the Court in Hawaiian Airlines emphasized
that "when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare
fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of
state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be distinguished."
Id., ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S. Ct. at 2248 n.8 (emphasis added) (quoting Livadas
v. Aubry, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2078, 129 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1994)).
11
The CBA between Amtrak and its employees, as is was submitted to this
Court, (see R. on Appeal at 686), is divided into the following sections:
Preamble; Seniority Datum; Validating Applications; Seniority Roster; Promotion,
Assignments, and Displacements; Bulletin and Assignment; Short Vacancies; Failure
to Qualify; Voluntary Transfer; Reducing and Increasing Forces; Sick Leave;
Bereavement Leave; Leave of Absence; Return from Leave of Absence or Temporary
Assignment; Physical Examinations and Disqualification; Discipline,
Investigation, and Appeal; Grievances; Vacation, Holiday, and Group Insurance;
and Union Shop and Dues Deduction. (R. on Appeal at 712-13.)
Amtrak contends on remand that the resolution of Hirras' claim requires an
interpretation of the provision of the CBA governing "what actions Amtrak was
required to take in response to Hirras' complaints that she was being harassed,"
but does not point to a particular provision. The CBA's section entitled
"Grievances," the only section even tangentially related to the handling of
employee complaints, addresses only the employees' right to file a grievance.
12
The absence of any such provision distinguishes Hirras' claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress from that in DeCoe v. General Motors
Corp., see supra note 7, which Amtrak describes as a "post-Hawaiian Airlines"
case involving LMRA preemption of an emotional distress claim based on the manner
in which an investigation of charges of sexual harassment was conducted.
(Appellant's Br. at 6 (citing DeCoe, 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994)). DeCoe's claim
was based on the manner in which his employers conducted a sexual harassment
investigation against him, and the relevant CBA "incorporated a sexual harassment
policy, which imposed a duty on GM, the individual defendants, and the [union]
to identify and resolve harassment complaints. In addition, the CBA specified
that sexual harassment claims were subject to its grievance and arbitration
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emotional distress claim does not depend on an interpretation of
the CBA, and thus is independent of the CBA.13
In similar cases, the Supreme Court has held that claims based
on emotional injury are not preempted by federal labor laws. In
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.
Ct. 1410, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1987), the Court held that a railroad
employee's claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
("FELA")14 that he had experienced "emotional suffering" from his
employer's "failure `to provide [him] with a safe place to work,
including, but not limited to, having fellow employees harass,
threaten, [and] intimidate [him]'" was not preempted by the RLA.
Id. at 559, 107 S. Ct. at 1412.15 In Farmer v. United Brotherhood
procedures." DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 217. Thus, General Motors arguably did no more
than insist upon rights created by and contained in the CBA.
13
See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38
F.3d 1392, 1401 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that LMRA did not preempt a
discrimination claim because CBA did not create any rights or duties related to
discrimination, and comparing holding to its previous determination "that an
employee's tort claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was not
subject to preemption, because reference to the CBA was unnecessary to determine
the duty of care owed").
14
The Court in Hawaiian Airlines noted:
Buell, of course, involved possible RLA preclusion of a cause of
action arising out of a federal statute, while [Hawaiian Airlines]
involves RLA preemption of a cause of action arising out of state
law and existing entirely independent of the collective bargaining
agreement. That distinction does not rob Buell of its force in this
context. Principles of federalism demand no less caution in finding
that a federal statute preempts state law.
Hawaiian Airlines, ___ U.S. at ___ n.6, 114 S. Ct. at 2247 n.6 (citation
omitted).
15
The Court in Buell noted that while there are policy arguments for
arbitration, "`different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees to individual workers.'" Id. at 565, 107 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737, 101 S. Ct.
1437, 1442, 67 L. Ed. 2d 641 (1981)); see also Hawaiian Airlines, ___ U.S. at
___, 114 S. Ct. at 2247.
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of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S. Ct. 1056, 51 L. Ed. 2d
338 (1977), the Court held that a state-law claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by federal labor
law because "the State has a substantial interest in regulation of
the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not
threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme."
Id. at 302, 97 S. Ct. at 1064 ("With respect to [plaintiff's]
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we cannot
conclude that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie in
the Board.").
Hirras' state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is independent of the CBA because its resolution does not
require an interpretation of the CBA. Therefore, we hold that this
claim is not preempted by the RLA's arbitration provisions.
III
Second, Hirras argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris supports her contention that her Title
VII claim is not preempted by the mandatory arbitration provisions
of the RLA. Because Amtrak has waived its contention that this
claim must be arbitrated, we also reverse the district court's
dismissal of Hirras' Title VII claim.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND to the
district court for consideration of Hirras' intentional infliction
of emotional distress and Title VII claims.
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