Williams v. Dixie Specialty Ins ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 95-60165
Summary Calendar
_____________________
BOBBY WILLIAMS
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
DIXIE SPECIALTY INSURANCE, INC.; STAR INSURANCE COMPANY;
WORLDWIDE WEATHER INSURANCE AGENCY
Defendants - Appellees
_______________________________________________________
_________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:93cv447BN)
_________________________________________________________________
April 16, 1996
Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Bobby Williams brought a breach of contract action against
Dixie Specialty Insurance, Inc. ("Dixie"), Star Insurance Company
("Star"), and Worldwide Weather Insurance Agency ("Worldwide"),
(collectively, the "Defendants"), for compensatory and punitive
damages arising out of an agreement for rain insurance coverage
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
for an outdoor concert. Williams appeals the district court's
granting of the Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of
law and denial of his motion for judgment as a matter of law, or
in the alternative, for a new trial. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams contacted Alberta Gibson about purchasing rain
insurance for an outdoor concert that he was promoting. The
concert was to be held on June 7, 1992, at Kickapoo Park in Hinds
County, Mississippi. On May 26, 1992, Williams, a resident of
Jackson, Mississippi, and Gibson, an employee of State-wide
General Insurance Agency ("State-wide"), submitted an application
for a quote through Dixie to Worldwide. State-wide was a
licensed independent insurance agency operating in Mississippi.
Dixie was a Mississippi corporation and a wholesale insurance
broker. Worldwide was an out-of-state corporation and the
managing agent of Star. Star was a Michigan corporation.
Williams signed an application for rain insurance dated May 28,
1992. There was conflicting evidence as to how the application
was completed. Gibson testified that she completed the
application according to Williams's instructions. Williams
testified that Gibson discussed all of the questions with him
except one; he claimed that Gibson did not ask the question
pertaining to where the rain was to be measured. As to this
question, Gibson checked the space on the application
corresponding to "Closest National Hourly Weather Station."
2
Additionally, in response to the options listed under the heading
"Measurement of weather peril against: Rain," Gibson checked "1/2
inch (.50) or more." With regard to "Coverage Format for Rain
Only," Gibson checked "Consecutive Dry Hours" and included a "6"
in parenthesis next to her check mark.2 Williams sent the
application for insurance to Worldwide, along with a check in the
amount of $3000--10% of the $30,000 coverage requested. Williams
testified that he did not read the application.
On June 3, 1992, Star issued a Commercial Inland Marine
Weather Insurance Policy to Williams whereby Star agreed to
indemnify Williams for loss in the amount of $30,000 caused by
.50 inches or more of rainfall on June 7, 1992 between the hours
of 12 p.m. and 7 p.m. as recorded at the closest national hourly
weather station. The closest national hourly weather station was
the government weather station located at the Jackson Airport,
2
The claims adjuster for Star testified that consecutive
dry hours "means that there are so many hours in a row that are
dry." The Director of special events at Worldwide testified that
"1/2 inch" and "consecutive dry hours," are "two entirely
different types of coverage." She stated: "Either you have half
inch or you have consecutive; you can't have both. . . .
[C]onsecutive dry hours is purchased only by film commercials or
movie productions." She added that consecutive dry hours
coverage is offered at a 55% rate--or approximately $17,000 for
$30,000 worth of coverage, as opposed to the 10% rate charged for
.50 inches coverage--$3,000 for $30,000 worth of coverage.
Although both the quote given by Worldwide and the insurance
policy issued by Star specified .50 inches coverage and made no
mention of consecutive dry hours coverage, the insurance
application stated that the application would "BE ATTACHED TO AND
MADE PART OF THE POLICY." Adding to the confusion regarding
whether Williams's policy included consecutive dry hours coverage
and, if so, to what extent, was the response on the application
specifying "6" consecutive dry hours coverage, despite the fact
that the application indicated the event was to take place
between 12 p.m. and 7 p.m.--seven hours.
3
approximately twenty miles from the concert site. The Director
of special events at Worldwide testified that the policy was
faxed to Dixie three days before the concert. The policy was not
delivered to Williams until after the day of the concert.
Williams was unable to proceed with the concert on June 7,
1992, due to rain at the site. There was no measurement of rain
taken on location with any type of gauge. Earl Gasson, a retired
meteorologist living approximately three miles from Kickapoo
Park, recorded approximately .84 inches of rainfall at his home
during the twenty-four hour period from 6 a.m. on the morning of
June 7, to 6 a.m. on the morning of June 8. Gasson testified
that he did not know how much rain fell at the concert site.
Williams made a claim for benefits under the policy issued
by Star. He calculated that the out-of-pocket expenses he
incurred as a result of the cancellation of the concert totalled
$30,160.96. Star denied the claim because less than .50 inches
of rain was measured during the time period at the location
specified in the policy.
On June 4, 1993, Williams filed suit against Star, Dixie,
and Worldwide in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District
of Hinds County, Mississippi. Claiming breach of contract,
Williams sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages for
alleged losses sustained as a result of Star's failure to pay his
claim under the rain insurance policy. He alleged that Dixie and
Worldwide were agents of Star. The Defendants removed the case
to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
4
Mississippi. Additionally, the Defendants filed a third-party
complaint against State-Wide.
Williams filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
in order to add an independent state law claim against Dixie for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The United States
Magistrate Judge denied Williams leave to file his amended
complaint. Williams filed a Motion to Remand the case to state
court alleging that Defendants' removal was improper. Denying
Williams's motion to remand, the court found that there was no
possibility that Williams could establish a cause of action
against Dixie in state court because Williams asserted no
independent tort by Dixie and under Mississippi law an agent for
a disclosed principal cannot be liable for breach of contract by
his principal.
Trial of the lawsuit began on December 15, 1994. After
Williams rested, he moved for a directed verdict on the issue of
liability and the Defendants moved for Judgment as a Matter of
Law. The district court denied Williams's motion and granted in
part the motion of the Defendants. The court ruled that no proof
had been presented from which a reasonable jury could find that
either Dixie or Worldwide had done anything that would entitle
Williams to obtain a judgment against them. Ruling that both
Dixie and Worldwide were agents for Star--a disclosed principal,
the district court dismissed all of Williams's claims against
them.
5
Additionally, the district court granted Star's Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law with regard to Williams's claims for
extra-contractual and punitive damages and Williams's claims for
coverage under the insurance policy for .50 inches or more of
rain. The remaining issue to be presented to the jury was
whether the insurance policy provided coverage for consecutive
dry hours. Williams and Star settled on this issue and the
district court's Final Judgment and Order was entered on December
16, 1993. Williams filed a Renewal of Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial, which the
district court denied. On February 28, 1995, Williams timely
filed his Notice of Appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
In the instant appeal, Williams asks this court to reverse
the district court and to remand his cause for a new trial on the
question of extra-contractual and punitive damages. It is well-
settled under Mississippi law that punitive damages are
appropriate only in the rare and extreme case. Greer v.
Burkhardt, 58 F.3d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1995). "[T]hey should be
allowed only with caution and within narrow limits." Beta Beta
Chapter of Beta Theta Pi Fraternity v. May, 611 So. 2d 889, 894
(Miss. 1992). "[B]efore punitive damages may be recovered from
an insurer, the insured must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the insurer acted with (1) malice, or (2) gross
negligence or reckless disregard for the rights of others." Hans
6
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 995 F.2d 53, 55 (5th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So.
2d 290, 293 (Miss. 1992)). Punitive damages are unavailable if
the insurance company had a legitimate or arguable reason for
failing to pay a claim. Id.; Guy v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.,
894 F.2d 1407, 1411 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Standard Life Ins.
Co. v. Veal, 354 So. 2d 239, 248 (Miss. 1977)). An insurer is
also shielded from extra-contractual damages--e.g. reasonable
attorney fees, court costs, and other economic losses--where
there was an arguable reason for denying a claim. Hans v.
Phoenix, 995 F.2d at 56.
Williams raises two sets of issues for consideration on
appeal: (1) whether the district court committed reversible
error by limiting the introduction of certain evidence--evidence
of extra-contractual and punitive damages, and certain evidence
offered for impeachment purposes; and (2) whether the district
court erred in finding that Star had an arguable reason to deny
payment of Williams's claim. We address these issues in turn.
A. Excluded Evidence
The district court ruled in the instant case that evidence
of extra-contractual and punitive damages could be presented only
after a finding of bad faith. The court based this ruling on the
provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65, which states in
pertinent part:
(1) In any action in which punitive damages are sought:
. . . .
(b) . . . the trier of fact shall first determine
whether compensatory damages are to be awarded and in
7
what amount, before addressing any issues related to
punitive damages.
(c) If, but only if, an award of compensatory damages
has been made against a party, the court shall promptly
commence an evidentiary hearing before the same trier
of fact to determine whether punitive damages may be
considered.
(d) The court shall determine whether the issue of
punitive damages may be submitted to the trier of fact;
and, if so, the trier of fact shall determine whether
to award punitive damages and in what amount.
. . . .
(2) The provisions of Section 11-1-65 shall not apply
to:
(a) Contracts; . . .
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65.3On appeal, Williams argues that limiting the introduction of
evidence of extra-contractual and punitive damages was reversible
error.4 However, Williams did not object to this ruling either
prior to or during the trial. Williams first objected to the
3
Williams contends that his claims fell outside the
statute because of the exclusion set forth in § 11-1-65(2)(a).
However, in an action based upon the bad faith of an insurance
company, such as the case sub judice, "punitive damages may not
be awarded in the absence of finding an independent tort separate
from the breach of contract." Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172, 1186 (Miss. 1990) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
To the extent that the district court followed the guidance
of § 11-1-65 in this case, we find that it committed no
reversible error. See Dixie Ins. Co. v. Mooneyhan, No. 91-CA-
01124-SCT., 1996 WL 97535, at *12 & *18 n.1 (Miss. March 7, 1996)
(noting, in case regarding punitive damages on bad faith denial
of insurance claim, that "the Mississippi Legislature has passed
a statute setting out procedures to be followed in actions where
punitive damages are sought. . . . § 11-1-65").
4
Prior to rendering judgment, the district court
determined that it correctly bifurcated the trial in regard to
punitive damages but that it should have allowed proof as to bad-
faith extra-contractual damages to be presented during Williams's
case in chief. The court determined that this error was
harmless, however, because Williams did not prove a case for
either punitive or extra-contractual damages.
8
district court's ruling to bifurcate the extra-contractual and
punitive damages in his motion for a new trial. Because Williams
did not move for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of
extra-contractual and punitive damages at the close of all the
evidence,5 his post-trial motion on this issue was not properly
raised. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. This court will not consider on
appeal an issue not properly raised in the proceedings below
unless it involves a pure legal question and the failure to
consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice. Auster Oil
& Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 835 F.2d 597, 601 (5th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 486 U.S. 1027, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988).
We find that failure to consider the bifurcation of extra-
contractual and punitive damages from Williams's case in chief
would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, we need
not address this issue further.
As to the issue of excluded impeachment evidence, Williams
argues that the district court erred in preventing him from
introducing two affidavits for the purpose of impeaching Gibson.
The court excluded the evidence, ruling: "That testimony, even
if it is used for impeachment purposes, is improper under [Fed.
R. Evid.] 404(b). Also under the circumstances of this case, its
probative value is outweighed by the prejudice that it would have
. . . ." In contrast to the issue of extra-contractual and
5
At the close of his own case in chief, Williams moved
for a directed verdict on the issue of liability.
9
punitive damages evidence, we consider this issue because
Williams properly preserved error in the district court.
We review the evidentiary rulings of the district court
under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Kelly v.
Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1995).
We will not reverse such evidentiary rulings unless they are
erroneous and substantial prejudice results. Fed. R. Evid.
103(a). The burden of proving substantial prejudice lies with
the party asserting error. FDIC v. Mijalis, 15 F.3d 1314, 1318-
19 (5th Cir. 1994).
As to the affidavits excluded by the district court, we find
that reversal is inappropriate. We conclude that none of
Williams's evidentiary arguments warrant reversal of the district
court's judgment.6
B. Arguable Reason to Deny Payment
We review the district court's ruling on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same legal
standard as did the trial court. Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d
1285, 1300 (5th Cir. 1994); Omnitech Int'l, Inc. v. Clorox Co.,
11 F.3d 1316, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1994). Judgment as a matter of
law is proper after "a party has been fully heard on an issue and
6
Additionally, Williams maintains that the dismissal of
Worldwide and Dixie was improper. Beyond noting this in a
footnote, however, he does not address this issue.
The district court ruled that, because Dixie and Worldwide
were agents for Star--a disclosed principal, no proof had been
presented from which a reasonable jury could find that either
Dixie or Worldwide had done anything that would entitle Williams
to obtain a judgment against them. We find that the dismissal of
Worldwide and Dixie was not improper.
10
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue."
Fed R. Civ. P. 50(a). In evaluating such a motion, we view the
entire trial record in the light most favorable to the non-movant
and draw all inferences in its favor. Conkling, 18 F.3d at 1300;
Omnitech, 11 F.3d at 1322-23. "The decision to grant a directed
verdict is not a matter of discretion, but a conclusion of law
based upon a finding that there is insufficient evidence to
create a fact question for the jury." Conkling, 18 F.3d at 1300;
Omnitech, 11 F.3d at 1322-23 (citations, ellipsis, and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In insurance contract cases, it is up to the trial court to
decide whether the issue of punitive damages should be submitted
to the jury. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.
2d 1172, 1187 (Miss. 1990). To this end, the trial court "is
responsible for reviewing all evidence before it." Lewis v.
Equity Nat. Life Ins. Co., 637 So. 2d 183, 185 (Miss. 1994)
(quoting Veasley, 610 So. 2d at 293). The trial court should
refuse to grant an instruction on the issue of punitive damages
where the insurer had a legitimate or arguable reason for denying
the claim. Id. "An arguable reason is one in support of which
there is some credible evidence. There may well be evidence to
the contrary. A person is said to have an arguable reason for
acting if there is some credible evidence that supports the
conclusions on the basis of which he acts." Guy, 894 F.2d at
1411 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Campbell, 466 So. 2d
11833, 851 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing)). Williams contends that Star had no arguable reason
to deny his claim because the insurance policy was ambiguous. He
argues that the policy was ambiguous because it was unclear
whether he had .50 inches coverage or consecutive dry hours
coverage or both. Because an ambiguous contract must be
construed against the drafter--the Defendants, in this case,
Banks v. Banks, 648 So. 2d 1116, 1121 (Miss. 1994), Williams
contends that there could be no arguable reason for Star to deny
his claim. Notwithstanding the ambiguous policy, this argument
is unpersuasive. See Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist. v.
Continental Casualty Co. & CNA, 632 F. Supp. 295, 304 (N.D. Miss.
1986) (finding that insurer had a reasonably arguable basis to
deny payment on claims despite ambiguity in policy). The
district court found that:
[i]n this case there are in fact two ambiguities. One
is as to whether there is one coverage or two types of
coverage; the other is in regard to the consecutive dry
hours coverage as to whether or not that coverage is to
be gauged by how much rain fell at the airport during
the time period in question.
The second ambiguity did not arise as a result of imperfect
drafting but as a result of factual circumstances peculiar to
this case.7 The district court found that Star had an arguable
reason to decline consecutive dry hours coverage because of this
7
The Director of special events at Worldwide testified
that the paperwork for consecutive dry hours coverage is
different than that for .50 inches coverage, and that it includes
a definition of "consecutive dry hours." The policy form issued
to Williams did not mention or include a definition of
"consecutive dry hours."
12
fact-based ambiguity. We conclude that the ambiguities regarding
Williams's coverage did not justify submitting the issues of
extra-contractual and punitive damages to the jury.
Under certain circumstances, despite the presence of an
arguable reason to deny the claim, the issues of extra-
contractual and punitive damages may be submitted to the jury.8
Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 185. "For example, an insurer who denies a
claim on an arguable basis could conceivably be held for punitive
damages if the insured's financial straits were used as
settlement leverage," Andrew Jackson, 566 So. 2d at 1186, or if
the insured committed "sufficiently repugnant acts in dealing
with the insured and the disputed claim." Id. The Mississippi
Supreme Court has enumerated several other such circumstances,
"including those where the insurer (1) denies a claim because of
a material misrepresentation by its own agent, (2) denies a claim
without proper investigation, (3) inordinately delays processing
the claim, and (4) engages in `post-claim under-writing.'"
Greer, 58 F.3d at 1074 (citing Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 186-89).
Williams argues that the "lying exception" is applicable in
the instant case. This exception arises when an insurance
company's defense "is based wholly on the issue of the
truthfulness of the insurance company's witnesses." Blue Cross,
8
Conversely, "[s]ubmission of the punitive-damages issue
may not be warranted--notwithstanding an absence of an arguable
basis for the denial or breach." Andrew Jackson, 566 So. 2d at
1185. Moreover, even where the insurer is not liable for
punitive damages, an award of extra-contractual damages may be
proper upon presentation of sufficient proof. Id. at 1186 n.13.
13
466 So. 2d at 852 (Robertson, J., concurring in denial of
rehearing). The lying exception is "operative only where the
jury is asked to reject on grounds of deliberate falsehood or
fabrication the insurer's defense to the underlying contract
claim." Id.
Williams also argues that Star did not properly investigate
his claim. The Mississippi Supreme Court has "established that
the denial of a claim without proper investigation may give rise
to punitive damages. [It has] recognized that an insurance
company has a duty to the insured to make a reasonably prompt
investigation of all relevant facts." Lewis, 637 So. 2d at 187
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In the health
insurance context, one Mississippi court found that as a part of
an insurance company's investigation, the insurance company must
interview its agents and employees to determine whether they have
knowledge relevant to the claim. Id. (citing Eichenseer v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 1355, 1366 (N.D. Miss. 1988),
aff'd, 881 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds,
499 U.S. 914 (1991)).
In the instant case, the measurement of rainfall at the
airport was critical to the denial of Williams's claim. Star's
claims adjuster testified that he denied Williams's claim based
on an examination of the insurance policy, a memo from the
Director of special events at Worldwide, a note and radar maps
supplied by Earl Gasson, and the rainfall records of the Jackson
Airport. Williams charges that, when Gibson was filling out the
14
insurance application for him, she did not offer Williams the
opportunity to choose a different location from which to measure
the rain,9 and that, during his investigation, Star's claims
adjuster did not talk to Gibson about the choice of "Closest
National Hourly Weather Station." We find that, with regard to
the lying exception and improper investigation, Williams's
arguments are meritless. "Any plaintiff asking for punitive
damages, or any special or extraordinary damages based upon `bad
faith' of an insurance company has a heavy burden." Hans Const.
Co., Inc. v. Drummond, 653 So. 2d 253, 263 (Miss. 1995). There
must be a finding of an independent tort--a finding of "bad
faith-plus" before punitive damages may be awarded. Andrew
Jackson, 566 So. 2d at 1188. Ordinary torts do not rise to the
"heightened level of an independent tort." Id. at 1186 (quoting
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simpson, 477 So. 2d 242, 250
(Miss. 1985)). Although the Defendants may have made mistakes in
handling Williams's coverage, there is no indication that the
Defendants or any of their employees deliberately made any
misrepresentations. The district court determined, in
particular, that there was no indication that Gibson acted in a
fraudulent or misleading manner.
9
In addition to "Closest National Hourly Weather
Station," the only option offered on the insurance application in
regard to a recording location was "Independent Weather Observer
on Location." As to this option the application noted,
"Independent Weather Observers are available on request at least
14 days prior to the event if you do not have access to a
qualified Independent Weather Observer." Williams submitted his
application for a quote on May, 26, 1992--less than fourteen days
before the concert, which was scheduled for June 7, 1992.
15
Furthermore, the investigation conducted by Star was not so
cursory as to rise to the level of gross or willful wrongdoing.
"[T]he mere fact that an investigation of a claim is deficient or
incompetent is not sufficient to establish malice, gross
negligence, or reckless disregard of the rights of the insured."
Guy, 894 F.2d at 1413 (citing Fedders Corp. v. Boatright, 493 So.
2d 301, 312 (Miss. 1986); Bellefonte Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 358 So.
2d 387, 391 (Miss. 1978)). In the instant case, the Defendants
could have handled Williams's insurance coverage with more
insight and skill--both at the application stage and the
investigation stage. "The totality of the circumstances,
however, does not suggest more than an unfortunate episode of a
failure of competence." Veasley, 610 So. 2d at 294 (holding that
insurer's denial of life insurance claim was result of mistake
and did not rise to level of gross negligence so as to justify
punitive damages award).
Finally, Williams acknowledged that he never read the
completed insurance application before he submitted it to
Worldwide.10 "Under Mississippi law, unless a party was induced
not to read the contract or have it read to him by fraudulent
representations made by another party, he will be required to
abide by its terms." Pedersen v. Chrysler Life Ins. Co., 677 F.
Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Miss. 1988). "A person is under an
obligation to read a contract before signing it, and will not as
10
Williams also testified that he did not read any of the
contracts he entered into with the entertainers scheduled to
perform at his Kickapoo Park concert.
16
a general rule be heard to complain of an oral misrepresentation
the error of which would have been disclosed by reading the
contract." Godfrey, Bassett & Kuykendall Architects, Ltd. v.
Huntington Lumber & Supply Co., Inc., 584 So. 2d 1254, 1257
(Miss. 1991). We conclude that the lying exception does not
apply to this case--nor does the improper investigation exception
or any of the other exceptions to the arguable basis rule.
Viewing the trial record in the light most favorable to Williams
and drawing all inferences in his favor, we find that the conduct
of the Defendants in denying Williams's rain insurance claim did
not justify submitting the issues of extra-contractual and
punitive damages to the jury.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
17