Woods v. Johnson ( 1996 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-40039
Summary Calendar
_____________________
MICHAEL JAY WOODS, STEVEN RAY TOWNSEND,
and HENRY KATSURO GILBERT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; ALLAN
B. POLUNSKY, Chairman; GARY JOHNSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Texas
(C-95-CV-622)
_______________________________________________________
July 17, 1996
Before REAVLEY, DUHÉ and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The above prisoners, all proceeding pro se, filed a civil
rights action against the executive officials responsible for the
Texas prison system pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and
1986. The prisoners sought injunctive relief and class
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The district court
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule
47.5.4.
determined the prisoners’ claims lacked an arguable basis in law
and dismissed the complaint as frivolous. The prisoners appeal.
We affirm.
The prisoners have brought forth two basic allegations.
First, they assert that the prison grooming regulations violate
their freedom of expression. Second, they assert that the
different grooming regulations for male and female prisoner in
the Texas prison system violate the Equal Protection Clause. An
in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed as frivolous if it
lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.1 We review a § 1915(d)
dismissal for an abuse of discretion.2
The prisoners argue that prison regulations governing length
of hair and the presence of facial hair violate their right of
freedom of expression. They also contend that these regulations
serve no legitimate purpose. We disagree. We have noted, as
have other courts, that prison regulations concerning hair length
are rationally related to the goal of preventing the concealment
of weapons and contraband in hair and beards.3 It also serves a
1
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728,
1733 (1992); Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 (5th Cir. 1994).
2
Denton, 112 S. Ct. at 1734.
3
Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 25 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, Harrison v. McKaskle, 506 U.S. 1025 (1992); see Iron Eyes
v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990); Fromer v. Scully, 874
F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989); Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 987 (1988); Martinelli v. Dugger,
817 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987), 484 U.S. 1012 (1988). The
2
purpose of preventing difficulties which arise in the
identification of prisoners.4 The prison regulations are
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.5
Next, the prisoners assert that the disparate grooming
regulations for male and female inmates in Texas violate the
Equal Protection Clause. However, again, we have previously held
this not to be true.6 As we have previously decided both issues
against the prisoners, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing their claims as frivolous.
Affirmed.
inmates insist that these weapons could just as easily be hidden
in other places such as shirts or pants, therefore, there is no
legitimate reason to establish grooming regulations. We
disagree. We believe that the elimination of one of three
locations a prisoner can hide a weapon is a valid regulation that
is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”
4
Powell, 959 F.2d at 25.
5
Id.
6
Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976); see also
Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 910 (1991) (denial of male prisoner right to attend classes
at female prison did not violate Equal Protection Clause). We
add that the same penological interests of security which
validated the grooming regulation against a freedom of expression
claim, validate the claim as to an equal protection challenge.
3