Lenoir v. Apfel ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60735
Summary Calendar
CENTRY LENOIR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KENNETH S. APFEL,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 4:98-CV-111-LN
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September 14, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Centry Lenoir, appeals the district court’s judgment
affirming the Commissioner's denial of his applications for
disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income.
This court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
determining whether the Commissioner used proper legal standards to
evaluate the evidence and whether the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. See Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th
Cir. 2000).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-60735
-2-
Lenoir contends that the ALJ erred in assessing his
residual functional capacity because the ALJ failed to evaluate his
complaints of pain according to the factors set forth in Social
Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p. Lenoir also challenges, as
unsupported by substantial evidence, the ALJ’s finding that his
complaints of pain were not credible. A review of the record
indicates that the ALJ adequately addressed the factors set forth
in SSR 96-7p. The ALJ’s decision included express findings about
the credibility of Lenoir’s complaints of pain and gave specific
reasons for the credibility finding based on the case record,
including Lenoir’s medical records and Lenoir’s own statements.
The ALJ’s findings were sufficiently specific to make clear the
ALJ’s reasons for his credibility conclusion. A review of the
record also indicates that there is substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s determination that Lenoir’s complaints of pain and its
impact on his ability to work were not fully credible.
Lenoir challenges as unsupported by substantial evidence,
the ALJ’s finding that jobs exist in the national economy which he
is able to perform. He contends that the ALJ was not entitled to
rely on the testimony of the vocational expert in making that
determination because the ALJ did not include all of his disabling
conditions in the hypothetical question that was presented to the
vocational expert. Lenoir also argues that the vocational expert
failed to identify adequately jobs that he could perform that were
available in the national economy.
Contrary to Lenoir’s assertions, the ALJ included all of
Lenoir’s disabling conditions in the hypothetical question that he
No. 99-60735
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presented to the vocational expert. Also contrary to Lenoir’s
assertions, the vocational expert specifically identified a number
of jobs that Lenoir could perform and indicated that those jobs
existed in significant numbers in both the national economy and in
Mississippi. The ALJ was entitled to rely on that testimony to
determine that jobs existed in the national economy that Lenoir was
able to perform. The ALJ’s determination was supported by
substantial evidence.
Finally, Lenoir argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to remand the case to the Commissioner for the
consideration of new evidence which he contends would have changed
the Commissioner’s decision. Lenoir sought to have considered
medical records from examinations which took place on October 13,
1998, and on November 30, 1998. The evidence, which is largely
cumulative, shows at best a deterioration of a previously non-
disabling condition. There is no reasonable probability that the
new evidence would have affected the ALJ’s determination that
Lenoir was not disabled at the time of the original hearing.
Moreover, the evidence does not relate to the time period for which
Lenoir’s benefits were denied. See Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d
1463, 1471 (5th Cir. 1989); Pierre v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 803
(5th Cir. 1989). Remand can not be based on new evidence of a
subsequent deterioration of what was previously correctly held to
be a non-disability condition. See Haywood, 888 F.2d at 1471. The
district court did not err in determining that Lenoir’s new
evidence did not warrant remand.
AFFIRMED.